RES COGITANS ET RES EXTENSA: LES OBJECTIONS DE GASSENDI ET DE LA PRINCESSE ELISABETH ET LES HESITATIONS DE DESCARTES

Cristian MOISUC

Abstract


This text covers the relationship between res extensa and res cogitans in Descartes, and the objections that have been addressed on this subject by Gassendi (in 1642) and Princess Elisabeth (in 1643). Unlike the common opinion, Descartes seems to have difficulties in responding to Gassendi’s objections and tries to dodge the answer. A year later, in the let-ters to Princess Elisabeth, he finally admits that the problem of the union of two substances exceeds the framework of earlier texts and proposes a „third primitive notion“ that can better reflect the relationship between res cogitans and res extensa. However, the third primitive notion seems to raise more problems than it solves.

Keywords


Cartesian dualisms; objections; primitive notion; mind; body

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References


DESCARTES, Rene: Oeuvres, éd. Ch.Adam et P.Tannery, Paris, Le Cerf, 1897-1911

GUÉNANCIA, Pierre: L'intelligence du sensible : essai sur le dualisme cartésien, Paris, Galllimard, 1988

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KOLESNIK-ANTOINE, Delphine (coord.): Union et distinction de l'âme et du corps: lectures de la „VI- ème Méditation“ : [journée d'études, 15 novembre 1997, Fontenay-aux-Roses], Paris, Kimé, 1988

MARGEL, Serge: Corps et âme. Descartes : Du pouvoir des représentations aux fictions du Dieu trompeur, Paris, Galilée, 2004

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