CONSTITUTIONAL PARTISANSHIP IN ISRAEL

BOGDAN ALEXANDRU CHELARIU

Abstract


This paper is trying to explore the constitutional partisanship in English web search queries of mass media and think and do tanks based in Israel, given the fact that in the recent years a tremendous debate has been evolving in Israel about the adoption of a constitution. Although it was decided by the founding fathers that the constitution will be embraced gradually by adopting a package of basic laws, due to certain particularities the process never ended. The need of a constitution is constantly rising on the public agenda every time some turmoil or social crisis occurs. Therefore, with this paper, I try to assemble the relevant knowledge related to constitutional drafting and bargaining with the Israeli political economy of institutions particularities, while exploring the constitutional partisanship within the mass media and think tanks. Consequently, I will try to answer the next question: how does the attitude regarding the constitution, human rights, judicial review, Supreme Court, democracy and Zionism influence partisanship on constitutionalism and, therefore, developing support for an affirmative or a no-decision? Among the first, are there any elements or clusters that can trigger alone the decision on one side or another? Or is it just rhetoric as the members of media and civil society made first their decision upon sides, or had already preconceptions, and later on they picked their arguments?

Keywords


Constitution; Israel; judicial review; Supreme Court

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