LA PHENOMENALITE DE L’AME CHEZ MALEBRANCHE ENTRE IDEE ET SENTIMENT: <br />L’ARGUMENT DU MANCHOT
Cuvinte cheie:
objective reality of the idea, Cartesian Cogito, representation, perception, feelingRezumat
The long controversy between Malebranche and Arnauld had as its subject the status of the objective reality of the idea. The stakes in this dispute largely exceeds the framework of a simple theory of knowledge, because the profound implications invoke the original definition of the Cartesian Cogito. Michel Henry argues that Malebranche has opposed the original definition of the Cartesian Cogito as feeling („videor videri”), while Jean-Cristophe Bardout tries to prove that the feeling is restored in the late works of Malebranche. This article attempts to analyze the famous argument of the amputee in order to determine whether Malebranche has really restored the role of feeling in his latest works.
Referințe
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