FROM A MATRIX OF PUBLIC POLICIES ANALYSIS
AT NEW RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES

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Rezumat
Analiza politicilor publice s-a realizat de-a lungul timpului din perspectiva unor paradigme diferite: instituționalism, developmentalism, neo-instituționalism sau sistemism, paradigme care au ridicat semne de întrebare în privința posibilității de a oferi o imagine exhaustivă asupra ciclului și a procesului politicilor publice. Dincolo de cadrul general de cercetare, diferitele modele ale luării deciziei în spațiul administrativ (modelulactorului rațional, modelul incremental, modelul organizării birocratice, etc.) aduc cu sine posibilitatea construcției unei matrici de analiză pe o serie de dimensiuni care își propun să ofere o imagine cuprinzătoare asupra ciclului politicilor publice în contextul global al unei lumi caracterizate prin incertitudine. Dimensiunile identificate la nivelul acestui studiu – actori, procese și mecanisme, criterii decizionale și modalități de a raționa și valori și principii – plasează politicile publice într-un cadru nou de analiză care le implică, conturând un univers analitic ce vizează o serie de paradigme noi: cea a comportamentului organizational și a guvernanței collaborative.

Cuvinte-cheie: politici publice, modele decizionale, matrice analitică, actori, raționalitate

Abstract
Public policy analysis was done over time from the perspective of different paradigms: developmentalism, institutionalism, neo-sistemism, institutionalism, but these paradigms have raised question marks about the possibility of providing a comprehensive picture of the lifecycle and process of public policies. Beyond the general framework of research, various models of decision making in administrative area (the rational actor model, incremental model, the model of bureaucratic organization, etc.) bring with them the possibility of building an array of analysis on a number of dimensions, which aim to provide a comprehensive picture of the public policies cycle in the context of a world characterized by uncertainty. Dimensions identified in this study- the actors, the processes and mechanisms, decision-making criteria and ways of reasoning and values and principles-place the public policies in a new frame of analysis that involves them, defining an analytic universe that concerns a number of new paradigms: the organizational behavior and the collaborative governance.

Keywords: public policies, decisional models, analysis matrix, actors, rationality

Résumé
L’analyse des politiques publiques a été fait au fil du temps, du point de vue de différents paradigmes: developmentalism, institutionalism, systemism or neo-institutionalism, des paradigmes qui ont soulevés des points d’interrogation quant à la possibilité de fournir

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une vue d'ensemble du cycle et des processus des politiques publiques. Au-delà du cadre général de recherche, divers modèles de décision en matière administrative (le modèle d'acteur rationnel, le modèle incrémentiel, le modèle d'organisation bureaucratique, etc.) apportent avec eux la possibilité de construire un tableau d'analyse sur un nombre de dimensions, qui visent à fournir une image complète du cycle de la politique publique dans le contexte d'un monde caractérisé par l'incertitude. Les dimensions définies dans cette étude - les acteurs, les processus et les mécanismes, les critères de décision et les modes de raisonnement, les valeurs et les principes - lieux des politiques publiques dans un nouveau cadre d'analyse qui les impliquent, définir un univers analytique qui concerne un certain nombre de nouveaux paradigmes: de comportement organisationnel et de la gouvernance concertée.

**Mots clés:** les politiques publiques, les processus décisionnel, la matrice analytique, les acteurs, la rationalité

### 1. Decision models – overview

Models can be generally defined as simplified structures of a phenomenon, process or as action trying to explain certain processes mentally. Dictionarul Explicativ al Limbii Române (The Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language) shows the polysemy of the term, defining the model as: what may serve as orientation, pattern; theoretic or material system by means of which one may study in an indirect way the properties and changes of another more complex system; simplified representation of a process or system; ideal, logic and mathematic system by means of which one may study, by analogy, the properties of another system; theoretic scheme elaborated in different sciences in order to represent the fundamental items of one or more phenomena or things (Coteanu, 1998, p. 95).

Adrian Miroiu defines the models of the public policies as “simplifying representations of some selected aspects of the issues conceived with precise objectives. Such an issue may take very different forms: from an image of the issue in the analyst’s mind, to precise concepts, diagrams, mathematic equations or computer simulations” (Miroiu, 2002, p. 45).

Starting from the dimensions of the definitions above, some critical notes are meant to be mentioned. In the specialised literature, there are many decision models, but the vision on them is heterogeneous, which makes difficult their research. A short review of them relates to the following types, either they are taken from the field of the public policies or not.

The limited rationality model has the role of placing within the decision process items which belong to the incertitude and the incapacity of the decision maker to always arrive to the best decisions by fault of information, of techniques, of resources and of political support. The incremental model asserts that the decision is not necessarily rational, but satisficient: one does not activate that objective totally rationalised process in order to choose the best public policy, but this is the result of several negotiations and it relates to the context, to the limited time, to the

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examples activated in this administrative space until that moment. The model of the bureaucratic organisation speaks about the cold rationality of the classic bureaucrat, but asserts that in the decision process, there are also other interventions, those of the organisms and their hierarchies, special relationships between the bosses and their staffs, rough negotiation games and political background. The mixed model relates also to a global rationality of the action, of the decision model, and also does not ignore the need to introduce in the decision process, contextual, contingent, particular decisions which pass beyond any logic of the global decision. The overcode model asserts that the decisions are not the result of a rationalised decisional process, but only some decisions that the decision makers take at one moment in time according to common expectations, to the common language used, to the common label, without seeing and global finality in all the decision approach. The model of the punctual equilibrium asserts that the decision process at the level of the public policies is the result of the environmental influences, the environment being especially the politic influences. The garbage can model asserts that the decision is not rational, but it is the result of a random selection of the actors involved in the decision process of some public policy projects, according to the current opportunities. The critical convergence model places the decision process in the sphere of success as long as the actors involved are correctly identified and are involved on each stage of the design of a public policy. One may not recognise a holistic rationality neither at the level of this model, but one may recognise particular rationalities of those involved and of their subsequent involvement. The game model places the decision and the decision process in a world of incertitude, where fault information, insufficient resources at a certain time are modelling the decision process within a game showing both winners and losers or tricksters. From their short presentation, the next aspect which becomes logic at the level of the research is that concerning the research in this field. Their multitude makes difficult their operationalisation, as their degree of relationship and difference between them. The need of an analysis matrix is imposed at a level at least operational.

2. The need for an analytic matrix

The article intends to analyse three models: the rational actor model (Anthony Downs), the incremental model (Charles Lindblom) and the bureaucratic organisation model (Graham Allison), so at the next levels of the analysis (developed in the next chapters), it will place the decision within the space of the personality and of the motivations, of the politics and of the ideologies.

The current perspective, such built, is based on several motivations. First of all, as we previously showed, the specialised literature did not clearly established until now a glossary of the decision models within public policies. Different authors
propose different models, different taxonomies etc. Some are excluded from the very beginning, other are minimised.

Secondly, some models appeared on the field of other disciplines and were taken here, at the level of the public policies, which causes a more or less accepted paternalism of them within the area.

Thirdly, we tried to identify those clearly differentiable models, which are not improvements of some of them, even if we previously insisted on the fact that making a hierarchy approach between them seems to us completely inadequate. Nevertheless, we cannot deny that the limited rationality model is extremely close to the classic one (of the rational actor), or we do not see it necessary to include at the analysis level the mixed model as long as it means a position between the rational and the incremental model. From the analyst’s point of view, we consider that, at the level of an empiric research, the final results could help us arrive to conclusions identifying valences of such a model by the operationalisation of the other two. We consider that the same approach may also apply in the case of the limited rationality, especially as we asserted here that it does not seem to us a standalone model. In fact, such a principle was stipulated also by Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, starting from the comparative analyses of the politic systems (Dogan, Pelassy, 1993, p. 23). Methodologically speaking, the comparison cannot be made between extremely similar systems simply because the results are predictable: the results of such an approach will help us to arrive at the conclusion that those systems are similar, and such a conclusion which is meant to be epistemic is no longer like that.

Fourthly, we considered that the analysis and the operationalisation of the models must refer to those models providing a logic scheme on the entire cycle of the public policies and cannot be subsumed only to a single stage. Or from this perspective, the three models – of the rational actor, incremental and bureaucratic organisation – satisfy this requirement. As long as in the specialised literature, there are authors considering for example that the model of the politic window is a model of agenda settings, even if others do not consider like that, we consider that here, the incrustation of the model becomes problematic and would generate differences between what we proposed to submit to the analytic matrix. Or, as we already mentioned, we want to avoid such differences.

Fifthly, the methodological restraints of the research oblige us to undertake fewer models as long as we propose a vertical research, with clearly established dimensions, subsumed to each individual model.

And sixthly, every research supposes a certain degree of originality specific to its initiator. Not even this analytic approach intends to be a discordant note.

The analytic matrix that we propose here is a systematic and systematised approach of the research itself which has the role to operationalise the models we referred to. The idea of the analytic matrix comes in order to study the general decisional theory, on the one hand, and on the other hand, that of the difference at
the level of the universe of public policies between the cycle of public policies and the analysis of public policies.

What the specialised literature proposes us in the field of decisional theory is the identification at the level of the decisional process of some dimensions: the decision maker, the criteria, the stages and the mechanisms of the decision process etc.

Is the cycle of public policies proposes public policy in action with all its stages (the identification of the issue, the penetration on the agenda, the formulation of solutions in order to solve the issue, the choice of a solution, its implementation and evaluation), the analysis of public policies is an approach which can be external to the public policy, but which can also enclose it at its level, and the analyst of public policies may also identify with the decision maker directly involved (we shall consider here that there is no superposition of functions between both of them). The analysis of the public policies “is a customer oriented advice, relevant for the public decision considering the social values” according to Weimer and Wining’s affirmation (Weimer, Wining, 2004, p. 32). We shall consider here that the analytic matrix is a logic scheme of the public policies analyst (which may interact or not with the directly involved decision maker, in order to come with advices, according to this matrix), necessary to research processes particular to public policies (especially the decisional process), which may provide funded prediction possibilities and which starts from the analysis of public policies.

The relationships between the analytic matrix and the analysis of the public policies provides to the matrix an orientation to the necessary analysis dimensions starting exactly from the second part of the report. Weimer and Wining used to consider that the analysis of a public policy must focus on how a public policy is performed, that is which is the decisional process, which are the objective, if they were achieved or not, what criteria were considered in order to achieve them, who was involved, which were the initial options, which were the values we related to, how is everything assessed in the end (Weimer, Wining, 2004, p. 35). These dimensions of the analysis become dimensions of the matrix.

Strictly methodologically, Rui Mata, von Helversen and Rieskamp are dealing with the need of research strategies when it is about making a decision (Mata et al., 2010, p. 300). The authors identify a series of dimensions that a particular research has to enclose. An analysis of the decisional process means identifying the participants at the decisional process, which is the form of the process (the design of making the decision), which are the tools (“the materials”) (Mata et al., 2010, p. 303) and the necessary relating information, which are the procedures, which are the purposes or the results, which is the classification of strategies, which are the costs and which are the implications of each individual model adopted. What one should remark is the fact that when it is about the values subsumed to the analysis of the models, the authors apply only economic values and the criteria subsumed: costs, efficiency etc.
Starting from the abovementioned aspects, the dimensions relating to the analytic matrix proposed by us will be: the involved actors, the processes and mechanisms, the typology of decisions and the typology of rationality, the principles and values. The choice of such a matrix supposes the assumption of a clearly determined logic. This is supposed to answer to the classic questions: who? what? where? when? how? why?. At the level of the matrix, one must identify the involved actors (who?), the processes (when? where?), the mechanisms (how?), the decisions (what?), the rationality, the principles-criteria and values (why?). Moreover, the concentration on the two dimensions – of the rationality and of the decision – is enhanced by the universe itself of the current analysis. Synthesising in this way the dimensions of the matrix, from this moment it is imposed the operational analysis of each one individually.

3. Dimensions of the analysis matrix

The dimensions relating to the analytic matrix proposed by us – the involved actors, the processes and mechanisms, the typology of decisions and the typology of rationality, the principles and values – will be presented hereinafter in our study.

3.1. Actors

The model of the rational actor proposed by Anthony Downs places to centre the individual mainly seen as economic agent beyond the other feelings or personal sides. This analysis, as the author says, is made in order to legitimate the rational behaviour of the human being. He does not deny the existence of the other dimensions of the individual (motivation, skills etc.), but considers that they do not substantiate the individual’s rationality, rationality understood according to the economic rationality terms. At the same time, the author does not place emotions or feelings outside the individual sphere or outside the sphere of the actor considered to be rational, but asserts that all these dimensions are particular to every individual, so the rational individual has preconceptions and feels emotions. What individualises this type of actor – decision maker is the way he acts, the direction to canalise the subjective part of his personality. It is about that actor (with experiences, feelings, emotions, motivations) who wishes to achieve his objectives in such a way to use, by his competence, the most reduced possible quantity of resources per unit relating to the result he wants to achieve.

Charles Lindblom (2003) proposes to identify the actors involved in the process of decision and of elaboration of the public policies starting from social, economic and politic real situations. By asking himself the common question: who is elaborating a policy? the author answers: “because the presidents, prime-ministers, Council secretaries, ministries, mayors, governors, law givers and bureaucrats are
the most visible parts of the process of elaboration of a policy, they receive a larger attention (...). Obviously, the goods and services are produced by a complex economic system. All of them result from the contribution of millions of people interacting ones with the others” (Lindblom, 2003, p. 15). At individual level, what is primordial at the level of this model is the different optics applied to the individual in relationship with the model of the rational actor. If the first model provides a total trust to the rationality of the individual, here it is supported the incapacity and the impossibility of the individual to solve the issues, to always take good decisions or which aspire to perfection. “Human brain capacity to formulate and to solve complex issues is very reduced, in comparison with the dimension of the issues that he wants to solve in his objective and rational behaviour of real life” (Simon, 1957, p. 138). The individual is characterised by limits of knowledge, of information, of assimilation, of the capacity to choose between good and bad, limits which if you are not aware about can allow the performance of a decisional process and of the elaboration of a policy only in conditions of higher costs than possible. Undoubtedly, the individualist direction is also present at the level of this model and receives a different explanation formula. But beside this, the author recognises the merit that the “leaders” (Lindblom, 2003, p. 12) have in the decisional process; by this term, one may understand the governmental authorities, the interest groups or other entities which may appear anytime during the decisional process both within the institutional sphere and outside it.

According to Graham Allison, the actors involved at the level of this model are not only the politic leaders which are found at the head of organisations, not only the Govers, not only the individuals, but all together and even more than them (see Table no. 1) (Allison, 2010, p. 42).

According to this model, the actors involved in the decision process are the institutions or groups of institutions or even institutionalised individuals, even if the model moves the accent from the dimension of the individual to the institutional or institutionalised dimension. Within this model, the actors are not viewed in a rigid manner, strictly bureaucratised and do not perform their activity only at international level (because the model starts from a historic fact specific to international relationships), but only at the level of the decisional process viewed as national strategic process, regional or local. Nevertheless, the major role at the level of this model is played by the governmental actors together with the individual actors (but institutionalised) or together with the groups.

**3.2. Processes and mechanisms**

The second dimension of the decisional matrix, that of the processes and mechanisms proposes to identify how functions the cycle of taking decisions within the area of public policies, particularly synthesising the differences intervening from a decisional model to another.
Table no. 1: The Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTORS</th>
<th>RATIONAL MODEL</th>
<th>INCREMENTAL MODEL</th>
<th>BUREAUCRATIC ORGANISATION MODEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. constant individual or collective actors</td>
<td>1. as individual and collective actors, new other actors may be involved</td>
<td>1. institutional actors or groups of institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. actors with economic logic</td>
<td>2. actors with a logic of small steps, the economic logic belonging particularly to the interest groups</td>
<td>2. the logic is clearly established by regulations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. decision makers are clearly defined, established</td>
<td>3. decision makers are not clearly established from the very beginning</td>
<td>3. the groups has a clear identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. decision makers are governmental, institutionalised</td>
<td>4. the decision makers may also be from outside the institutions</td>
<td>4. the decision makers are clearly delimited by each department, structure, individual group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. they are not independent (they are parts of the systems)</td>
<td>5. there is a certain degree of decentralisation</td>
<td>5. each department is quasi-independent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rational actor model bases the decisional process starting from the actors who are specific to him (that we previously analysed), that is from the individual-decision maker. From this point of view, the decisional process is performed when the individual:
- clearly established his purposes, the objectives that the decision must achieve
- and has at hand different means to achieve those purposes.

Starting from the two previously enounced actions, the decision at the level of this model is a teleological one, being substantiated by the rationality of the decision maker and, by default, of his action. The distinction between means and purposes is fundamental at the level of this model in order to understand and analyse the behaviour of the decision maker. The purposes have a primordial character in relationship with the decision and means, the last ones being chosen by the actor-decision maker in order to achieve the first ones. The decisional process supposes for the actor to achieve those purposes with the most efficient existent means and to relate to all the possible means in order to achieve the purposes. The choice of the means supposes the existence of a decisional process characterised by rationality.

The decisional process, according to the incremental model, is put from the beginning in the light of ambiguity the public policies are confronted with several times. According to this model, the decisional process is: “imperfect; it cannot fully solve the value-based conflicts and the conflicts of interest; it is too slow and too expensive; one should not say definitively what issues to attack” (Lindblom, 2003, p. 39).
It results from here that the decisional process is not necessarily a comprehensive and operational one, and the decisional objectives may disappear if they have not a certain type of politic support. The process is performed step by step and it develops decisions which improve the current situations even if it supposes the constant come-back and modification of the strategies and means of application, even after they have been started. In a simplified manner, the decisional process supposes the identification of the issue, the search for an alternative which have already been implemented (known), the issue is redefined, the alternative is implemented, and if not functional, another alternative is searched in order to differ very little from what is already known. According to Charles Lindblom, the first issue appearing at the level of the decisional process is the incapacity of the decision makers to arrive at a consensus both between them and relating to the hierarchic superiors and to the citizens who chose them for those titles (Lindblom, 1959, p. 80).

Both in the case of the rational actor model and in the case of the incremental one, there are several models of the black box type, that is one does not take into account the impact that the structure of the public policies has on the decisional process. The bureaucratic model or the organisational model or the model of the bureaucratic organisation proposed by Graham Allison proposed to underline how much the process influences the product. Allison asserts that there may be three different perspectives which may influence the same action or the same decision:

- the perspective of the rational actor according to which the actor – decision maker has clear purposes, the actors, generally, are clearly established, at their turn, they have clear purposes and they choose the best way to achieve them.

- the dimension of the organisational process, according to which the decisions are the result of specialised organisms with different purposes and methods to solve the specific issues, the final solution being found at the crossway of these interactions.

- the bureaucratic policy according to which the decisions are results of the politic processes of negotiation between different power relationships.

From the interaction of these dimensions, practically, it results that complex model of the bureaucratic organisation stressing the impact that the values have on the decisions, as well as the behaviour models met within the large organisations.

The decisional process reflects more the culture of the department, of the origin agency of the decision maker or of the agency he manages, than the rational analysis or the objective evaluation. From this point of view, the decisional process does not involve anymore only the monolith type State decisional actors, the idea of unique purpose and unique interest, but means that the decisions originate from a competitive arena where the balance of the advantage is continuously moving (see Table no. 2).
Table no. 2: Processes and mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. the issue is identified – it is searched the alternative which has already been applied (known) – the issue is redefined – the alternative is put into practice – if not functional, another alternative is searched which may differ very little from what is already known</th>
<th>2. defining the issue – searching for an alternative following a process of negotiation – the choice of an optimal solution recognised by everyone according to some routines – implementing it</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. it is identified the issue – the purposes are hierarchised – there are identified all the alternatives – it is chosen the best – it is applied – the purposes are achieved</td>
<td>2. the change is intended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. the change is intended</td>
<td>3. there are evaluated all the alternatives and then all the consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. the issue is identified – it is searched the alternative which has already been applied (known) – the issue is redefined – the alternative is put into practice – if not functional, another alternative is searched which may differ very little from what is already known</td>
<td>2. keeping the existent policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. it is evaluated the alternative differing the less by what has already been applied</td>
<td>3. 3. Decisional criteria and typologies of decisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decisional criteria at the level of the rational actor model must be deduces, also as in the case of the other dimensions of the matrices analysed until now, but which shall be analysed also from now on, from the processes, mechanisms, typology of the specific rationality of each individual. A characterisation of the decisions specific to the model of the rational actor is deduced starting from the economic rationality, for the incremental model, the decisions will be correlated with the appeal made at a logic of the experience, and for the bureaucratic organisation model, the decisions will follow the line of the processes specific to the power relationships at the highest possible level. The decisions of this rational actor mean the choice of some actions leading to solutions which shall intend the total benefits, irrespective of the present or the future. The decision is a rational one since it intends the achievement of clearly established purposes which belong to a series of values, such as: utility, profit and wealth (see Table no. 3).

The decision within the incremental model seems to be a simplification of the complexity of the decisional process within the rational actor model. The decision follows a dominant common purpose which is a combination of the individual or group purposes, but also the “own vision of the decision maker on the public good” (Lindblom, 2003, p. 43). It supposes the improvement of the most pressing issues and not necessarily the finding of the most innovatory solutions for their resolution, this fact supposing that the final decision is not the result of an exhaustive process, but it supposes only the focus on several political options, even if they are not
extremely attractive. From this point of view, the decisional environment is
recognised as imprecise, dominated by incertitude in relationship with the existent
information, the decisional process is not necessarily continuous, but it supposes
mechanisms of trial and error and then the correction of the error and a new trial,
which leads to a possible fragmentation of the process between the partisans and
even to mechanisms to contest the authority and the hierarchy.

For the third model, the decision appears like the result of some negotiations of
the high level power games and complies with the routines and the norms specific
to this level. The main characteristic of the decision is the strategy, following the
games appearing between the politic leaders involved in the process; it must be
enough precise for solving the issue existing in the public agenda. The stress is not
on the idea of innovation, from the point of view of always finding new solutions,
but effectively on the resolution of the issues needing solutions especially because
of the decisional environment which does not support delays or errors, because the
repercussions may reflect on some multiple actors (especially because the model
itself starts from the concrete case of the international relationships area).

Table no. 3: Criteria to take decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERIA TO TAKE DECISIONS</th>
<th>RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL</th>
<th>INCREMENTAL MODEL</th>
<th>BUREAUCRATIC ORGANISATION MODEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. efficiency</td>
<td>1. progressive improvement (remediation)</td>
<td>1. complying with the rules and procedures, isomorphism, objectivity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. costs and benefits of all the alternatives</td>
<td>2. continuity and stability</td>
<td>2. the benefit of the group beyond the economic logic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. general benefit</td>
<td>3. mutual benefit between the members of the decision making group</td>
<td>3. strong ethic codes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. it does not suppose individual ethic principles</td>
<td>4. the individual ethic principles can be manifested, they can have consequences at the level of the group beyond a general ethics</td>
<td>4. the individual ethic principles are those of loyalty for the heads</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4. Typologies of rationality

The rationality that the rational actor model promotes is the economic type rationality or the instrumental type rationality. This approach supposes the definition of rationality as “efficiency and supposes the maximisation of the results which may be obtained from a certain quantity of resources or the reduction of the quantity of resources necessary to achieve a certain result” (Downs, 2009, p. 37).
The rational individual, according to this model, is that type of individual who does not suppose necessarily the performance of actions or value based judgments by the appeal made only to logic type arguments or according to that type of classic logic, with logic phrases and deductions. This type of individual is not deprived of feelings or emotions, but what prevail for him and for his decisions are the criteria which belong to the economic rationality. The economic rationality is a certain type of instrumental rationality because it is defined in relationship with the means and with the purposes of the action of the decision makers involved in the area of the public policies. According to the rational behaviour, the behaviour of the decision makers supposes a rational process of deliberation and of performance of the actions. The rationality of the decisions and of the decision makers supposes that each actor, according to calculations reducing the costs and maximising the benefits, to take a decision. This decision is the best decision. But in order to arrive to such a rational decision, one should comply with three conditions: the decision makers shall have the individual preferences totally ordered, to own full information about the decisional process and not only and a perfect calculation of costs and benefits.

According to this incremental model, the specific rationality of the actors may be limited, daily or in other words adaptable to every situation and context, erotetic or traditional (see Table no. 4).

**Table no. 4: Typologies of the rationality for decisional models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rational actor model (Downs)</th>
<th>Incremental model (Lindblom)</th>
<th>Bureaucratic organisation model (Allison)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal rationality, cognitive rationality; strategic rationality; technological rationality; instrumental rationality</td>
<td>Every day rationality; Limited rationality; Erotetic rationality; Traditional rationality</td>
<td>Hermeneutic rationality; valuable rationality; rationality as consistent choices; communicative rationality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rationality specific to this model supposes the adaptation to every day situations, it does not start from preconceived purposes established for the decisions which have to be taken, but adapts them and adjusts them incrementally according to each individual situation. It may modify the purposes according to their availability and to the means or vice versa and supposes a rationality of the tiny steps relating to the decisions which must be taken. This type of reason does not intend to make major changes, but insists on previously implemented solutions for the projects of policies, a selection criterion of good decisions being their previous success. This type of rationality is a practical one, because it does not relate to the great theories or to theoretic examples for explaining the behaviour of the decision makers. “The intellectualist approaches of some issues seem to
consider sometimes minor analytic categories or statistic analyses brought to dangerous extremes” (Lindblom, 2003, p. 16).

The bureaucratic organisation model or the mixed model enounced by Graham Allison develops, starting from the theory of international relationships, a specific rationality of the actors-decision makers (Allison, 2010, p. 305). The specific rationality of this model is, firstly, a rationality of internal consistent choices. This type of rationality is folded on the structure, on the group the decision maker belongs to. It is a development of the relationship manager-agent supported by this model. From this point of view, a rational decision is a decision which is included in the atmosphere of the group the actor belongs to, if it is compliant with the interests of the group or of the privileged people, if it satisfies the interests of that formation. Relating to other groups involved and with their decisional criteria, the decision may appear as totally irrational. The rationality of the decision maker specific to this model is “the rationality resulted following the negotiations within the executive area” (Allison, 2010, p. 333) of the different groups involved, rationality which may be influenced by the perceptions and by the different priorities, by their purposes and objectives, but also by their different hierarchic positions and stakes. From this point of view, the rationality of the decision maker is a rationality of the communication (communicative), it does not suppose a priori calculations with strict economic character or to keep the status, but a hermeneutic rationality because it supposes a strict interpretation of the situations and communication relationships which take place within official environments and with exclusivist character.

3.5. Principles and values

The last dimension of the analytic matrix proposed here relates to the identification of the values relating to each individual decisional model and of the particular principles these three models proposed operate with.

Downs considers that we may speak about the utility both at the level of the individual actions and at the level of the governmental activities. We may assert that all the citizens at the level of a community receive benefits following the governmental activity and only the sender of the action may be identified as being governmental. On the market, the existence of the utility value is, also, existent and manifested. Relating to the efficiency and efficacy, they also derive from the idea of utility. The efficiency supposes the idea of decision and of action which shall have more benefits in relationship with the costs, and the other value supposes the achievement of the purposes proposed in relationship with the initially established objectives. The clarity, the concision and the novelty are other values which must be deduced from the characteristics of the mechanisms and processes relating to this model. Since the decision is taken after having defined clearly all the alternatives, after having discussed in terms of decisional context which shall use
the total necessary information, the appeal made to clarity and to concision becomes clear. The decision makers take decisions only after they have defined all the alternatives, after they have a global, clear, concise image on them. Nevertheless, Downs does not assert that the decisional environment is one of absolute certitudes, but of total information, but, at least at the theoretic and ideal level, the decision maker relates to such principles or his behaviour tends to them. Even the practices suppose at the level of this model the research of all the decisional alternatives, of the concision, of information as exact and complete as possible (see Table no. 5).

Table no. 5: Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUES</th>
<th>RATIONAL MODEL</th>
<th>INCREMENTAL MODEL</th>
<th>BUREAUCRATIC ORGANISATION MODEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. reward, utility, efficiency, efficacy, clarity, concision, novelty</td>
<td>1. inequality, adaptability, continuity, stability, experience</td>
<td>1. non-ideologisation, strategic objectivity, loyalty, power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the level of the incremental model, a primary identifiable value is that of inequality (Lindblom, 2003, p. 20). If the model of the rational actor used to stress the individual, as we previously affirmed when we analysed the dimension of the particular actors, the incremental model put forth the issue of the representative character and the idea of inequality that derives from here. For Charles Lindblom, the inequality manifests within the decisional process as a form of absence of representation. “The persons taking the decisions represent a very small ratio of the entire population” (Lindblom, 2003, p. 21). From this perspective, a discrepancy may appear here between the decisions wanted by the population and the decisions of the actors involved in the decisional process. The decisional process may appear as a process favouring some people and disadvantaging the entire population or as a process where different unequal actors arrive to decisions which may favour them more relating to the others. More than that, different groups of interests, political groups or other non-formal actors may increase even more the social or political inequalities. Taking a decision becomes a long and interactive process which supposes a high degree of adaptability of those involved and may generate excluded persons.

The model of bureaucratic organisation supposes the existence of several values, such as: non-ideologisation, objectivity and loyalty. When we bring up the value of the non-ideologisation, Allison considers that the optics over this complex model must be returned (Allison, 2010, p. 334). The existence of so different persons participating at the decisional process beside the government or the president passes beyond any politic ideology. The decision is nothing but the result
of several severe negotiations between the individuals with power, pressure groups which have own interests, several times divergent. From this point of view, this model overpasses the characteristics of the rational model, because it is necessary to additionally define the rationality of the process of choosing an option (the comprehensive rationality of the perfect actor, with perfect information and which must not take into account the time factor in the choosing process), as well as a more exact detail of the actors involved in the decisional process. Then, even the economic ideological credo does not determine anymore the process of decision taking when it is about the values relating to the decisional process specific to the bureaucratic organisation model. The values characterising the best this model would be, from this point of view, the strategic objectivity and loyalty. The strategic objectivity supposes the fact that the decision is not a solution chosen rationally for answering to several issues, but the result of strong negotiation and compromise processes. Allison asserts, starting from the historic fact of the Cuba’s crisis of rockets, that the decision within the international relationships area (and not only) is a group decision, of leaders with enough authority which do not action neither according to the parties they belong nor according strictly to the governments they belong to.

4. Conclusions

The identification of all the characteristics of each dimension of our analysis matrix consequently leads to two conclusions: the outlining in this form of the matrix brings a different analysis tool, original at the level of the research and of the knowledge of the domain itself, on the one hand, and the position of the decisional process in this form on the other hand, at the level of these decisional models supposes the activation of all these matrix dimensions. This fact supposes the activation of the motivations, of the individuals’ values, of the evaluative and axiological criteria. All these and not only are reflected on the decisional process at the administrative level and influences it (its research by default).

The paradigms which integrate the best the strictly rational and administrative line with the line of the humans, of the group, of the decision maker (with the motivations, with its experiences, with its feeling, with the values assumed) are those of the organisational behaviour. Placing at the level of the environment the administrative framework, beyond Weber’s point of view over the administration, as paradigm including – as well – the human dimension – the collaborative governance provides another answer to the cognitive approach. From this point of view, the two paradigms reopen new lines of research over the area of research and of knowledge of the decisional process within the public policies.
References