FINANCING OF TRADE UNION FEDERATIONS: THE CASE OF THE GUIW\textsuperscript{1} AND ICFTU\textsuperscript{2} IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE

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Abstract
In order to better the living and working conditions of their members, trade union confederations have many financing sources. The text is related to social solidarity which is important for trade unions. Throughout this article, the author sorts out the terms for more effective funding of the Ivorian trade-unions. This research lays the emphasis on a literature review, an examination of texts related to Ivorian social law, texts of the General Union of Ivorian’s workers (GUIW) and DIGNITY. Also it is based on data collected from interview with leaders of GUIW and DIGNITY. Without being exhaustive, first we present the funding sources in various part of the world. Then we glance at the Ivorian context based on current legislation on the funding of trade unions federations and empirical evidence on this issue. Finally, we suggest some ways to boost trade-union and improve their funding in order to fulfil efficiently their mission.

Keywords: Union, funding, organization, labour law, Côte d’Ivoire.

Résumé
Afin d’améliorer la vie et les conditions de travail de leurs membres, les confédérations syndicales ont de nombreuses sources de financement. Le texte est lié à la solidarité sociale qui est important pour les syndicats. Tout au long de cet article, l’auteur recherche des modalités de financement plus efficace des syndicats ivoiriens. Cette recherche s’appuie sur une revue de la littérature, un examen des textes du droit social ivoirien, des textes de l’Union générale des Travailleurs de Côte d’Ivoire (UGTCI) et de la centrale syndicale DIGNITÉ. En outre, il est basé sur des données recueillies auprès entrevue avec les dirigeants de l’UGTCI et de DIGNITÉ. Sans être exhaustif, nous présentons d’abord les

\textsuperscript{1}General Union of Ivoirian’s Workers.
\textsuperscript{2}Ivorian Confederation of free trade union (ICFTU) also called DIGNITY. In the text we will use both ICFTU and DIGNITY for that union.

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sources de financement dans diverses parties du monde. Ensuite, nous examineront le contexte ivoirien basé sur la législation actuelle sur le financement des syndicats fédérations et les données empiriques sur cette question. Enfin, nous vous proposons quelques façons de stimuler syndicale et d’améliorer leur financement afin de remplir efficacement leur mission.

Mots-clés: Syndicat, financement, organisation, droit social, Côte d’Ivoire.

Rezumat. În vederea unor mai bune condiţii de muncă şi de viaţă ale membrilor, confederaţiile sindicale au mai multe surse de finanţare. Textul se referă la solidaritatea socială care este importantă pentru sindicate. De-a lungul acestui articol, autorul caută termenii finanţării mai eficiente a sindicatelor ivoiriene. Aceasta cercetare pune accentul pe analiza literaturii de specialitate, pe examinarea textelor legate de dreptul social ivorian, pe texte ale Uniunii Generale a Muncitorilor din Côte d’Ivoire – GULCI şi DIGNITY. De asemenea, se bazează pe datele colectate din interviuri cu liderii acestora. Fără a fi exhaustiv, articolul prezintă surse de finanţare în diferite părţi ale lumii. Apoi aruncă o privire asupra contextului ivoirian bazat pe legislaţia în vigoare cu privire la finanţarea federaţiilor sindicale. În cele din urmă, sugerează câteva modalităţi de a stimula sindicatelor şi de a îmbunătăţi finanţarea acestora, în scopul de a-şi îndeplini mai eficient misiunea.

Cuvinte cheie: Union, finanţare, organizare, dreptul muncii, Côte d’Ivoire.

Introduction

In Côte d’Ivoire the issue of funding is at the heart of union activity. In reality, the autonomy of trade unions is closely related to the nature and sources of funding. Given labour organizations missions of general interest, they benefit from-as some civil society organizations do-public, semi-public and even private grants. These funds are used to acquire headquarters, office equipment’s, to pay for permanent employees, bonuses for leaders’ travel, to train their members, etc.

But in many cases it occurs that the funding granted to labour organizations is acting as a brake upon their autonomous. In reality, the entity bestowing the subsidy of course expects in return for flexibility regarding the claims or a negation of social conflict. This sorts out the issue of the trade union structures’ autonomous. Moreover, social democracy is pointed up. The transparency in the management of funds received is sometimes surrounded by an opacity that allows a set of behaviours and practices not very recommendable.

Apart from the grants, the labours’ organizations are allowed to make investments through non-negotiating activities to function. In some cases, these activities are innovative approaches for structuring organizations and their legitimacy derived from their representativeness. With variable importance, these sources contribute to the structuring and specialization of these organizations in their fields of action. They reinforce the social link between the organization and its environment, including members of organizations sharing the same targets, employers, the State, etc.
Despite the importance of the issue, the financial flows between the trade unions are poorly documented in Côte d'Ivoire. Bikoko (2012) who addresses the limited resources of trade union in Africa searches for the conditions for alternative sources of funding to revitalize the labour organizations whose balance sheet after fifty years of practice is unflattering. Appiah (2013) points out the issue of funding in Côte d'Ivoire following the same approach, ie emphasizing the low financial capacity of unions. But the work does not insist on the sources of funding of trade unions. In addition, they remain coy about the favourable conditions to an efficient funding of labour organizations. They are silent on the relationship between funding and workers organizations autonomy’s. Moreover, the issue raised by this scientific gap is how to reconcile the funding of a union structure while ensuring its autonomy and thus preserving its position vis-à-vis other social partners, including employers and State.

The article attempts to address this concern. We sort out a literature review, an examination of texts related to the Ivorian social law, the texts of the General Union of Ivoirian’s Workers (GUIW) and Ivorian Confederation of free trade union (ICFTU). We also rely on data from a survey conducted among leaders of GUIW and DIGNITY union trade. The article analyzes the funding of trade union organizations in Côte d'Ivoire. Without being exhaustive, this article first presents the funding sources in various parts of the world helping to provide strength to the unions. Then it deals with the Ivorian context based on current legislation on funding trade union federations and empirical evidence on this issue. Finally, it suggests some ways to boost trade unions and improve their funding to fulfil more efficiently their mission.

1. Types of Unions Sources of Funding

This section seeks to identify unions funding modalities generally speaking. We do not pretend to provide an exhaustive list of financing sources, but rather to cite some of them that help unions to function. They can be divided into two categories. These sources include, own resources generated by trade union structures themselves or their activities and the external resources from physical and legal entities who do not belong to the organization.

1.1. Own resources

Own resources include membership fees, contributions of members, activity products and strike funds.

Membership fees

Membership fees should represent the compensation paid by an employee wishing to organize or be active in a trade union. The membership fees follow two objectives. The first is to replenish the coffers of the union. In fact, the union membership does not imply that the militant would regularly pay his dues,
especially if they are not deducted directly from the wage. It is not uncommon to notice that the militants still do not pay (Appiah 2013; Bikoko 2012). It is an opportunity for unions to mobilize resources.

The second responds to the principle of freedom of association. Under the terms of Article 2 of the Convention 87 and Article 1 of Convention 98 of the ILO (ILO 1995; Trabi Botty 2010), anyone is free to enter into a union and to advocate without external constraint. This is an evidence of the expression of the freedom of workers who entered on their own. In addition, membership fees are used to determine, \emph{a priori}, the number of trade union activists. In some countries like Germany, the number of militants appears among the criteria for the representativeness of a trade union. Membership fees are always a preparatory step to the regular payment of contributions that are more regular and periodical.

\textbf{Member’s contributions}

The member’s contributions are paid periodically according to the organizations, monthly or yearly. The amount of the contribution is set by decision-makers, including the Congress and / or the General Assembly. In practice, trade union confederations allow affiliate members to increase or reduce, under certain conditions, their rates according to their specific context and reality. As regards the terms of payment of the contributions, unions use two approaches. The first offers the worker the possibility to pay himself. Various ways are available for this purpose: the cash payment, the cheques, bank transfer, etc. There is a second way: the employee authorizes the employer to deduct from his salary the amount of its contribution.

As for the amount of contributions, it appears under many forms. It can be fixed; this is a fixed amount defined and applicable to members. Within some unions, this amount is directly related to salary and is automatically adjusted according to its evolution (increase or decrease). In France, the General Confederation of Labour (GCL) has such a way of contribution. Other organizations apply a system linked to slices. In Sweden, some “... unions have a tariff system where the amount of the contribution is defined by wage bracket. Adherents to such a SIF union pay a fee determined by their income (by income) which varies from 10 to 20 euros per month ”(De Siantignon P. et al 2004, p. 11). Unions offer discounts or preferential rates to categories deemed precarious, including job seekers, students, members on parental leave or sick leave, pensioners, etc. Their contributions are reduced to meet their specific conditions.

These various funding arrangements deal more with basic unions. As for trade union confederations, the members are made up of affiliated unions. They collect contributions from unionists and send them to the labour unions using two procedures. The first is to pay fully the amounts to union trades that in return gave them some discounts whose rate is set in advance to basic unions. In the second case, the affiliate organizations give directly a part of the collected
amount to the union and this amount rate is defined beforehand. In addition to membership dues and contributions, union trades derive their funding from the products of activities.

**The products of activities**

Also referred to as non-negotiating activities, products of activities are other sources of funding. These activities are organized by a trade union in order to improve the living conditions of the members and strengthen solidarity. This can result in consumer cooperatives, housing cooperatives, labour subcontracting cooperatives, etc. (Bikoko 2012). This is a form of solidarity enabling members of a trade union to benefit from social services. The advantage of such solidarity is to increase the purchasing power of the militants and thus improve their living standards. Moreover, unions can draw income from investments. These resources are derived from properties rental, dividends generated by the shares held in companies, interest on obligations, mortgages, and other financial investments, sale of publication, etc. (Guedj et al 2004b). In addition, unions are engaged in activities generating income such as seminar, conference, symposium, etc. whose participation is not toll-free. On these occasions, there may be fee-paying stands for companies, insurance companies, associations, etc. wishing to advertise their products to workers and visitors. Trade unions are selling products with their logo and the incomes belong to the union.

**The compensation paid out to unions or related structures**

Union members belonging to industrial relations bodies (joint or not) receive indemnities. They are used to cover the reimbursement for housing, transportation, food, etc. These actors also receive attendance fees for attending meetings. And according to established rules set by the legislation, activists belonging to these bodies are required to pay all or some part of their allowances to the union (Guedj et al 2004a).

**The strike funds**

These are funds to support militants in strikes to compensate for their loss of income resulting from the termination of activities. On varying importance between countries, these funds are financed from membership dues (Guedj 2004a; De Santignon et al 2004a). We remember the strike of a union of Spanish women that lasted 1136 days and ended with the Union victory. The first question that comes to one’s mind is: how and with what resources (human, financial and material) did this trade union achieve the modification of the industrial relations for its benefit? This historic resistance may be due to the strike fund initiated in 1976 by the Basque trade union ELA (Du Roy 2015). Indeed, the strength of their cash appears as a determining factor in the success of their action.
1.2. External Resources

External resources are made of subsidies, donations and bequests.

**Subsidies**

Subsidies are another form of funding labour organizations and are granted by the government and/or companies. Public funds are used to support activities such as training for example. In some European countries, namely France, the regions, departments and cities provide trade unions some resources like premises including amenities and building maintenance (Adam 2012). In addition, subsidies may take the form of tax reductions granted to militants. In Quebec for example, tax measures granted to members of trade unions under the form of tax credit. The tax credit for union dues which can reach 20% is deducted from the income tax. Similarly, the labour contributing to labour funds is offered a tax credit on its taxable income. Indeed, strike benefits paid to union members during strikes are exempt from tax (Fortin et al 2011). Moreover, there is another form of subsidy, including union release. It means to "release" the union leader from his activity into the workplace. He can devote himself exclusively to his new responsibilities while continuing to be paid. Besides, local authorities financed by public authorities provide trade unions funds as gracious provision of premises that constitute direct subsidies.

Companies also provide grants to trade unions. More often than not, they appear as means available to trade unions to finance their activities. These are premises for duty office and other amenities necessary for union activity. Among stand other reprographics, fax, telephone and mail. In addition, hours credits incurred by the company are granted to union leaders to conduct their activities. In fact, these hours spent on union activity constitute for companies a shortfall. It is as if he was paying an employee who does not contribute directly to production. These means may vary over countries and specific contexts. In many cases, these means guaranteed by law (De Saintignon et al 2004b) derive from Convention 98 of the ILO which makes union practice a right and not a favour granted to workers’ organizations.

Thus, they grant subsidies to labour unions as aid to employees. The trade premiums charged in Belgium consist for employers to pay "... more than half of the members contributions, in industries where they exist" (De Santignon et al 2014b, p. 26). In France, AXA Company has initiated since the early 1990s the "right of trade union funding." This is an amount paid to the employee who passes it on to a union of choice by way of union dues. This is an indirect subsidy to unions of the company.

**Donations**

It entails in providing support in cash or kind to a labour organization which the actor, may it be an individual or a group, supports the actions. This form of financing can occur at any time. But it is more noticeable in conflict. On
the occasion of a strike of workers, for example, people may provide financial support to the union. To deal with unforeseen circumstances, the trade unions resort to fundraising and collecting donations from people who do not necessarily belong to the union, but sharing the cause defended by the trade union. Resources from donations, in kind or in cash, help measure the anchoring of a union in the company. Indeed, the amount and nature of gifts can measure the audience of the union in the company. Similarly, they can help take the opinion of the people regarding an ongoing strike for example. Moreover, it is not excluded that activists can also make donations to their trade union apart from contributions to support specific actions.

**Bequests**

This is a set of resources (financial, material, etc.) that a natural or legal person sells a trade union in certain circumstances such as the dissolution. This approach is linked to the nature of unions. Indeed, they are non-profit organizations. That is to say, they do not aim to make profits for the benefit of its members. Consequently, the resources generated by the organization should not be redistributed or between members or between third party entities. Thus, one possibility to comply with this provision and do not contravene the legal provisions is to repay its property and other resources to another organization that share the same goals. The various funding sources quoted are taken from practices worldwide. They are based, on selected countries, on a legal corpus and the result of a long structure. Indeed, these gains are generally obtained after conflicts or collective bargaining. In any case, the representative and/or the strength of the unions have helped snatch the acquired forms of funding from employers and states. What about Ivory Coast?

2. Ivorian Trade Unions Facing Their Funding

In Côte d'Ivoire, as in many other countries, funding for labour organizations is subject to a set of laws, but also a structured life through negotiations and achievements. This part analyzes the case of Côte d'Ivoire through laws and trade union practices.

2.1. The legal framework for funding

In Côte d'Ivoire, there is no legal corpus exclusively devoted to the funding of trade union organizations. The thereto provisions are scattered in various texts dealing with labour relations. This is interprofessional collective bargaining Convention of 1977, the 1992 General Statute of Civil Service, the 1995 Labour Code and a decree on workers' representatives.
**Interprofessional Collective Bargaining Convention of 1977**

The Interprofessional Collective Bargaining Convention was negotiated between the single trade union confederation, namely GULCI and employers in 1977. It is surprising that this text does not care about the funding of trade union organizations. Indeed, it is only interested in union dues and ignores other possible forms of financing. It merely mentions in its article 12 that: "The collection of union dues is allowed inside the establishment. They are originally levied from the salary of the worker" How can one explain the fact that the union leaders involved in the negotiations have not addressed the different forms of funding possible in the discussions?

The answer is given by the context. Indeed, this text goes back to the period of the single party where Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), including trade unions were more like specialized structures of the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (DPCI) (Appiah 2008). Under these conditions, we can assume that financial resources were not the trade union leaders’ priority at that time. In addition, the approach taken by the GUIW during that period, namely the trade unionism of participation (Touré 1987) helps to strengthen this position. At another stage, this can result from a political strategy to control the resources of the trade union confederation. Moreover, he did the same thing to other CSOs. Indeed, the law governing organizations is Law No. 60-315 of September 21, 1960 on Associations, which significantly limits the CSO funding opportunities.

As for the unions, such is not the case. Indeed, they are governed by international provisions that do not allow the government to define the nature of their activities even less their funding. Under these conditions, one can legitimately surmise that the reduction of funding terms during the payment of contribution is an effective means of control of the unions. Thus, this a subtle way of entrusting the financing of trade union to the state and its agencies to limit the actions of unions whose Noise Rate (NR) (Gataz 2010) are significant enough to make the course of a State switch. Early in 1963, Beninese unions had contributed to the fall of former President Fulbert YOULOU. This was a bad precedent for not giving enough strength to unions. This suggests locking this text. What about the Labour Code?

**Labour Code**

Contrary to the collective agreement, the Labour Code is a real breakthrough in terms of financing trade organizations. While the previous text limited the unions to acquire property for the sole purpose of their activities, it allows them to acquire for a lucrative purpose. The only requirement is to be authorized by their texts. In this regard, Article 52.7 points out:

*If they are authorized by their statutes and provided it does not distribute profits, even in the form of discounts to their members, unions can:
1) buy to rent, lend or distribute, amongst their members all that is necessary for the exercise of their profession, including raw materials, tools, instruments, machines, fertilizers, seeds, plants, animals and foodstuffs for livestock;

2) take their business to the sale of products derived solely from personal labour or from unionized farms; assist such sale by exhibitions, advertisements, publications, orders and shipping groups without being able to operate on their behalf and under their responsibility.

So, trade unions are allowed to broaden their financial base through other activities that generate additional contributions to earnings. Similarly, they are allowed to create, manage, or subsidize the institutions, directly or indirectly providing financial resources. The Labour Code goes further by allowing unions to have the same privileges as commercial enterprises. Indeed, under the terms of Article 53.1 of the Labour Code, they may hold marks or labels and enjoy intellectual property. These two texts, especially Interprofessional Collective Bargaining Convention of 1977 and the Labour Code rule the private sector. What about public service?

Decree No. 96-207 of March 7, 1996

In this text, particularly memorable indirect subsidies granted by the employer to the trade unions. Indeed, the staff representative, commonly referred to as a union banner, has a time credit for these activities. This is 15 hours per month of working time, but "... paid as working time" (Article 18). In addition to the credit of hours, the entrepreneur "... shall provide staff representatives, premises necessary to enable them to fulfil their tasks and specially to meet" (Article 19). Of course, premises and all associated costs (electricity, maintenance, furniture) are under the responsibility of the employer.

The general status of the public service and Decree No. 93-607 of July 2, 1993 on common rules for implementing the General Statute of Public Service

In the civil service, Act No. 92-570 of September 11, 1992 on the general status of the civil service and the implementing decree No. 93-607 of July 2, 1993 setting common rules for implementing the general status of Public Service grant union leaders leave authorizations with salary as part of their activities. Moreover, these texts allow union officials to suspend their activities for the benefit of trade union office. This is the detachment specified in Article 40 of the text: "The detachment is the position of an officer authorized to temporarily suspend his duties to perform another job or to perform a national or international public tenure, trade union office or to hold a Ministerial position". According to paragraph 6 of Article 21 of Decree No. 93-607 of July 2, 1993 above mentioned, detachment for trade union office is made possible "... when the function or mandate includes
obligations inconsistent with the normal exercise of employment”. May it be the leave authorization, which is accompanied by a wage or a detachment; the official shall continue to receive his salary. It is exactly as if the state was paying the official on behalf of the union. This is therefore an indirect funding from the state labour organizations.

The analysis of the sources of financing trade unions under Ivorian laws enable us to identify own sources and external sources. Own sources concerns the contributions and the products of activities. On the contrary, external sources deal with government subsidies and its decentralized structures. Similarly, they represent the financial support of employers and therefore companies. But what are the funding arrangements in practice?

2.2. In practice

This section analyzes practices as for financing trade union confederations in Côte d’Ivoire by adopting a comparative approach. It is based on interviews with leaders of both unions. The organizations studies are the Ivorian Confederations of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) more known as Dignity and the General Union of Ivoirian’s Workers (GUIW).

**Internal resources**

From the interviews we had with union leaders, it appears that membership fees and contributions are the main source of funding for unions. However, DIGNITY adopts a particular method of payment of contributions. Indeed, when adhering, the activist receives a card whose amount encompasses the membership fees and contribution of the ongoing year. For the ensuing years till the next congress, the member pays the equivalent of the contribution. If union dues and membership fees make up the bulk of domestic funding sources of DIGNITY, GUIW however has other sources of income. This is what the answers of the following respondent suggest, non-negotiating activities:

"The activities that allow us to realize a surplus:
A cooperative of tailors whose activities are suspended;
The events we organize which may be sources of surplus value;
Renting our rooms;
The hotel de la Bourse that helps relieves workers;
Training "(union leader, GUIW).

Moreover, it is interesting to point out that its headquarters has rooms and accommodation leased to third parties for events and other activities. Similarly, the headquarters houses a hotel and workshops for various goods manufacturing which provide significant income for the organization. The headquarters of GUIW was built by the state for Ivorian workers at the time of
one-single unionism is, even today, part of the GUIW’s heritage despite the proliferation of unions. Other labour organizations’ attempts, namely DIGNITY (in late 1990s), to occupy some part of the premises were unsuccessful. In return, the State granted subsidies to these trade unions to build their own head offices. But today, the headquarters of DIGNITY are still under construction.

**External resources**

Regarding funding from external resources, the results of the survey reveal that there are no formal state grants and/or these decentralized and devolved structures. However, the trade union federations deemed representative by the State, DIGNITY and GUIW receive an amount estimated at fifteen million for the Labour Day celebrations on May 1 each year. In addition, respondents noted that their respective unions used to receive occasional support of the State under previous regimes that is to say between 1993 and 2011. But these funds have faded with the advent of the incumbent regime since 2011 as revealed by the data of the survey of trade union leaders. State subsidies to labour unions are at the heart of industrial relations in Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, workers consider their role in the Ivorian economy as stated by these respondents:

"If trade unions were not working, how the state would have sent her financial authorities in companies to search for money" (union leader, DIGNITY).

"If labour unions were not working, how the state would have sent her financial authorities in companies search for the money" (union leader, GUIW).

These remarks highlight labour organizations assess their importance in the Ivorian economic system. It therefore becomes evident that they are demanding these funds to the state. In 2009, a Protocol of Agreement was signed among the trade union confederations, employers and the state provided subsidies to labour organizations. This is what the following respondent’s sayings unveil: "In the social forum, the social partners have agreed that the state should subsidize unions" (union leader, DIGNITY). As can be read in point 1 of Article 4 of the document, the government committed funding these organizations through "... the grant by law or regulation of financial subsidies from the state to representative workers' organizations in national in order to enable them to fulfil their mission " (RCI^3 and al. 2009).

The political and economic context at that time was not consistent with social conflict. The government, since 2001, has consistently called for a "social truce". So it was an opportunity for workers to request in return for this social stability, subsidies to fulfil their mission. The total amount of the grant was based

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on data collected during the study, 1,334,706.47 US $ to start among three union confederations, including DIGNITY, GUIW and the Federation of Independent Unions of Côte d’Ivoire (FIUCI).

Unlike the state, employers are also actors that can provide grants to unions. The Ivorian legislation is not compelled to finance trade unions that still receive some amounts for specific activities, including the organization of conferences or General Assembly from their partners. However, the trade union federations’ affiliates investigated receive subsidies in the form of means for their operation. Similarly, union leaders have a time credit of 15 hours per month. All things considered, the trade union confederations receive, thus indirectly, employers’ subsidies, since ultimately the basic labour unions represent union federations locally.

In addition to these two actors, including the state and employers, international organizations provide grants to the studied trade union federations. The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) has solidarity funds meant to "... support the development and the" practice "of a democratic, independent and representative unionism and to assist victims of repression or other hostility acts affecting the practice of trade union freedoms "(ITUC 2006). The investigation revealed that these funds have to assist DIGNITY’s former Secretary General during his prison stay in northern Côte d’Ivoire further to the post-election crisis. Likewise, the funds used to equip DIGNITY’s headquarters ransacked during the crisis. They also support other activities such as trade-unionism, trade union activities (conferences, training, etc.)

The investigation has revealed that other international trade union organizations provide grants to trade union federations at stake. Among such international unions stand the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions of Belgium (CCTUB) which supported, for example the Institute of International Labour Education programme (IILE) with DIGNITY. The General Confederation of Labour (GCL), the French Democratic Confederation of Labour (FDCL) in France and the Interprofessional Union of Labour (IUL) in Switzerland, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), etc. are all international trade union federations financially supporting the activities of the Ivorian unions. These grants usually appear, according to the survey data, under the form of training, awareness. In addition, they are cash money and are used to organize demonstrations. In addition, respondents noted that the International Labour Office (ILO) also provides grants to workers' organizations through training on topics chosen by their experts or proposed by local unions (to add for GUIW).

3. Favourable Conditions For Funding Effective Central Union

All sources of funding described above allow trade union federations to ensure their operations and thus, to defend labour. However, in the Ivorian context marked by numerous limitations, they can be obstacles to the
development of trade unions. This part aims to provide favourable conditions for these loans to contribute to the development of trade unions. Four conditions are required to achieve this autonomy: democratic centralism, trade union training, representation and an appropriate legal framework.

**Democratic centralism**

Democratic centralism refers to social democracy and to the participation of all members in the functioning of the labour organizations. This implies that the social elections are held to promote the alternation of union leaders. It goes without saying that all structures operate regularly. The decision-making board holds their congress on the due dates. And above all, the union has some supervisory organs whose members are elected to ensure freedom of action. In organic texts, the autonomy of these organs must be reflected clearly in order to ensure their position vis-à-vis the independence of the executive, including the Executive Bureau, the Trade Union Council, etc.

In these circumstances, leaders have a reduced capacity to use the funds raised for their benefit. During the Congress, the outgoing team has a balance sheet, as moral and financial, and may be penalized if there is an ideological drift or a misuse of financial resources. At mid-term, that is to say on the occasion of a General Assembly, for example, leaders will also take stock of the funds received and their use. In terms of company unions, transparency must also be real and there must be a level of traceability of funds raised.

**Union training**

Labour education is the second condition for the effective funding of trade unions. Recent studies (Appiah 2013; Bikoko 2012) show that labour organizations lack trainings. The activist does not actually perceive the indenture link that binds him to the union. Indeed, the member has the duty to strengthen its structure by learning about the philosophy of his union, participating in activities and especially by paying his dues. This requires a union training, that is to say, a socialization in which the syndicated integrates admitted standards of his organization.

In return, the union has sufficient resources (trained militants, money, etc.) to defend the participant and in some cases, offer social services. Labour education is also meant for trade union leaders who must have background knowledge in accounting, management, for optimum use of funds collected. They are accountable for expenditures and the sums received. This increases the accountability to militants charisma union officials and strengthens the unions.

**The representativeness**

This is important in order for a union trade could be funded. With only 3 trade unions in 1992, we now have at least 9. Do all these labour organizations, especially the new ones, obey the criteria for representativeness set by the Labour
Code (Article 56.2)? The oldest ones find it difficult to count and identify their members (Appiah 2013; Bikoko 2012). What about these new labour organizations?

Moreover, the participation of employees in social elections does not still clarify the audience of a labour organization in Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, our work revealed that a unionist shift from one labour organization to another one depending on the fact that some circumstances are favourable or unfavourable to him. Under these conditions, how to allocate funding to a labour organization while ensuring that they will be paid out to employees? Therefore all stakeholders (unions, employers and government) must take into account the criterion of representativeness of trade union organizations before granting funding. As for the unions, they must review their administrative structures in order to obtain information on their activists.

An appropriate legal framework

In Ivory Coast, the legal provisions for unions funding are almost non-existent. They do not sufficiently address the financing of trade unions. The Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) addressed in its Article 52, Law No. 95-15 of January 12, 1995, on the Labour Code is also silent regarding the funding of labour organizations. In public services, the same observation is made with Law No. 92-571 of September 11, 1992 on the general status of the Public Service. In countries with advanced legislation, many problems remain. In France for example, it is since 21 March 1884 that the Waldeck law has authorized the funding of trade union organizations. The guarantees provided for organizations, especially regarding privacy on the functioning of trade unions, led to many abuses. A report published in 2006 helped to update irregularities in the financing of trade organizations.

The discovery in 2007 of an employer slush fund to "buy" social stability with unions highlighted the dysfunction in funding of trade unions. It was only in 2008 that a law was adopted to better regulate the financing of trade unions. This is Law No. 2008-789 of August 20, 2008 on the renewal social democracy and reform of working time. That said, simple legal provisions are not enough to ensure transparency in the funding of trade union federations and ensure their independence. The adopted texts should highlight transparency and accountability. The trade union confederations have to account for the use of funds received to not only their members but also to all external entities, including employers and the State. The labour organizations must have their expenditures known and certified. In doing so, unions can keep their autonomy while receiving funds.
Conclusion

As part of their operation, the union trades have many funding mechanisms. They can be grouped into two categories: internal sources and external sources. Internal sources are those produced by the organizations themselves. These are membership fees, contributions, products of activity and non-negotiating activities. External sources are mainly made of donations, bequests, and subsidies and provided by external entities.

The analysis laid the emphasis on all these forms of funding who are not practiced by the trade unions in Côte d'Ivoire. It also helped to reveal that there is no perfect model in this regard. In each case, there exist strengths and limitations. In fact, it is possible to conclude that no funding method does ensure autonomy to a central labour. In Côte d'Ivoire, this finding is also proved; the weakness of trade unions has been raised in our previous work. And funding is one of the major causes of this weakness. Indeed, the study deepens and confirms the previous results. Activists contribute little. The obsolescence of the administrative organization of trade unions does not allow to identify all militants. Moreover, the scarcity of union training limits the awareness of members. Accordingly, contributions are rare and are still not mobilized enough to meet all the needs of the trade unions as highlighted by the investigation.

From the above, it appears that the effectiveness of unions is pointed up. Indeed, without sufficient financial resources, no union can claim to defend better conditions of life and work its militants. The issue raised by the study was to reconcile funding and union autonomy. The analysis helped reveal that under certain conditions, trade union organizations can take advantage of different funding sources. This is the democratic centralism of trade union education, representation and an appropriate legal framework.

Democratic centralism offers transparency in the management of the funds collected and limits the opacity observed in many countries as regards financing. Furthermore it allows the participation of activists who feel involved in the administration of their organization. Union training allows socialize activists adopt the values required for participation of activists who contribute to make more efficient organization. In between, the representative can help external entities to fund organizations with the largest number of militants. And finally the appropriate equal framework will help frame the financing of trade union federations in order to prevent them from turning into a structure to enrich at the expense of the leaders of the organizations and activists.

In this respect, it becomes legitimate to ask the question: are the Ivorian trade union confederations willing to meet these conditions to become more effective? If it is difficult to answer this question here, one can but surmise that it will be difficult to achieve. Indeed, many countries with advanced union practices, we can notice that, as recently in France, there are still pitfalls that limit the usefulness of funding. The new issue raised is how the Ivorian trade unions
can become strong like in Western countries by making the economy of the shortcomings that characterize them? Without the hypothesis that there is a linear path of development that the Ivorian stations must follow to reach the level of Western organizations, the problem still stands.

It is clear that the Ivorian trade unions must have their own experiences; but is it possible to grow up without knowing the difficulties faced by more advanced labour unions? Under these conditions the Ivorian organizations should, considering the experience of others, necessary learn to build real trade unions with large financial surfaces to allow efficiency that could better defend their constituents, including the militants.

References
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BOOK REVIEWS