Gerard STAN


The main purpose of this investigation is to identify counterarguments that can be made to the idea of truth understood as warranted assertability. From my point of view, this approach of truth has a number of drawbacks: the concept of assertability is unclear; there is no overlap between the meaning of the concept of truth and the concept of warranted assertability; warranted assertability may be equated with the local epistemic consensus, paving the way for epistemic relativism; warranted assertability involves a confusion between truth and foundation of knowledge; the theorists of warranted assertability accept as unproblematic the idea that we can talk about a „complete theory‟ or a „final stage of the research‟. My belief is that the idea of truth understood as warranted assertability has some undeniable merits: it promotes a fallible image about knowledge, it emphasizes that every epistemic effort depends on certain standards of foundation and it highlights that the possibility of reaching the truth depends on the efforts of the researcher to test and to found his opinions.


truth; warranted assertability; pragmatism; epistemic relativism; epistemic consensus

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