MENTAL STATES IN THE BRAIN: A CRITIQUE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES
Mots-clés :
cognitive sciences, implementation conception, functionalization, syntax of Men-talese, real patterns, architecture of the brain.Résumé
In this text we shall criticize a certain cognitive position about the relation between mental states and the brain. Our target is the claim, found in many cognitive theories, that mind is implemented in the brain, that is, that mind results from the brain’s processing of symbols. We argue from a philosophical position that the image of brain as a symbolic engine is false. The brain does not have to work with symbols in order to produce mind. The text is divided in three chapters: the first chapter sketches the sources of implementation thesis; the second chapter shows the problems met by such a thesis; the third chapter discusses the consequences of this critique for mental realism. As a first general remark, our critique of cognitive sciences is based on some well known ideas of John Searle. Especially, we have developed some ideas found in the chapters 9 and 10 of his The Rediscovery of the Mind, 1992.
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