SOME PROBLEMS REGARDING<br />THE DISQUOTATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON TRUTH
Mots-clés :
formal semantics, deflationism, disquotational truth theory, T-sentence, TarskiRésumé
According to the proponents of disquotationalism, „being true” is ‚strongly’ equivalent to „being a device of (sentential) disquotation”. This means, on the one hand, that the disquo-tational use of the truth predicate covers everything there is to say about truth, and on the other hand, that the disquotational axioms are warranted. I am expanding these issues by pointing out the main features of the disquotational theories of truth, their formation from Tarski’s „concept of truth” (on the basis of an elementary intuition about truth present from Aristotle’s philosophy on), I give an interpretation of the way they build their truth predi-cate and I present some arguments and counter-arguments for or against the deflated con-ception of truth, based on the requirement of analyticity of the T-sentences.Références
Hartry Field, „Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content”, in Hartry Field, Truth and the Absence of the Fact, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 104-140
Hartry Field, „Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse”, in Har-try Field, Truth and the Absence of the Fact, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 222-258
Anil Gupta, „Truth and Paradox“, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 11, 1982, pp. 1-6
Anil Gupta; Nuel Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, MIT Press, Cambridge, London, 1993
Volker Halbach, Semantics and Deflationism, unpublished Habilitationsschrift, 2001
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Casimir Lewy, „Truth and Significance”, Analysis, vol. 8, 1947, pp. 24-27
Alfred Tarski, „The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages”, in Alfred Tar-ski, Logic, Semantics, Metamatematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938, 2. ed., Hackett, Indianapolis, 1983, pp. 152-278
Alfred Tarski, „The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Se-mantics”, in Steven R. Givant, Ralph N. McKenzie (eds.), Alfred Tarski, Collected Papers, Volume 2 (1935 – 1944), Birkhäuser, Basel, Boston, Stuttgart, pp. 665-699