OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE AS INTERSUBJECTIVE AGREEMENT
Keywords:Rorty, objectivity, scientific knowledge, representation, truth, vocabulary, ho-lism
AbstractIn this paper, I will show how Richard Rorty’s critiques of objectivity fail to explain some degrees of objectivity that are achieved through scientific knowledge. On the one hand, I will analyze Rorty’s objections to the classical view on epistemic values (such as truth, justification or objectivity). On the other hand, I will try a critical approach on Rorty’s solution to the problem of objectivity. I will argue that Rorty is right in emphasizing that knowledge has an important social component but his dismissal of the classical desiderata, out of which the most important one is the possibility of a direct confrontation with the reality, is rather hard to accept.
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