SOCIOLOGIE ȘI ASISTENȚĂ SOCIALĂ

SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

SUMMARY

PROBLEMS OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA

Ciprian IFTIMOAEI [*]

Rezumat

Dacă în ceea ce privește prăbușirea comunismului și demararea tranziției către democrație în Europa Centrală și de Est, putem vorbi despre existența unui *starting point*, este mai dificil din punct de vedere metodologic și empiric să stabilim când anume începe procesul de consolidare democratică. Faptul că Revoluțiile din 1989 marchează startul procesul de tranziție democratică ne comunică prea puține date în legătură cu modul în care vor evolua tinerele democrații din spațiul est-central european spre democrațiile consolidate. Prăbușirea comunismului în Europa s-a datorat, în primul rând, consecințelor sociale și economice dezastruoase ale modului în care regimurile comuniste au guvernat și, în al doilea rând, datorită „asistenței" factorilor externi. Natura regimurilor politice înainte de prăbușirea comunismului, modul în care s-a realizat tranziția de la un sistem politic la altul, nivelul de dezvoltare socio-economică, tradițiile democratice anterioare instalării comunismului în spațiul est-central european, cultura și tradițiile populației constituie condiții esențiale pentru a developa modul în care au evoluat țările postcomuniste. În această lucrare, îmi propun să analizez procesul de consolidare democratică în România, utilizând date și informații prelucrate din rapoartele *Nation in Tranzit* ale Freedom House, prezentate într-o manieră comparativă pentru cinci țări postcomuniste: Polonia, Cehia, Ungaria, Bulgaria și România.

Cuvinte cheie: democrație, consolidare democratică, proces electoral, societate civilă, independența mass-media, independența justiției, guvernare.

Abstract

If, regarding the fall of communism and the start of transition towards democracy of the Eastern and Central European countries we can talk about a common starting point, it is more difficult both methodologically and empirically to identify the time when the process of democratic consolidation itself begins. The fact that the revolutions of 1989 mark the start of the democratic transition tells us little about how the young East-Central European democracies would evolve towards democratic consolidation. The implosion of communism in Europe was due first of all to the disastrous social and economic consequences of the way the communist regimes operated and, secondly, to the fact that these countries were "helped" by a multitude of external factors. The nature of the political regimes before the collapse of communism, the way the transition from a political system to another was made, the level of social-economic development, the democratic traditions before the installation of communism in the Eastern-Central European area, the culture and the state of

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mind of the population will all constitute essential coordinates for unraveling the way the post-communist countries have evolved. I shall analyze the process of democratic consolidation in post-communist Romania, using the data supplied by the *Nations in Transit* reports elaborated by Freedom House, presented in a comparative manner for five post-communist countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania.

Keywords: democracy, democratic consolidation, electoral process, civil society, media independence, independence of justice, governance.

Résumé

En ce qui concerne la chute du communisme et le début de la transition vers la démocratie dans les pays d'Europe orientale et centrale, on peut parler d'un point de départ commun, il est plus difficile du point de vue méthodologique et empirique d'identifier le moment où le processus de consolidation de la démocratie elle-même commence. Le fait que les révolutions de 1989 marquent le début de la transition démocratique nous dit peu de choses sur la façon dont les jeunes démocraties d'Europe centrale et de l'est avaient évolué vers la consolidation démocratique. L'implosion du communisme en Europe est due tout d'abord aux conséquences sociales et économiques désastreuses résultées de la façon dont les régimes communistes fonctionnaient et, d'autre part, au fait que ces pays ont été «aidés» par une multitude de facteurs externes. La nature des régimes politiques avant l'effondrement du communisme, la façon dont la transition d'un système politique à un autre a été faite, le niveau de développement socio-économique, les traditions démocratiques avant l'installation du communisme dans la région de l'Europe de l'est et centrale, la culture et l'état d'esprit de la population vont tous constituer des coordonnées essentielles pour montrer la façon dont les pays post-communistes ont évolué. Je vais analyser le processus de consolidation de la démocratie en Roumanie post-communiste, en utilisant les données fournies par les rapports de *Nations in Transit*, élaborés par *Freedom House*, présentés de manière comparative, concernant cinq pays post-communistes: la Pologne, la République Tchèque, la Hongrie, la Bulgarie et la Roumanie.

Mots-clés: démocratie, consolidation démocratique, processus électoral, société civile, indépendance des médias, indépendance de la justice, gouvernance.

1. The path from electoral democracy to consolidated democracy

Initially, the concept of "democratic consolidation" described the effort by which the new democracies were trying to protect themselves against the tendencies to return to the previous undemocratic regimes. Andreas Schedler proposes an analogy between democratic consolidation and the process of immunization of an organism. The antibodies developed in the process of democratic consolidation must act against authoritarian regression (Schedler, 2002, p. 122).

The process of democratization and democratic consolidation involves stages that differ from one historical context to another and from one country to another. These stages can be graphically represented on an axis that begins with the moment of collapse of an undemocratic regime (from authoritarianism), it continues with the stage of transition to electoral democracy ("non-liberal"), then liberal

democracy, finally leading to the stage called consolidated democracy or advanced democracy. The advanced democracy is clearly not the final stage of democratic consolidation, but it represents an empirical benchmark that corresponds to the way that the western democracies are functioning. These four categories correspond to the semantic inventory of democracy and to its subcategories developed by David Collier and Steven Levitsky. According to the two researchers, the conceptual beach of democracy extends from the definitions given to undemocratic regimes, to electoral regimes ("semi-democracies", "partial democracies"), to the definitions of minimal procedural democracies and finally it reaches the liberal democracies category.

Semi-consolidated democracies are considered transition regimes where the elections are held without the expression of civil liberties (freedom of expression and of thought, freedom of association, freedom of criticism and public protest). Minimal procedural democracies concern the political regimes that hold fair and competitive elections, ensure manifestation of civil liberties, and the government doesn't have the full capacity to govern. Liberal democracies benefit of elections, participation, civil liberties and effective power of the elected people to govern (Collier & Levitsky, 1997).

The path from the recently installed democracy to consolidated democracy requires not only a process of quantitative accumulations expressed in institutional procurements and democratic procedures, but also a process of qualitative changes regarding the values, attitudes and behaviors of all the involved actors. In order to consolidate the democratic rules and institutions, it is necessary for all the participants to the democratic game (elites, political parties, interest groups, professional associations, citizens) to "learn" to behave and act democratically. Consolidated democracy requires from the masses a participatory political culture (Almond & Verba, 1996) and from the elites a consensual approach regarding the governance issues whether they have the power or find themselves in opposition.

In terms of time, democratization is a process that takes place during two periods (two stages). As a long-term structural process of change of the entire society, democratization begins with the stage of transition from a non-democratic regime to a democratic regime and it continues with the democracy consolidation stage. In this paper, we are interested in the second phase of democratization - the actual process of democracy consolidation. At its turn, democratic consolidation requires the existence of institutional infrastructure specific to a democratic regime and also the application of the democratic cohabitation rules from all social actors. If these conditions are respected, we can say that the process of democratic consolidation begins where the democracy in its minimal or electoral version already operates.

Electoral democracy is the stage of the democratization process that implies multiparty, free elections, unabridged competition between parties for gaining political power. Even if the "double test of alternation in power" of Huntington is

confirmed, we can not talk about a consolidated democracy yet. If the governmental elites that were freely elected get to violate the constitution which they swore to comply with, they violate the rights and freedoms of individuals and minorities, undermine the legitimate functions of the legislative power and thus they fail in governing according to the rule of law and their regimes are not democratic. In electoral democracies the power abuse is possible and also frequent violations of the law for favoring various interest groups, constraints from the political power on the media and on independent organizations, distorted multiparty system or a dominant party which monopolizes political power and politicizes the state institutions. Therefore, the "electoralism error" should be avoided or, in other words, the organization of regular, free and fair elections represents a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the democracy consolidation.

After electoral democracy, the next step towards democracy consolidation is "liberal democracy" where the organization and conduct of free elections is completed with the respect for the rights and freedoms of the citizens within the operating frame of the rule of law. However, neither the stage of liberal democracy guarantees complete elimination of the antidemocratic slippages, such as populism, extremism, nationalism or any authoritarian regime version. Democracy is consolidated when the functioning of the democratic institutions is linked to learning and practicing some rules such as political trust, tolerance, willingness to reach a compromise and, more than anything, the belief in the perfectibility of democracy, as the only system of government in which the individual rights and liberties can be constantly defended and affirmed.

Referring to electoral democracy and liberal democracy, Andreas Schedler believes that they are the "empirical references" of the debate on democratic consolidation. "In addition, notes the political scientist Austrian, the electoral and liberal democracies represent normative horizons for each other. While electoral democracy appears as the proximate horizon that should be avoided by liberal democracy, liberal democracy presents itself as the proximate horizon to be reached by the electoral democracy."

H. Linz and A. Stepan consider that democratic politics should be instituted and legitimized through various appeals before the benefits of the market economy to materialize. Other authors argue in favor of the simultaneity of democratic reforms together with the economic reforms, while for others the priority is represented by the economic development as a precondition in the democratic consolidation process. In contrast to the two authors, Adam Przeworski considers that in the developing countries that have recently left totalitarianism, the economic performance of the new democratic governments is essential for the process of democratic consolidation. Democracies have significantly more chances to survive when there is real economic growth (i.e. more than 5% per year), while in the situation of high inflation (more than 30% per year), the rate of democratic consolidation reduces significantly (Przeworki, 1996). In agreement with Przeworski,

Huntington also argues that economic development can bring changes in the culture of a country, considering it an important pillar of democratic consolidation. Huntington lists several preconditions that are necessary in the democratic consolidation process: a relatively high level of economic development and the prevalence of what we call Western culture and values, which also include Western Christianity.

Although many of the systemic features of the market economy generally favors the functioning of political democracy and contribute to the development of a democratic culture, Robert Dahl believes that an advanced market economy does not always necessarily lead to the affirmation of a democratic culture and, thus, to democracy consolidation. Throughout the world, we have many examples of countries that have well developed economies, but are deficient in terms of democracy, functioning of the rule of law and also regarding the respect for the rights and freedoms of individuals. "The Asian tigers" and China represent relevant examples for the Dahl's assumption.

In order to differentiate democracies and non-democracies, Guillermo O'Donnell presents seven attributes of polyarchy, as the term is defined by Robert Dahl, to which he adds two more: 1) elected officials, 2) free and fair elections, 3) inclusive suffrage (the right of all adults to vote in free, direct and regular elections) 4) the right to run for public office, 5) freedom of speech, 6) the existence of alternative sources of information 7) associative autonomy, 8) the elected or appointed officials should not arbitrarily lose their positions before completing the mandates entrusted to them (e.g. Alberto Fugimori in Peru and Boris Yeltsin in Russia); 9) the elected or appointed authorities should not be prevented from completing their mandates by the intervention of other actors (e.g. the intervention of the army or illegitimate groups). Just as we can distinguish non-democracies and democracies, in the same way we can make the distinction between many aspects of consolidated democracies. Not all consolidated democracies have economies that are developing in the same rhythm, nor the same levels of participation of the citizens to public life or the same solid civic cultures.

"The post-socialist trajectories" of the Central and Eastern Europe countries represented the subject of study for independent researchers, universities, international institutions, prestigious think-tanks. Among these, Freedom House, an organization working for over 70 years in assessing the level of democratization and progress in terms of democratic consolidation in all the countries throughout the world, uses seven categories of analysis: 1) the national democratic governance, 2) electoral process, 3) civil society, 3) independence of the media, 4) local democratic governance, 6) the legal frame and independence of the judiciary and 7) corruption. Each category of analysis is formed of a set of items expressed as questions.

In the following sections, we shall analyze the process of democratic consolidation in post-communist Romania, using the data supplied by the *Nations in Transit* reports elaborated by Freedom House, presented in a comparative manner for five post-communist countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. We have focused on this group of countries from the Eastern and Central Europe in order to make a comparison of how the democracy "parameters" have evolved. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were part of the Visegrad Group, countries that joined the first wave of enlargement: NATO (1998) and EU (2005). Bulgaria and Romania joined in during the second wave of enlargement: NATO (2004) and EU (2007). The analyzed period is between 1999 and 2012.

2. The electoral process in post-communist Romania

Freedom of expression, pluralism of opinions, the institutionalization of multi-party and free elections were the first coordinates of the structural change produced in the former communist countries. Freedom of expression was practiced long before the collapse of the communist regimes among the dissident movements that contested the legitimacy of the system. The revolutions of 1989 created the context for the unrestricted manifestation of freedom of expression and thought, which is a fundamental human right, also stipulated in communist constitutions, but denied by the system and repressed by the political police. Immediately after the end of the revolutionary tumult of 1989, in almost all former communist countries the historical parties that had been abolished in the communist dictatorship were reactivated. On their ruins, left parties emerged, parties converted to modern social-democracy and integrated into the European socialist family. The political currents that did not correspond to the reinstated historical parties, neither to the "heirs" of the deceased Communist party, have transformed into new political parties.

The first years of democratic transition can be characterized by an inflation of political parties, their number exceeding a few tens or hundreds in every post communist country. After the multiparty institutionalization, the next step was to organize free elections in order to occupy the positions of power that had been left available in the political-administrative hierarchy of the state after removing the communist elite and also the positions created through the implementation of the institutional infrastructure of democracy. The first free elections mark a first step towards electoral democracy. The first test that the new democratic authorities will have to pass is the fair and transparent organization of free, competitive and regular elections (at the established time), whose results must be accepted by all participants in the electoral game. The second fundamental test will be the rotation in power or double alternation in power, as Samuel P. Huntington called it.

Figure no. 1. The electoral process in five post-communist countries
(Source: author's diagram processed according to the data taken from the „Nations in Transit" 2000-2012 Reports of Freedom House: www.freedomhouse.org. Note: the evaluation is based on a regressive scale from 7 to 1, where 7 is the lowest level of the electoral process and 1 is the highest).

The electoral process in post-communist Romania was conducted during several successive electoral cycles: 1) the first election cycle refers to the period 1990-1996, characterized by the transition from communist totalitarianism to electoral or competitive authoritarianism; 2) the second election cycle begins with the first democratic alternation to power (in 1996) when the political system meets the requirements of the electoral or minimal democracy and continues until 2004 when Romania joins NATO and concludes the negotiation chapters with the EU; 3) the third election cycle begins in 2004 when the third democratic rotation of power takes place and it extends until 2007, when Romania joins the EU; 4) the fourth election cycle after the EU accession corresponds to the period of integration into the European structures itself. The first three election cycles are placed on an ascending trajectory of the transition process and democratic consolidation. The fourth election cycle develops a phenomenon of democratic erosion or degradation of the democracy parameters, including the electoral process. The moment that marks the democratic erosion phenomenon is the referendum proposed by the Parliament (by a vote expressed by 322 members of the Parliament) to suspend the President in office, Traian Basescu, despite the negative notice given by the Constitutional Court (May 2007). From this moment, what was expected to be a period of consolidation of liberal democracy will remain in the political history of post-communist Romania as a period of democratic regression.

   After the end of the revolutionary moment in 1989, a new political con-figuration, called the National Salvation Front (FSN/NSF), would take over the political power after the killing of dictator Ceausescu at the end of a controversial trial. At the beginning of 1990, the NSF led by Ion Iliescu expressed the intention

to organize free elections without participating to the electoral competition as a party in its own right. But on January 3rd 1990, FSN changed its mind and declared that the political configuration would run the elections that it had organized, not as a political party but as a civic movement. In the first months of 1990 the historical parties were also reactivated (PNȚCD, PNL, PSD) and they declared their intention to take over the country, challenging the legitimacy of NSF and its leaders. During this time a lot of other political configurations appeared, that were inexperienced, without logistics or technical personnel necessary in the administration of the party activities and in the management of the election campaigns. This period of political openness culminated with the general and presidential elections in May 1990. Ion Iliescu was the candidate of FSN for the presidency and obtained an overwhelming result of 83% of the votes, and the party that supported him obtained 66.91% of the votes.

The period between the elections of May 1990 and September-October 1992 was one of the most tumultuous periods of the recent past, being convulsed by two miners: the first coming of the miners in June 1990 had the result of stopping the violent anti-communist demonstrations in the University Square and the second coming in September 1991 determined the collapse of the government led by Petre Roman, a premier who had started some bold economic reforms. After the dismissal of the reformist Prime Minister Petre Roman, the government led by Theodor Stolojan was installed, who had been minister of finance in the previous cabinet. During this period the first draft Constitution was elaborated, draft which was meant to replace the constitution in force since the communist era. The new Constitution was adopted by referendum in 1991. The local elections held in February 1992 recorded several victories of the democratic opposition in the major cities. The success achieved by the opposition in the urban area reflected its growing strength and anticipated the future political changes. Parliamentary and presidential elections were held in September 1992 and a second round of presidential elections took place in the first days of October of the same year. The electoral campaign of 1992 was not characterized by violence exercised against the historical parties, such as at the elections in the May 1990. Nevertheless, FDSN and Ion Iliescu have fully turned to profit the control over the Media, especially the radio and the public television, as well as the administrative and economic levers for providing resources for the electoral campaign. Despite the disparity of resources between the presidential party and other political parties, the Romanian political spectrum has shifted from the multiparty with a hyper-dominant party resulted from the 1990 elections to a balanced multiparty that took shape after the 1992 elections.

Although during 1992-1996 the democratization has stagnated within the official political institutions, in other sectors of the social life there have been positive changes. The Media continued to operate freely and to diversify. Also during this period many private television channels appeared, that were mainly

broadcast in the urban areas and represented a credible competitive alternative to the state television channels. The "Pro TV'" phenomenon, a private TV channel set up with U.S. financial support in 1995, has significantly contributed to informing the public interested in politics and its actors. After the local elections in the spring of 1996, Romania prepared for the parliamentary and presidential elections in the fall. In terms of candidates and parties, the elections seemed to have the pattern of the 1992 elections. The top three candidates appreciated as having the chance to win the President position were the same: Ion Iliescu, Emil Constantinescu and Petre Roman. Neither the political parties nor the coalitions of parties have changed much. The Democratic Convention of Romania lost several liberal parties: Civic Alliance Party (PAC) and the Liberal Party's Young Wing of Dinu Patriciu and Horia Rusu (PL'93). The last two formed the National Liberal Alliance. Petre Roman's Democratic Party formed the Social Democratic Union with the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR) led by Sergiu Cunescu.

The 1996 elections were held in the context of an important economic decline together with the accumulating popular discontent against Iliescu and the PDSR - the main ruling party. The result of the elections has shown the victory of the Democratic Convention of Romania and a comfortable positioning of the Democrat Party. In the second round of the presidential elections, Petre Roman declared his support for the candidate Emil Constantinescu, who had qualified in the second round of elections against President Ion Iliescu. Constantinescu won the presidential elections in November 1996 and formed a governmental coalition (CDR, USD, UDMR) led by Victor Ciorbea. For the first time in more than half a century, Romania experienced a peaceful and democratic alternation in power.

The accession to power of the Democratic Convention of Romania and its allies meant the definitive strategic orientation of Romania towards the Euro-Atlantic political economic and security space. The governmental policies in the period 1997-2000 will have a negative impact on the public perception, leading to a vote of sanction ("negative vote") from the population at the general elections in 2000. PNȚCD, the main ruling party, will miss the accession to the Parliament. The Democratic Party and the National Liberal Party will manage to save themselves, entering the Parliament and obtaining similar percentages (approximately 7%). PDSR will form the first mono-color government of the post-communist period, supported in the Parliament by UDMR and the representatives of other national minorities. Having a consistent and stable parliamentary support, the Government led by Adrian Nastase managed to promote a package of measures that led to the macro-economic stabilization of the country. The economic reforms continued, even if the privatizations were not always transparent, nor they gave up the policy of state subsidies given to the clientage of PDSR (renamed PSD after merging with the historical Romanian Social Democratic Party). Despite these negative aspects to which the government corruption was added - that was to become the trademark of Adrian Nastase's governance, Romania, benefiting from a favorable inter-

national context, joined NATO in 2003 and at the end of 2004 finalized the negotiation chapters with the European Commission in view of joining the EU.

At the elections of November 2004, despite the good economic performance (growth of approximately 5% in 2004, continuing the disinflation process etc.), the Government led by Adrian Năstase, Prime Minister and PSD president, was sanctioned by the population for corruption and the arrogance of its leaders. The victory in the second round of the presidential elections of Traian Basescu, general mayor of the Capital, also meant the transfer of PSD in opposition. The new president has entrusted Calin-Popescu Tariceanu, co-president of the D.A. PNL-PD Alliance, the mission to form a new cabinet. In order to have a stable parliamentary majority, the Romanian Humanist Party (renamed the Conservative Party) and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) were invited to participate to the governance. The governmental arch was formed of a coalition which included the D.A. PNL-PD Alliance, PC and UDMR. The priority of the government led by Calin Popescu-Tariceanu, subsequently elected president of the Liberal Party, was Romania's accession to the European Union until January 1st 2007, objective that was actually reached despite all the debts of the government and the objections expressed by some European officials who supervised this process.

The local and parliamentary elections of 2008 will take place after some substantial changes to the electoral law. The first change concerns the election of the presidents of county councils through a uninominal vote in one round: the candidate who obtains the highest number of votes and therefore ranks first is the winner. The second change concerned the general elections that were held on the basis of a compensated uninominal voting system. In short, the "electoral formula" by which the members of the Parliament are elected is: the deputies and senators are elected in uninominal constituency; those who obtain 50 +1% of all votes win a parliamentary mandate; when this majority is not reached in the electoral bodies, a mechanism of proportional distribution is used at the county level (depending on the score obtained by the party of a parliamentary member) and then at the national level (based on the calculation of the electoral coefficients and the biggest rests).

The uninominal voting system with compensation ("mixed") applied at the general elections of 2008 generated the following situations that were considered "absurd" by the citizens who were not familiar with the complexity of the electoral formula: 1) the situation when a candidate who won the first place in his electoral body does not enter the parliament because there is another candidate of the same party that participated in another electoral body of the same county electoral circumscription who obtained a better result and thus he won more votes for his party, 2) the situation when a candidate who won the 2nd or the 3rd place in an electoral body enters the Parliament according to the proportional distribution in the county. This electoral system has been criticized for a long time by the internal political analysts and by observers outside the electoral process in Romania. A huge pressure was created on the public perception in order to change the system or to replace it with a two-round majority uninominal system or with a mixed

uninominal system after the German model where 50% of the deputies and senators mandates are elected uninominal and 50% proportional (on the lists). There were also some voices claiming the return to the proportional voting system, and others who proposed a proportional preferential voting (the voters have the possibility to rank the candidates proposed on a party list according to their preference).

In the period between the elections of 2008 and 2012 there were many other changes to the electoral law. First of all, it is the changing of the law regarding the election of local authorities, which means the use of the uninominal voting system with one round also for the election of the mayors. Secondly, the PDL-UDMR-UNPR governmental coalition supported in the Parliament by the minority groups voted on a law that stipulated the merging of the local elections and the general elections. The arguments brought by Prime Minister Emil Boc concerned the saving of financial resources necessary for organizing local elections separately from the parliamentary elections. After the intimation submitted by the opposition grouped in the Social Liberal Union (USL), alliance formed by PSD+PNL+PC, to the Constitutional Court, this law was declared unconstitutional. Thirdly, we have the modification of the law regarding the election of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate and the introduction of the uninominal majority vote in a single round ("uninominal pure") also for the parliamentary elections. These changes in the electoral legislation were made despite the recommendations of the Venice Commission that considered inappropriate and undemocratic the modification of the electoral law with less than 12 months before the effective organization of the electoral process. Taking into account the political context in which the elections were conducted since 1990 until now, the frequent changes to the electoral law "during the game", the behavior of the Power versus Opposition during the elections, Romania received from 2003 until 2011 a 2.75 score for the electoral process. Of all the post-communist countries that we have studied, Romania receives the lowest "grade" at the "electoral process" chapter, excepting 2009 when there were the European Parliament elections.

3. The role of civil society in consolidating democracy in Romania after the communist period

The presence of an active civil society with various manifestations represents a democratic consolidation factor. There are various definitions of the concept of "civil society." In common language, the given meaning is often reductionist due to the fact that many people understand by civil society non-governmental organizations. London School of Economics, the Centre for Civil Society define civil society as a set of institutions, organizations and behaviors situated between the state, business and family, which include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), professional associations, political organizations, civic clubs, trade unions, charities, social and sports clubs,

cultural institutions, religious organizations, environmental movements etc. Beyond the institutional aspect, civil society consists of citizens who, associated under various forms, participate to public life, influence public policy, protect and promote the interests of the population.

Civil society acts as a regulating mechanism for democratic societies. The civil society institutions are also needed in the countries with consolidated democracies, especially in the countries that are in process of democratic consolidation. Philippe Schmitter considers that, although it contributes to the democracy consolidation, civil society is not a cause of it. The existence of some types of civil society does not necessarily lead to democracy and nor can it "unilaterally" support the democratic consolidation process. Civil society operates efficiently on the democratic process by interacting with other public institutions (Government, Parliament, political parties, interest groups), processes (political, electoral), economic mechanisms, political and parliamentary elites, etc.

Civil society reacts differently to administrative and economic policies that come against its interests: demonstrations, media campaigns, protest messages etc. Due to the fact that such actions are difficult to organize and often have only a short-term impact, it is necessary the appearance of alternative and/or com-plementary structures beside the state structures (non-governmental organizations, professional associations, trade unions, employers, etc.) that would monitor the activity of the state institutions and the manner of solving claims and would maintain constant pressure on the governmental elite. They should collaborate with the structures involved in the society administration, in order to find the right solutions and continuously improve the life quality.

Figure no. 2. Index of the civil society development in five post-communist countries. (Source: author's diagram processed according to the data taken from the „Nations in Transit" 2000-2012 Reports of Freedom House: www.freedomhouse.org. Note: the evaluation is based on a regres-sive scale from 7 to 1, where 7 is the lowest level of progress of the civil society and 1 is the highest).

Unlike Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, where it was possible to implement some elements of economic and political reform before the collapse of communism, in Romania of the 80s all the aspects of the social life were in a noticeable stagnation. The Romanian "National Stalinism" as it was named by Daniel Barbu, marked by Ceausescu's personality cult, had a demoralizing effect on all forms of manifestation of citizenship.

After December 1989, the affirmation of the fundamental liberties and the democratization of political life led to an explosion of forms of civic association from the citizens. Thus, various non-governmental organizations appeared, called "associations", "foundations", "organizations", "leagues", "unions", etc. In general, the most important source of funding of the associative sector in Romania was provided by international foundations and institutions. Several prestigious international organizations such as World Vision, Holt International, Bethany Social Services Foundation, Children on the Edge, UNICEF, etc. have opened branches in Romania. These foundations have exported to Romania not only consistent funding programs which often have continued throughout the Romanian transition, but also *know-how*, specific infrastructure, consultancy and professional training programs for the Romanian specialists involved in the development of the associative sector. The foreign foundations in partnership with the indigenous organizations have developed a series of services (social, psychological, medical, educational, etc.) that, through their quality, successfully competed with many of the services offered by the public sector. In 1996 there were over 10,000 registered NGOs, but few of them would gain a national or international reputation through their activities developed for the public interest.

Under the pressure of some international financers such as the World Bank, the European Commission of Brussels, the U.S. Agency for International Development, United Nations Organization through the Development Program of the United Nations etc., the public authorities have initiated public-private partnerships with the non-governmental organizations in order to provide quality services to beneficiaries. A series of organizations such as the Foundation for Open Society, the Institute of Public Policies, the Academic Society of Romania, Pro Democracy Association, Freedom House Romania, Transparency International Romania, the Romanian Center for European Policies, the Association for Democracy Implementation were actively and directly involved in the demo-cratization of the Romanian political life, the transparency of governance, decentralization of public administration, monitoring of the electoral processes, fight against corruption, etc. These organizations have brought extra-quality to life in Romania, and some of them have become credible and constant partners of some governmental institutions and officials from different areas of activity.

The non-governmental organizations were also involved in reforming the Romanian legislation by making it compatible with the standards and recom-mendations of the European Commission and by adapting it to the concrete

realities and the requirements of the citizens. In the present, according to an emergency ordinance, Romanians have the possibility to donate 2% of their annual income tax for funding non-profit organizations. In 2005, as a result of an initiative of Prime Minister Calin Popescu-Tariceanu, The Consultative Board of the NGOs of Romania was established in order to exploit the expertise of these organizations in the process of elaborating public policies.

The Freedom House evaluators consider that the Romanian civil society suffers because of a feeling of "cynicism" from the public, also being affected by the reduced funding sources as a result of the EU accession and the economic crisis. In May 2012, the Prime Minister Victor Ponta announced that the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development (SOP HRD) would be suspended by the European Commission. After an audit held by experts from Brussels, serious disparities were found at the Management Authority responsible for the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development. This event has caused serious problems to the funding of the NGO sector and the public institutions which had started training programs in the human resources field.

4. The independence of the Media and the democratization of the Romanian political life

The Media represents the "transmission belt" between elites and masses, politicians and voters, between public institutions and citizens-beneficiaries, between the state, civil society and individuals. For more than a century, it is difficult to imagine any activity or any profession that does not use or does not intersect with the Media and its related fields. In consolidated democracies, the mass media represents more than just a connector between various social actors, institutions and citizens, acting as a vigilant tool for monitoring and sanctioning the political power and, in general, all democratic slippages.

The media is seen as "the watchdog of democracy". In order to fulfill its democratic mission, the media needs to operate in a legal framework that guarantees human rights and civil liberties, on a free and competitive market without state or private monopolies without any type of interference in their editorial activity, in an environment where journalists respect the laws and codes of ethics and deontology accepted by the associations to which they belong. In a democracy where the media is politically and economically controlled, the consolidation of democracy has small chances to be realized.

The experience of the last decade in Central and Eastern Europe shows that the Media was significantly useful for the expression of civil liberties, the construction of civil society, in the disclosure of the cases where the democratic norms and rules were broken, violation of law, corruption at all administrative levels of the state, and for the censorship of the authoritarian tendencies of the political actors. At the same time, the media sanctions and corrects excesses, the omissions and errors of

the governmental elites in the countries with democracy in process of consolidation, often positioning itself on the side of the opposition or the counter-elite. Freedom of thought and expression and the independence of the media are fundamental values of modern democracy. These liberties gained during the democratic transition are currently exercised in subtle forms for purposes that make vulnerable the democratic game, determining phenomena such as democratic erosion or collapse of the democratic system. The political propaganda that transgresses the law, disinformation and manipulation of public opinion by political and economic, internal or external interests, more or less visible, are part of the Media arsenal that can endanger democratic construction and freedom of a country and its citizens.

The excess of the Media freedom creates problems for democratic consolidation in post-communist countries. These problems in their turn can be exacerbated by economic difficulties such as the global economic crisis, by the inadequacy between the democratic mechanisms and the problems faced by the society, by the rise of populist leaders and social segments receptive to populist messages, by the discrediting of democracy and its actors (elite and masses) due to the fact that the political phenomenon is marked by marketing, electoral and trade tendencies. The invasion of the public space by political and electoral marketing methods, the transformation of the politics into a television show instead of offering a real agenda needed by the public, with the interest of the Media, leads to the depravation of democracy. Low political participation, electoral absenteeism, dissatisfaction with politicians, institutions and politics are "signs" of erosion of the post-communist democracies.

Figure no. 3. Index of the Media independence in five post-communist countries
(Source: author's diagram processed according to the data taken from the „Nations in Transit" 2000-2012 Reports of Freedom House: www.freedomhouse.org. Note: the evaluation is based on a regressive scale from 7 to 1, where 7 is the lowest level of Media progress and 1 is the highest).

After December 1989, along with the freedom of expression and freedom of association, the Media seemed to be among the few gains of the "genuine democracy" in Romania. After the finish of the revolutionary effervescence, the Romanian Media would bring big disappointment compared to the public expectations regarding the democratic role that the Media could have played. Taking as a reference the politics and the behavior of the Media towards it, we propose the following chronology of the evolution of the media during post-communism: 1) the period between 1989-1990 or the stage of "live broadcast revolution", 2) the period between 1991 -1993 characterized by the diversification and technologization of the media, period characterized by an explosion of *print* media, some of them having an impressive number of printed copies; 3) the period after 1993 defined by political polarization, economic consolidation, orientation towards the private sector and consumerist models that provide audience (Coman, 2003). By 2005, much of the press in Romania, but also a part of the audio-visual Media were massively "sponsored" by the state through a kind of hidden advertising provided by public companies. This practice culminated during the government of Prime Minister Adrian Nastase (2000-2004). After 2005, the funding provided by the state in various forms of advertising has considerably reduced. The global economic crisis together with the reduced funding for the public sector has forced a significant part of the media to restructure. Some major newspapers (*Ziua, Cotidianul, Gândul, Curentul* etc.) opted for online distribution. In the development of information journalism in television, the moments when Pro TV (1995) and Reality TV (2000) were launched step into light. Subsequently, the private channel Pro TV has left the editorial line that made it famous and has become a "tabloid" television, currently being the most profitable private television station in Romania. The disappointment of the public towards politics was reflected into a decreased interest in political information and the media that promoted it, and, finally, into a decreasing audience during the radio and television trans-missions focused on political issues. In 2012 the print media mainly consisted of tabloids, newspapers that looked for the "sensational". Broadsheet newspapers can be considered only *România liberă*, *Evenimentul Zilei*, *Adevărul*, but they also have sections or consistent headings focused on sensational news.

In Romania, the printed press is not regulated, unlike the audio-video Media where the sovereign body is the National Audiovisual Council (CNA). The global economic crisis has deeply affected the Media in Romania, too, hundreds of journalists being fired, especially after 2008. The investigative journalism has suffered the most due to the exacerbation of the political and electoral con-frontations and also because of the polarization of economic interests connected to the political elites. The "mogulization" of the Romanian Media is increasingly mentioned, meaning that the major media trusts are owned or discretely controlled by tycoons that are strongly connected to politics and its people.

Paradoxically, after Romania's adhesion to the EU, media campaigns financially supported by politicians – owners of media trusts (e.g. Dan Voiculescu) or by business people interested in controlling political power (e.g. Sorin Ovidiu Vântu) were directed towards certain political leaders or parties represented by them, the campaigns against President Traian Basescu being particularly aggressive. In this context, at the last revision of the National Security Strategy of Romania, Traian Basescu, as president of the Supreme Defense Council of the State (CSAT), mentioned the Media among the " threats to national security" when the media campaigns are targeted against state institutions by disseminating distorted and false information about their work for the benefit of private purposes of "illegitimate" interest groups from inside or outside the country. Since 2003, Freedom House evaluation of the Media in Romania recorded a negative trend, from a score of 3.5 to 4.00 in 2011.

5. The evolution of democratic governance

Democratic consolidation is a process that considerably depends on how the political elites are governing. Democratic politics is the result of an interaction between various social actors (executive or legislative political elites, interest groups, associations, citizens, etc.) and institutions (Government, Parliament, justice, political parties, etc.). In a mathematical language, the democratic governance is a function that depends on two important variables: on one hand, it is the democratic or undemocratic behavior, the consensual or conflictual behavior of the political elites, and on the other hand it is the government - the institution that represents the executive power in the state and is responsible with the law enforcement.

Evaluating how "democratic" a government is, is a rather difficult task that depends primarily on the definitions of the used terms and then on the used criteria. It is important not to confuse the government as action of ruling and control of public affairs through bureaucracy with the form of government (the regime) that can be either democratic or undemocratic.

Of all the post-communist countries that joined the EU in both waves of enlargement (2005, 2009), Romania obtained the lowest scores in terms of democratic governance. While the average of the countries become EU members varies during the period 2002-2012 from a score of 2.6 to 2.75, our country is not below 3.5 points, according to Freedom House. In 1997, immediately after the democratic alternation produced at the local and parliamentary elections of 1996, Romania had a 4.24 rating. The reforms promoted by the governments led by Victor Ciorbea, Radu Vasile and Mugur Isărescu have definitely shaped the engagement towards the Euro-Atlantic integration of Romania (NATO, EU).

Figure no. 4. The evolution of democratic governance in five post-communist countries
(Source: author's diagram processed according to the data taken from the „Nations in Transit" 2000-2012 Reports of Freedom House: www.freedomhouse.org. Note: the evaluation is based on a regressive scale from 7 to 1, where 7 is the lowest level of national governance and 1 is the highest).

Despite the governmental instability that marked the 1997-2000 period, the economic reforms focused on restructuring, privatization, reduction of subsidies for the economic sectors and units that caused massive losses, the reforms regarding the restitution of the properties confiscated by the communist regime, civil rights and freedoms, etc. have been appreciated by the international evaluators as evidence of good intentions. Thus, Romania's rating has gradually improved to 3.5 in 2000.

The Adrian Nastase government managed to stabilize the macroeconomic situation of the country launching at the same time ambitious programs of social assistance for disadvantaged persons and child protection. During the governance of Adrian Nastase, Romania joined NATO (March 2004), obtained the title of "functioning market economy" and closed the chapter of negotiation for adhesion to the EU (at the end of 2004). The unwarrantable interference of the government officials on justice, the generalized corruption, the excessive politicization of central and local public administration and the control on the media represented "weaknesses" of the Nastase government. During this period, the rating of the democratic governance has been constant, that is 3.75.

During 2005-2007, the government led by Calin Popescu-Tariceanu brought a slight improvement, the government rating reaching 3.5 points. The Prime Minister has proposed a governmental program that focused on consolidating the rule of law, strengthening its functions as guarantor of legality, strengthening individual liberties, restricting the state intervention in the economy, guarantying and developing private property, ensuring the full restitution of the properties that had

been abusively confiscated during communism, eliminating the exemption from payment of debts for certain business agents, promoting measures by which the economy might become "functional and competitive" in the perspective of joining the EU.

The economic performance achieved during the first two years of this government were overshadowed by the political conflict between President Traian Basescu and Prime Minister Calin Popescu-Tariceanu, conflict generated by his refusal to resign and hold early parliamentary elections in a time when the Alliance for Truth and Justice (DA PNL-PD) enjoyed the confidence from the population, according to the sociological evaluations at the middle of 2005. During this period, the President placed himself as a fierce critic of the Government and the Prime Minister and was also a supporter of the Democratic Party, party that he had formerly led before occupying the position of president. This conflict culminated when the Democratic Party left the governing arch (April 2007) and when it placed itself in opposition to the government led by Prime Minister Tariceanu.

As a minority, the Government consisting of representatives of PNL and UDMR, which did not sum up more than 20% of the votes in the Parliament, has ensured its parliamentary support with the help of PSD, in exchange of financial allocations for the administrative-territorial units under the political control of the latter. The return over the resignation announced in the summer of 2005 and the refuse to start the procedures for organizing early elections, the rejection of the project of political fusion between PNL and PD to form a strong right-wing party and the tempestuous announcement of the withdrawal of Romanian troops from Iraq led to a decisive separation between Prime Minister Tariceanu and the President Traian Basescu.

The conflict between the two protagonists of the Romanian political stage culminated with the suspension of the president by the Parliament (322 votes pro), without a clear notice of the Constitutional Court, followed by the referendum on the president's dismissal. The results of this referendum reaffirmed the popular support for the president and he received again the constitutional powers that had been temporary taken by the President of the Senate Nicolae Vacaroiu.

The results of the parliamentary elections in November 2008 determined the installation of a cabinet led by Emil Boc, supported by a large parliamentary majority formed of PDL and PSD. The government had declared its mission to prepare Romanian economy and society for facing the effects of the global economic crisis. Although it benefited of good parliamentary support that would have provided the political support needed to promote a package of economic and financial measures for adjusting the budget deficit and other economic parameters, the government led by Emil Boc faced the moment when PSD left the govern-mental arch and subsequently it has collapsed after an impeachment motion. The

Prime Minister and the minority government remained in office until the presidential elections of December 2009, won by Traian Basescu by a close shave. The President has appointed Emil Boc again to form a government supported by PDL, UDMR, the group of the national minorities and a number of members of the Parliament who had migrated from PSD and PNL, which formed UNPR later. The political instability of the recent years, the vulnerability of the minority governments led by Tăriceanu (the second mandate) and Emil Boc (the first mandate), the conflicts between the political institutions and their representatives, have determined Freedom House to give the Government in 2010 a score of 4 points.

Analyzing the history of the Romanian government evaluations, it is clear that a similar score was not achieved since 1998, during Ciorbea's governance. The second government led by Emil Boc has proposed a program of tough austerity measures such as the reduction of salaries for the state employees by 25%, the reduction of pensions, the re-organization of public institutions accompanied by the firing of about 200,000 civil servants. All these macro-economic adjustment measures established with the international financial institutions - IMF, WB, EC - have generated widespread social protests from unions, professional associations (self-employed), have polarized the media and have exacerbated political fights. Although Romania's macroeconomic situation was maintained in the limits of the agreement with the international financiers, the confidence of the population in the government has decreased.

In January 2012, despite extremely low temperatures, people came out in Bucharest and in the county capital cities in order to protest against the presidency and the government. Facing a tense social situation that threatened to degenerate, the government led by Emil Boc submitted its mandate. The President nominated Mihai Razvan Ungureanu, director of the Foreign Information Service (SIE) to form a new cabinet. The latter received the vote of investiture in February 2012, but he lost the parliamentary support two months later (May 2012) as a result of an impeachment motion submitted by the opposition which also received the support of some Parliament members who had previously supported the governmental coalition.

A parliamentary majority comprising of PSD, PNL, UNPR and the parliamentary group of the minorities supported the investiture of the USL government (PSD-PNL) led by the PSD President Victor Ponta. Immediately after his installation in office, they started the negotiations with the IMF to ease the austerity measures for reducing the accumulated social tensions and for contenting the population. The task of the new government, considered by the analysts a "service" government, was to organize the local elections in May-June 2012 and the parliamentary elections in December 2012.

6. The independence of justice and the corruption issue

In every state, an important pillar of democratic consolidation is represented by the construction of the legal system, the independence of the judiciary and the effectiveness of the mechanisms of prevention and punishment of corruption. Democratic order is based on the functioning of the rule of law by which we understand a coherent set of laws and regulations articulated around the Constitution or the "fundamental law" in order to ensure individual rights and freedoms, elaborated by the legislative power (Parliament), implemented by the executive power (Government) and interpreted and sanctioned if violated by the judicial power (justice). The application of the principle of powers separation – legislative, executive and judicial – is a guarantee for the existence of the rule of law, to which a consensual behavior of the elites is added, regarding the obligation for respecting this principle, and also the public support expressed in the level of confidence in justice and in its institutions.

The construction of a state of law designed to ensure the application and promotion of the human rights and civil liberties was one of the great challenges during the transition from communism to democracy. The independence of justice and corruption issue have become indicators used by any analysts or evaluators of the democratic consolidation. A functional legal framework requires that the legal institutions and regulations be in agreement with the constitution of the country, coherent, meaning to avoid duplication, parallelism or contrariety, and efficient in relation to the specific situations in which they must be applied.

Regarding the independence of justice, the international standards require the creation of an institution that would supervise and sanction the cases when the personal independence of the judge or the judicial act as a whole are violated. For example, the Superior Council of Magistracy (CSM) is operating in Romania, an organization that was recognized as guarantor of the independence of the judiciary. The special importance of the independence of the judiciary in the rule of law requires that this body should be able to have effective means for defending the independence, impartiality or professional reputation of the magistrates. As judges or prosecutors, they must be legally protected from any interference of politics, individuals or groups interested in influencing the judicial process.

Ensuring the independence of the judiciary was one of the toughest criteria for the post-communist countries for being admitted in the European Union. Bulgaria and Romania still receive a severe monitoring of the justice and internal affairs domains, even after they became members of the EU with full rights. For this purpose, the "Cooperation and Verification Mechanism" (MCV) was established in order to supervise the Justice and Internal Affairs, and it realized regular evaluations regarding the implementation stage of the European Commission's recommendations.

**Figure no. 5. The evolution of the independence of the judiciary
in five post-communist countries**

(Source: author's diagram processed according to the data taken from the „Nations in Transit" 2000-2012 Reports of Freedom House: www.freedomhouse.org. Note: the evaluation is based on a regressive scale from 7 to 1, where 7 is the lowest level of democratic progress and 1 is the highest).

According to all national and international assessments, justice is indeed a serious problem for Romania. The slow and sometimes inefficient and corrupt mechanism of the Romanian justice was denounced by both the citizens that looked for justice and the media, independent observers and monitoring institutions. Of all five analyzed countries, our country recorded the lowest scores on the regressive scale from 7 to 1 designed by Freedom House. During Nastase's government (2000-2004) we have been constantly evaluated with 4.24 points. No other country of those who became EU members received such a low score. During Rodica Stănoiu's ministry (2000-2003), later proven to have been informer of the former political police Security, the politicization and generalized corruption in the Romanian justice was also "discovered" by the EU.

A study on the situation of the judiciary system published in 2004 by the National Institute of Criminology and ProDemocracy organization revealed that 77% of 3.400 interviewed magistrates complained of the extremely obvious political pressure on the justice process. Furthermore, 81% of the respondents affirmed that the judiciary is not independent.

According to an evaluation of the World Bank, the judiciary was ranked on the second place after the health system in the classification of the most corrupt institutions in Romania (Gallager, p. 135). The regular reports of the European Commission elaborated during Romania's EU pre-adhesion period revealed, in addition to the politicization and corruption of justice, other issues such as the lack of administrative capacity to make progress in this area, the overcrowding of the courts with cases, the appointment of prosecutors and judges without proper qualification and transparent criteria in the selection and employment on the vacant

positions, the promotion of the "appeal for annulment". Regarding the prevention and fight against economic crimes, organized crime and corruption, there was not any trained staff for implementing an approach according to the EU standards. Romania received 3.75 points from Freedom House in 2007 (the year of accession to the EU) at the "justice" chapter, for the administrative progress.

Corruption represents the abusive use of the powers given by the occupation of an office or public function in order to satisfy personal or group interests. Any act of any person or authority with the purpose to promote a personal or group interest/profit that causes damage to the public or private interest can be described as "corrupt". The legislation punishes both the corruption acts identifiable by their tangible or material damage and also the intent of the crime. In short, we can say that we are facing corruption when a high official or a public official, regardless his position, taking advantage of his position and duties, obtains personal benefits for himself or for another person, other than those to which he is entitled by the law (salary/emoluments).

All post-communist countries are facing the issue of fighting against corruption, a phenomenon that affects all dimensions of social life, causing serious damage regarding the economic, administrative and political point of view, but also the morality. Among the countries that have recently been admitted to the European Union, Romania is considered by the Freedom House experts the most corrupt country, being closely followed by Bulgaria. Referring to this aspect, Vasile Boari, the political scientist from Cluj, speaks of "the great paradox of the fight against corruption" which is that justice – the main weapon, is perceived as being one of the most corrupt institutions of Romania.

7. Instead of conclusions: Romania remains in process of consolidation

Democracy consolidation is a process eminently focused on achieving political standards: free and fair elections, independent media, democratic governance (rule of law, efficiency, transparency, truth in the allocation and spending of public funds, equidistance), civil society, independent judiciary, efficient fight against corruption. For the EU member countries or for those aspiring to obtain the EU membership, these standards are known under the name of "the Copenhagen political criteria": the existence of stable institutions that would guarantee the functioning of democracy, the supremacy of the law, the respect for human rights and the protection of minorities. The Copenhagen political criteria were later developed in the *Amsterdam Treaty* which states that „the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States (article 6). Any European State which respects these principles can become a member of the Union.

On the 1st of January 2007, when Romania became a member of the EU with full rights, it met all these political criteria, several reservations being expressed by some European officials regarding the judiciary reform and the fight against corruption. The political change made in 1996 included Romania in the category of the electoral ("minimal") democracies. Starting with this moment, a democratic consolidation process begins, process that, until the EU adhesion, presented an ascending trend, of *completing democracy*.

After more than a decade of democratic development (1996-2007), the process of democratic consolidation in Romania enters a stage of "democratic erosion" starting with the first suspension of President Traian Basescu (May 2007). The conflicts between the two representatives of the executive power – the President and the Prime Minister – and governmental instability will characterize the Romanian politics after the EU accession.

The second suspension of the President (July 2012) was produced by "forcing" the institutions and mechanisms of the rule of law and was politically sanctioned by the officials of the European institutions in Brussels. The disunion of the political elites, the deep cleavage between the political forces that placed themselves as pro-president and against the president, the lack of consensus even in areas such as foreign policy, national security and defense, the dispute over the constitutional procedures have created the perception of a country on the edge of democratic breakdown.

**Figure no. 6. The evolution of the democratic consolidation
in five post-communist countries**

(Source: author's diagram processed according to the data taken from the „Nations in Transit" 2000-2012 Reports of Freedom House: www.freedomhouse.org. Note: the evaluation is based on a regressive scale from 7 to 1, where 7 is the lowest level of democratic progress and 1 is the highest).

The conflict which characterizes not only the executive power, but the entire Romanian political system has as main cause the constitutional arrangement and the afferent legislation that regulates the relations between the three powers (executive, legislative, judicial), the relation between the fundamental institutions of the rule of law (the Presidency, Government, Parliament, Judiciary, the Constitutional Court). The second referendum organized for suspending the President Traian Basescu has unmistakably demonstrated the constitutional conflict amplified by the political elites at paroxysmal levels and also the urgent need to rearrange the constitutional relations between the state institutions, taking into account the experience gained in more then two decades of democratization, the current political realities and the requirements imposed by the Euro-Atlantic status of Romania. According to the international evaluations (Freedom House), in 2013 Romania remains a semi-consolidated democracy or located on the "long road of democratic consolidation."

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THE SUCCESS OF THE SOCIAL WORK APPARATUS IN THE BANAT REGION

Cosmin GOIAN [*]

Rezumat

Lucrarea de față își propune să prezinte o descriere a particultarităţilor asistenţei sociale din trei judeţe ale României care fac parte din provincia Banat (Timiş, Caraş Severin şi Arad). Sunt descrise rezultatele unor analize calitative din perspectiva a patru categorii de entităţi din domeniu (instituţii publice, organizaţii nonguvernamentale, instiţutii de învăţă-mânt universitar si organizaţii profesionale) pentru perioada 1990-2013. Sunt luate in consi-derare repere diacronice obţinute atât din consultarea unor informaţii de arhiva, lucrări de specialitate, surse din internet, ghiduri sociale, etc. Se va aloca un spaţiu în această lucrare şi elementelor de identitate profesională în asistenţa socială din Banat de după 1990. S-a încercat şi o inventariere a dificultăţilor asistenţilor sociali realizate în baza unei evaluări efectuate de Asociaţia Asistenţilor Sociali din Banat şi de sucursala Timiş a Colegiului Naţional al Asistenţilor Sociali din România. De asemenea, trebuie precizat că se va ţine seama şi de rolul autorului ca practicant in asistenţă socială, cadru didactic universitar în domeniu si preşedinte a două organizaţii profesionale din judeţul Timiş. Lucrarea îşi propune să fie parte dintr-o cercetare naţională care se va realiza în anul 2014, analizându-se particularităţile serviciilor sociale, ale organizaţiilor profesionale şi universităţilor care pregătesc viitorii asistenţi sociali.

Cuvinte cheie: identitate profesională, istoria asistenţei sociale din Banat, servicii sociale, organizaţii profesionale

Abstract

The present study intends to analyze the current situation of social work in three Romanian counties, which constitute the Banat region of Romania (Timis, Caras Severin and Arad counties). The qualitative analysis was completed from the perspective of four fields (the activities of the public institutions, nongovernmental organizations, university education institutions and professional organizations) over the span of time 1990 - 2013. The diachronic markers were obtained after consulting archives, different Internet resources, social guides etc. A special part of the present paper is dedicated to elements of professional identity in the field of social work in Banat, following 1990. We have also attempted to sum up the issues addressed by social workers based on assessments realized by the Social Workers Association from Banat and by the Timis Branch of the National College of Social Workers from Romania. Also, the author's role as an actively practicing social worker, academic and president of two professional organizations in Timis county are being considered. This paper wishes to be part of a national research panned to be

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implemented in 2014, analyzing the particularities of the social services, professional organizations and universities.

Keywords: professional identity, history of the social work, social services, professional organizations.

Résumé

Cette étude vise à présenter la situation du travail sociale dans trois comtés de la Roumanie, qui font partie du région Banat (Timis, Caras-Severin et Arad). A été utilise une méthodologie qualitative qui a analysé les quatre catégories suivantes d'institutions: les institutions publiques, les organisations non gouvernementales, les institutions éducatives et universitaires et les organisations professionnelles) pour la période 1990-2013. Les éléments utiles d'analyse diachronique ont été utilisés par la consultation des documents d'archives, des guides sociales et des ouvrages, pour obtenir des données sur les institutions de travail social du Banat entre 1990-2013. Sont inventoriés aussi des difficultés de la communauté professionnelle du Banat, et l'étude fait partie d'une recherche qui étendra dans toute le pays de 2014.

Mots clés: identité professionnelle, l'histoire du travail social, les services sociaux et les organisations professionnelles.

1. Introduction

According to the diachronic analysis, the social work system in Romania will be structured as follows:
- 1800-1920 - structuring the bases of the social work system;
- 1920-1945 - institutional diversifying and maturing of the social work system;
- 1945-1989 - the fall of the social work system;
- 1989-2013- restructuring and modernization of the social work system (Livadã-Cadeschi, p. 61, 2002)

The epicentral academic target is focused on the period 1989-2013. In 1990 Romania was free of the communist regime and was facing serious social issues. We specially refer to the situation of the institutionalized children and of the disabled people. The Banat region was no exception despite the fact that it is part of a geographic area considered more prosperous from an economic point of view. Nevertheless it still had the same common issue as the other regions of the country, namely the lack of trained social workers.

From a historical point of view, Social Work in Banat had common and different elements in the period 1880-1945. We have identified as common targets the initiative of social work associated with charity of religious institutions. The major difference lay in certain elements of administrative organization specific for the Austro-Hungarian domination (up to 1.12.1918), which remained conservative in the following period, as well. An inventory completed in 1936 shows a number

of 24 social work institutions in the Banat region, out of these 4 were financed by the region, 9 by the state, 3 by community resources, 7 by the county and 1 had private funding (Manuilã, 1938).

Coming back to the year 1990 we must mention that Banat indeed was an area of opening towards *(see* **table no 1***)*.Western influences and it had a larger number of social work institutions, mainly NGOs, but also important public institutions such as orphanages, State Inspectorates for disabled people, or Departments for child protection. See **table no 1**.

Table no 1. Inventory of social work institutions in Banat
(Source: *Ghidul Social al Banatului*, Edit Aprilia Print, 2000, pp.187-199)

County	Timis	Arad	Caras Severin
Number of institutions	117	93	45

2. Discussions

As follows, we will provide a description of the evolution of the social work institutions in Banat over the period 1990-2013, in the following fields:
Public organizations, NGOs, educational institutions and professional organizations.

2.1. Public organizations

The development of social work governmental institutions saw a rapid evolution and diversification as a result of the existing social problems, quite severe in the then Romania. Firstly, we must underline that a thorough reshuffling of the existing institutions (inherited from the Communist regime) followed, for example the centers for elderly people ("camine de batrani") present both in urban areas (Timisoara, Arad. Jimbolia, Resita, Caransebes etc) as well as in rural areas (Comlosul Mare). Orphanages ("centre de plasament") in urban areas (Arad, Resita, Timisoara, Lugoj) and in rural areas (Recas, Gavojdia, Santana, etc.) should be considered in the same category. The institutional development of the public organizations focused on the development of services for the disabled, the Territorial Inspectorate for Disabled People ("Inspectoratul de stat teritorial pt. persoane cu handicap") present in all county centers of the region (Timisoara, Arad, Resita). In the middle of the 1990s the main cities developed public social services which became public community services of social work in 2002. Over the last decade, rural area community services have also been developed, usually with

the support of the rural mayors' offices (SCPAS – "Servicii publice de asistenta sociala comunitara"). Considering the child's and the adult's protection, separate institutions functioned in 2003-2004: each of these 3 counties housed a General Headquarter for the Protection of Children's Rights ("Directia Generala de Protectie a Drepturilor Copilului") and a General Headquarter for Labour and Social Protection ("Directia Generala de Munca si Protectie Sociala"). After 2004-2005 the Department for Social Work and Child Protection ("Directiile Generale de Asistenta Sociala si Protectie a Copilului") was also founded.

Along with the development of social work as a profession and through Law No. 466/2004, professionals in this field found employment in other public institutions (*see* **table no 2***).

Over the last 24 years Banat has witnessed an intense dynamics of its institutions and of the public services of social care. Here we shall also consider Social Inspection. We must add that according to the present legal frame these institutions work in continuous partnership with the NGOs of the Timis, Arad and Caras Severin counties.

Table no 2. Tabel representing the social work oriented public institutions others DGASPC, DPS and SCPAS (The present graph belongs to the author.)

No	Field	Examples of institutions
1	Health	The county hospitals from Timisoara, Arad, Resita; the psychiatric hospitals from Jebel, Gataia, The Early Diagnosis Center and Medical Recovery – Radu Dunareanu from Timisoara, the Eduard Pamfil psychiatric clinic
2	Delinquency	Penitentiaries from Timsioara, Arad, the Probation service from Timisoara, Arad, Resita, the Center for Minors from Buzias etc
3	Unemployment	The county Agencies for integrating on the labour market (AJOFM)

2.2. NGOs

We will now present some particularities of the NGOs in the Banat area. The most significant source of charity and of social services after 1990 was the NGOs' sector. Their occurrence was the result of the urgent need to answer the crises faced by the post-communist society confronted itself. Most of them aimed to aid children and disabled people, leading to those NGOs of the present days which offer integrating services onto the labour market (Elena Zamfir, 2000).

Due to the ample social problems faced by children, we have observed that in the three counties of the Banat region there were organizations specialized exclusively on child protection, with their activity clearly focused on:

- abandoned children
- homeless children
- disabled children or children with chronic diseases
- abused children
- children form economically disadvantaged families

The majority of these NGOs were established without having trained social workers as their employees (Mănoiu 1996), yet in time, as services became more professional, a progressive translation from charity to specialized social work took place (*see* **table no 3** *and* **table no 4**)*.* In accordance with the current laws, NGOs have active partnerships with public institutions implementing important financial resources from the European Commission or form the Romanian state (Iovita D.C. 2012).

Table no 3. The list of NGOs according to the category of their funding members
(The present graph belongs to the author.)

Category after type of founding members	Ex. from Timis county	Ex. from Arad county	Ex. from Caras Severin county
Branches of religious organizations	Asociatia Evanghelica si de caritate ISR, Asociatia Umanitar crestina Calea lui Hristos, Asociatia Filantropia	Diakonia evanghe-lica, Asociatia tine-ret pt Cristos, Aso-ciatia de caritate Maranata, Asociatia ortodoxa romana Buna Vestire	Fundatia Humanitas Pro Deo, Asociatia Baptista caritabila Casa Dorca
Branches of national organizations	Salvati Copiii, Cru-cea rosie, Asociatia nevazatorilor din Romania, Comuni-tatea Nationala a Aloolicilor Anonimi	Salvati copiii, crucea rosie, Comunitatea Nationala a Aloolicilor Anonimi	Salvati copiii, Crucea rosie, Comunitatea Nationala a Aloolicilor Anonimi
Branches of large international organizations	Caritas Timisoara, Serviciul de ajutor maltez, Fundatia Bethany, Fundatia Kolping	Caritas Arad, Servi-ciul de ajutor maltez Dorobant, Fundatia Mondo Umano,	Federatia Caritas a Diecezei Caransebes, World Vision
Initiatives of local community members	Asociatia Armonia, Fundatia Pentru Voi, Fundatia Timisoara 89, Fundatia SCOP	Asociatia Morar Ioan, Asociatia Andrei, Asociatia Hora copiilor	Asociatia Huma-nitas, Asociatia pentru fiecare copil o familie, Asociatia umanitara Minerva.

Table no 4. Tabel representing a list of NGOs according to their category of beneficiaries (The present graph belongs to the author.)

Category of beneficiaries	Timis	Arad	Caras Severin
Children in difficulty	Salvati Copiii Timisoara, Fundatia Bethany, Fundatia SCOP, Fundatia Rudolf Walter	Asociatia Morar Ioan, Asociatia Andrei, Asociatia Adobe Romania, Santana	Fundatia Humanitas Pro Deo, Organizatia Salvati Copiii, Asociatia Umanitara Speranta
Disabled persons	Asociatia Podul cel Lung, Fundatia Pentru Voi, Asociatia handicapatilor locomotori,	Asociatia distrofi-cilor muscular, Fundatia BRITT, Asociatia nevazato-rilor filiala Arad	Fundatia umanitara Maria, Asociatia Humanitas, Asociatia handicapatilor neuromotor Caransebes
Elderly people	Serviciul de ajutor maltez, Fundatia Adam Muller Guttenbrunn, Federatia Caritas	Serviciul de ajutor maltez Dorobanti, Asociatia Caritas Banat Sanctus Gerhardus	Centrul de ingrijire si asistenta Sacu, Federatia Caritas, Asociatia Humanitas Resita
People released from detention	Asociatia umnaitara Sfantul Petru si Pavel,	Asociatia de binefacere Europa pentru Europa	Asociatia Sfanta Maria, Resita
Women in difficulty	Asociatia pentru promovarea femeii, Fundatia Estera, Fundatia Scop	Asociatia Oaza, Fundatia Bobul de grau, Fundatia crestina Betesda,	Asociatia umanitara Minerva, Resita
Ethnic groups	Asociatia Social-culturala a romilor din Banat, Asociatia femeilor tiganci	Forumul Democrat al Germanilor din Arad, Asociatia Tineret pentru Cristos	Asociatia Romilor din judetul Caras Severin

2.3. The Educational Institutions in the Social work field from the Banat area

The seriousness and the high number of social problems after 1990 triggered emerging interest towards social work. The profession was banned by the communist regime, this lead to the fact that the great majority of the employees in this field were unqualified. The desperate need of specialists also encouraged short term courses organized by foreign NGOs, which met the necessities of the moment (Elena Zamfir, 2000). In time, they were replaced by university study programs,

the only who respected the criteria of Law 466 / 2004, which stipulates a BA degree as an eligibility criterion to practice in social work. The most important university in the region, the West University of Timisoara, started to prepare and qualify social workers in 1992. The need to have graduate specialists lead to the extension of the social work studies to the state universities from Resita and Arad, but also to the private universities in the Banat area.

The abovementioned universities are authorized to prepare social workers at a BA and at an MA level, except for the private ones in Timis county *(see* **table no 5***)*. The West University of Timisoara and the Vasile Goldis Univeristy are enabled to prepare social workers in the system of long distance learning. Also, the West University of Timisoara has received the permission to offer PhD level studies with topics in social work.

Table no 5. Tabel representing the Universities offering BA degrees in social work, the graph belongs to the author (The present graph belongs to the author.)

Type of university	Timis	Arad	Caras Severin
Public	West University of Timisoara	Aurel Vlaicu University	Eftimie Murgu University
Private	Mihai Eminescu University, Banatul University	Vasile Goldis University	A branch of Spiru Haret University

Concerning the curricula of these universities they have been adapted from models of long tradition universities from the UK and the USA, in the 1990s. After the year 2000 the Education Ministry has imposed certain uniformity of the curricula at a national level, through its field commissions. The field practice represented an important place in the curricula of social work.

We will now consider the actors involved in the educational process in the field of social work. Our academic staff from the early 1990s was selected from specialists in the fields of sociology and psychology or they were professors from the USA. At the end of the 1990s a part of the graduates of the social work courses remained in the higher education system, continuing their MA and PhD studies either in the Romania or abroad. They elevated the quality of education in this field.

Up to the implementation of the Bologna system students' BA program lasted for 4 years. This was reduced to a period of 3 years' time.

The social work graduates in the Banat region are active on the Romanian labor market, but also abroad, in countries from Western Europe (UK, England or France) or in North America (Canada and USA). For instance, an analysis of the 2007 alumni shows that 1/3 of them are social workers in North America.

The social work departments are in a continuous partnership with the organizations which offer services for the preparing of specialists, initiating and implementing research and intervention projects but also for organizing national and international conferences.

3. The professional organization from the Banat region

Starting with the year 1996, when the first generation of graduates in social works graduated the bachelor studies, the necessity occurred to form associations to support their rights. All these steps remained at an informal level in the 1990s, for example every Thursday an evening of the social workers was organized. Starting with the year 2000 in Timisoara a group of 24 people founded the Association of Social Workers from Banat, as an organization with juridical status, was meant to represent the interests of the group. This association created a number of opportunities for the social workers to develop projects and activities in the interest of the professional community (http://www.aasbanat.ro/activitati.php). Afterwards, in 2001 the Association of Social Workers from Banat became the founding member of the National Federation of Social Workers from Romania. The representatives of this professional organization extended their communication with social workers from other regions of the country and after a series of work meetings, they succeeded to implement the Law of the Social Workers / 2004 and implicitly the National College of the Social Workers from Romania. In 2007 a branch of this college was constituted in Caras Severin and another one was founded in Arad in 2012.

During an inventory of the issues of the social workers' community in Timis county, completed by 160 members of the CNASR, the following has been concluded: the social workers' dissatisfaction with their salaries; the lack of professional supervising; the presence of burn-out due to the high level and long term stress exposure; the lack of authority in multidisciplinary teams; willingness of the employers to hire unqualified personnel, without university degrees in this field. The members of the professional associations from Banat can be divided in two categories:

1. Social workers who are involved in the professional organizations' activities (work committees, debates, meetings, conferences) apart from their direct professional duties (Goian 2013 pp. 59-60).
2. Social workers who choose to not get involved in other activities besides their regular job.

At present the professional organization in Banat are active through the following activities:
- publishing an monthly online journal, which presents the activities of the social workers in Banat

- a group of online discussions active since 2001, with over 200 subscribed professionals
- a festive meeting starting in November 2013 where awards are offered to social workers and their projects.

4. Conclusion

As a conclusion, social work in Banat has had a development that may be considered a professional identity encompassing activities of public organizations, NGOs, universities and professional organizations. The aforementioned success creates the premises that social work is a developed field in the Romanian social space. The difficulties described above as well as those which we could not analyze in the present paper should not discourage us. Let us consider the social work system in the USA, which gained its maturity after approximately half a century since its birth.

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SETTING THE HISTORICAL RECORD STRAIGHT: JUDGING THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PAST AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF POPULAR NOSTALGIC RESISTANCE

Mihai Stelian RUSU [*]

Rezumat

Lucrarea de față examinează relația dintre regimul politic postcomunist și trecutul comunist, urmărind mai exact modul în care, după o perioadă în care actorii statali au recurs la strategii evitaționiste, trecutul comunist a fost până la urmă confruntat frontal în 2006 prin comisionarea de către președintele României a Raportului Tismăneanu în vederea condamnării oficiale a regimului comunist. Raportul Tismăneanu este interpretat ca fiind o tentativă sponsorizată statal de impunere a unei memorii oficiale a comunismului ca unică narativă „științifică" a trecutului comunist. Procesul comunismului, sfârșit prin condamnarea regimului ca ilegitim și criminal pe baza Raportului Tismăneanu, este văzut ca alcătuind o strategie politică de legitimare a noii ordini democratice prin ruperea de trecut. Lucrarea analizează apoi conflictul latent existent între memoria oficială a comunismului codificată în narativa furnizată de Raportul Tismăneanu și memoria populară exprimată de o puternică nostalgie colectivă față de același trecut comunist. În concluzie, lucrarea sugerează că elitele politice și intelectuale anti-comuniste au câștigat bătălia asupra memoriei oficiale a comunismului, dar au pierdut războiul asupra amintirilor private ale fostului regim, puternic încărcate de sentimente nostalgice.

Cuvinte cheie: memoria colectivă, nostalgia comunistă, politicile memoriei, „comisia adevărului", Raportul Tismăneanu, justiție tranzițională, procesul comunismului

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the post-communist political regime and the communist past, analysing how the communist past, after a period of time when the state agents resorted to eschewing strategies, was eventually confronted frontally in 2006 when the Romanian President commissioned what came to be known as the "Tismăneanu Report" in order to officially condemn the communist regime. The Tismăneanu Report is seen here as a state-sponsored attempt to impose an official memory of communism as the sole "scientifically" based narrative of the communist past. The trial of communism, ended with the sentencing of the communist regime as illegitimate and murderous based on the conclusions of the Tismăneanu Report, is seen as expressing a political strategy of legitimating the new democratic order by breaking off with the past. The paper then examines the latent conflict subsisting between the official memory of communism codified in the narrative delivered by the Tismăneanu Report and the popular memory expressed by a strong collective nostalgia towards the same communist past. The paper concludes by suggesting that the anti-communist intellectual and political elites won the battle over public memory of communism, but lost the war over private remembrances of communism.

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Résumé

Ce papier examine la relation entre le régime politique post-communiste et le passé communiste, analysant plus exactement la manière dont, après une période dans laquelle les acteurs de l'État ont eu recours à des stratégies d'évitement, le passé communiste a finalement été confronté frontalement en 2006 lorsque le Président de la Roumanie a commissionné le «Rapport Tismăneanu» afin de condamner officiellement le régime communiste. Le rapport Tismăneanu est vu ici comme une tentative soutenue par l'État d'imposer une mémoire officielle du communisme comme le seul récit «scientifique» du passé communiste. Le procès du communisme, qui a pris fin avec la condamnation du régime communiste comme illégitime et meurtrière sur la base des conclusions du rapport Tismăneanu, est considéré comme l'expression d'une stratégie politique de légitimer le nouvel ordre démocratique en rompant avec le passé. Le papier examine ensuite le conflit latent qui existe entre la mémoire officielle du communisme codifiée dans le récit livré par le rapport Tismăneanu et la mémoire populaire exprimée par une forte nostalgie collective vers le même passé communiste. Le document conclut en suggérant que les élites intellectuelles et politiques anti-communistes ont gagné la bataille sur la mémoire officielle du communisme, mais ont perdu la guerre sur les mémoires privés de l'ancien régime, lourdement chargés de sentiments nostalgiques.

Mots-clés: la mémoire collective, la nostalgie communiste, la politique de la mémoire, «la commission de la vérité», le rapport Tismăneanu, la justice transitionnelle, le procès du communisme.

1. Collective memory in the context of transitional justice

The "third wave of democratization" (Huntington 1993) by which former authoritarian societies switched their political orientation towards embracing a democratic confession of faith left in its wake, amidst a wilderness of other difficulties inherent to the transitional process, the problem posed by the burden of their authoritarian past. One of the most burning questions requesting public attention in post-authoritarian times addresses the problem of managing the difficult legacy of the past: "How should [newly democratized] societies deal with their evil pasts?" (Teitel 2000, p. 3). As a rule, the abrupt shift from one political regime to another form of political organization (be it either by bloody upheaval, "velvet" revolution, or coup d'état) sets in motion a process of "coming to terms with the past" that sometimes takes the form of "transitional justice." The notion of transitional justice refers to the set of measures, both judiciary and non-judiciary, by which societies emerged out of authoritarian political regimes confront their past, bringing it in the judicial, moral, historical, and interpretive firing line of the current socio-political order. Jon Elster (2004, p. 1) defines transnational justice as a form of "retrospective justice," "made up of the processes of trials, purges, and

reparations that take place after the transition from one political regime to another." The body of measures making up the procedural arsenal of transitional justice includes judicial prosecuting, establishing "truth commissions," regulating the mechanisms of political participation and representation (especially by instituting lustration as a mean of blocking former members of the ruling elite from reaching the political power positions within the new regime), re-writing official history, opening access to secret files, material and financial reparations provided to victims of the former regime, as well as establishing new public symbols by changing streets names, erecting statues, building memorials, and devising commemoration ceremonies (see also Stan 2013, p. 1). Alongside judicial policies, a major component of transitional justice is "the politics of memory," by which the new regime takes pains to recast collective memory along the interpretive lines sanctioned under the new political conditions. Collective memory, by which we refer to the retro-projective system of social representations promoted by the current socio-political order concerning its own past, becomes the subject of politically motivated actions within the context of transitional justice. In the aftermath of the regime change, the new political actors who launched the process of transitional justice also start a process of demolishing and reconstructing what can be called the "mnemonic order" of society (Rusu 2011), i.e., the social institutions and cultural structures responsible for cultivating, managing, and promoting collective memory.

2. The Tismăneanu report: historical truth by political design

Romanian society emerged out of the totalitarian captivity of the communist regime through the flames of revolutionary violence that broke out in the middle of the December 1989 events. Still shrouded in mystery, the events that took place in December 1989 suggest the transformation of a spontaneous revolt over a minor issue (the eviction of the pastor László Tőkés from his parsonage in Timişoara), which, magnetizing the chronic dissatisfaction of the population, rapidly developed into a full-blown anti-communist revolution (Siani-Davies 2006). Despite the spurts of violence (largely provoked by the brutal reaction of the communist repressive forces), the movement remained an "unfinished revolution" (Roper 2000), seized by figures coming from the second echelon of the Communist Party who achieved the remarkable double performance of thinning down the radicality of revolutionary claims while asserting themselves as legitimate leader of the movement. In these conditions of a "confiscated revolution" by the revisionist communists, who ensured by this move their control over the Romanian political life during the post-communist period, it is no wonder that from the moment of the regime change (December 1989) until the moment of the official condemnation of communism (December 2006) 17 years have passed. Precisely due to this firm grip

over the Romanian political means held by the former communists, the public claims for starting the "trial of communism" remained unanswered. The political domination of the inheritors of the former Communist Party, initially transfigured into the National Salvation Front (FSN), later split and metamorphosed into the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Democratic Party (PD), was responsible for systematically ignoring the civic claims requesting the state to reckon with the communist past. Although circulating in public arena from as early as 1990, benefiting from a large social support, these claims remained unsuccessful until 2006, when President Traian Băsescu, against a background of political conflicts, symbolically speculated and politically capitalized the "window of opportunity" of officially condemning the communist regime (see Abraham 2008, pp. 13-17 for the contextual details and political insides regarding the presidential decision to follow an invitation he previously eschewed). Simplifying to the extreme, it can be concluded that the decision to formally and officially condemn communism has been taken against the background of insisting claims made by civil society, but also in a political conjuncture from which T. Băsescu tried to gain an infusion of political capital.

In April 2006, president Băsescu appointed political scientist Vladimir Tismăneanu as coordinator of the Presidential Commission for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania. The task given to him was expressly formulated: "The presidential Commission for the analysis of communist dictatorship is made up as a response to President Traian Băsescu's request of condemning the communist regime from Romania, on the basis of a rigorous and coherent document" (Press release, Romanian Presidency, April 20 2006). The "Final Report" had been written by the end of the year, and assumed by the Romanian president, who condemned the communist regime in the name of the Romanian state in the common session of the two chambers of the Parliament in December 18, 2006. By promulgating the condemnation of the communist past by the Romanian president, the post-communist Romanian democratic state tried to symbolically mark the breaking of the communist past as the decisive turning point in the democratic becoming of Romanian society.

The Final Report drawn up by the team coordinated by V. Tismăneanu comprises an analysis extending over 660 pages, prefaced by an "Introduction" where "The nature, purpose, and effects of the totalitarian communist regime in Romania, 1945-1989" are clarified, followed by the section setting the "Historiographical landmarks" of the Romanian communist regime. Next, the Report thoroughly analyses "The Romanian Communist Party" (Chapter 1), "The Repression" (Chapter 2), where the authors plead the case for proving the "communist genocide in Romania." In this section, the analysis centers upon the institution of *Securitate* as Party instrument, and then maps out the "geography of repression" represented by the concentrationary system of the Romanian Gulag. Questions pertaining to "Society, Economy, Culture" are pooled together in the third Chapter

of the Report. This section discusses the planned economy, the process of collectivization of agriculture, the cultural and educational policies of the regime, the "ideological terror" by which the complete monopole over the cultural life was established, and the pro-natalist demographic policy legislated in 1966. The Report closes down by a "Conclusion," in which "the necessity of analysing, repudiating, and condemning the communist regime" is put forward (Report 2006, p. 628). The Report includes, in the appendix, the list of the nomenklaturists' biographies, compiling a kind of *index infamis nominum* of the human protagonist made responsible for the crimes of the communist regime.

The Report's sententious conclusion, already drawn prior to the beginning of the analysis[1], is that the communist regime was "illegitimate and murderous" (Report 2006, p. 638). The verdict of illegitimacy and criminality of the communist regime is the axial idea threading throughout the entire length of the historical exposition, the whole analysis being wrapped around this pivotal theme. The historical meta-narrative produced by the "truth commission" is structured upon the following frames: the beginning of the Second World War in 1939 put an end to "a relatively happy period" in Romanian history. Then, after passing through the sufferings of the war, the change of sides done by King Michael's coup d'état of August 23 1944 marked "the beginning of the most dark epoch of the country's modern history" (Report 2006, p. 158). Imposed by the force of Soviet tanks, and democratically legitimated by an electoral fraud, the communist regime has been, during its whole existence, an "occupation regime" (Report 2006, p. 168). "For four and an half decades, the Romanian state has been seized by a political group stranger to the interests and aspirations of the Romanian people" (Report 2006, p. 17), responsible for "raping the masses" as well for designing and executing a double genocide (one against "the biological fund of the nation," the other as a "cultural genocide"). Cutting a long (hi)story short, this political group is blamable for "Romania's tragedy under communism" (Report 2006, p. 19). Without specifying here all the other counts raised against communism, the conclusion of the Report deriving from these is straightforward: the communist regime was illegitimate and murderous, and the moral duty to condemn it is not only plainly evident but also imperative.

Highly vulnerable to substantial critiques coming from multiple attack angles (most of them grouped together in the volume *The Illusion of Anticommunism* [Ernu et al 2008]), the Report can be characterized as a paradoxical document: first, although announced as scientific research, the argumentation developed over the entire length of the analysis is driven by rather prosecuting intentions than analytic purposes. Its manifest accusatorial nature and the systematic scrupulosity

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[1] The conclusion of the "illegitimacy and murderousness" of communist regime was already advanced to president Traian Băsescu by Sorin Ilieşiu in October 2005 in a "Report for condemning communist regime as illegitimate and murderous." The counts raised in this document are reiterated in the Final Report published in 2006.

of identifying moral culprits responsible for the crimes of communism give the Report the quality of being an indictment rather than having the status of scientific document. Completely justified, Michael Shafir (2007) classifies the Report in the category of "memory," rejecting its belonging to "history" due to its explicit moral content and accusatorial tone. This first paradox is further complicated by the fact that, although formulated as an *in absentia* indictment of communism (raising counts, putting the past on trial, followed by claiming formal condemnation of the communist regime), the language used in prosecuting communism abounds in poetic licenses, metaphorical formulations, and other expressive extravaganza, all of these converging towards conceptual impressionism an semantic inflation. For instance, one of the *pièces des résistance* making up the conceptual armature of the Report is the notion of genocide used to describe the criminal acts of the communist regime to destroy the "biological fund of the nation" (Report 2006, p. 160). As a series of critics compellingly argued, the concept of "genocide," as defined both in international jurisprudence and in academic literature, cannot be applied to the Romanian case (Shafir 2007). In sum, without mentioning all of its weaknesses, the Report is a document pretending scientific status ending up raising counts, ultimately condemning communism not on the basis of evidence presented in the aseptic language requested by the formal rules prevalent in judicial proceedings, but in a poetic language cast in a metaphoric style. Instead of trying to comply with the methodological canons of historical scholarship, the Report seems to be firmly rooted in the "lyrical-speculative paradigm" (Iluţ 2009, p. 24).

The soundest critique, however, is pointing out the fact that the Report conformed to an express political command. The fact that the Commission had the objective of delivering a pre-concluded document in order to justify the official condemnation of communism is clearly revealed by the paragraph of the already mentioned Presidency Press release, which specifies that the President "wishes that this commission to draw up a 'rigorous and coherent' report, that would give him the opportunity to officially condemn the period of those approximately fifty years of communism in Romania" (Romanian Presidency Press release, April 20 2006). Resulting without a doubt from this statement is that we are dealing with the commissioning of historical truth by political command, as a basis for condemning a political regime. The major problem is that the sentence of the "trial of communism" had been already prejudged. The commission fulfilled its officially designated task, choosing to ignore all these profoundly disturbing issues, which throw doubt over the validity of the entire analytic endeavour of the Report, and also raise troubling questions concerning the general epistemic status of state-sponsored history: what is the epistemological validity of pre-concluded, politically ordered historical truth? Moreover, can the historian erect himself as moral instance and issue condemning sentences?

Following the line laid down by Leopold von Ranke as far back as the mid-19th century, continued by Max Weber with his postulate of "value-free" scholarship,

the answer to the previous question is a negative one: the sole moral duty of a historian *qua* historian is the epistemic integrity of his or her conclusions (Berger 1963)[2]. "To history has been assigned the office of judging the past, of instructing the present for the benefit of future ages. To such high offices this work does not aspires: it wants only to show what actually happened," this is what Ranke wrote as his methodological manifesto in the preface of one of his works (Evans 1997, p. 17). The "Rankean revolution" by which historiography gained a respectable epistemological status has been propelled by this imperative of not judging the past in the court of the present. This is not the case for the Tismăneanu Report. Although pretends to deliver the scientific truth of Romanian communism, the Report diverges greatly from the principle of moral abstinence. Moreover, the very idea of "truth commission" must be subjected to an intense critical scrutiny, since the desire to definitively settle a conclusion as the official truth by a state-sponsored commission is alien to the ethos of science, codified in what came to be known as "the Mertonian norms": communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, and organized scepticism (Merton 1973). Establishing definitive and apodictic truth goes against the epistemic spirit of science. As early as Charles S. Pierce's philosophy, the principles of tentativity and fallibility of human knowledge entered into the epistemic chart respected by all "communities of inquirers." Ratifying provisory conclusions as definitive truth is the surest path towards dogma, as Karl Popper (1981) [1934] assures us, for whom only abrogations are possible in science, while ratification and promulgation go beyond the realm of science.

Assuming the Tismăneanu Report by the republic's president in the name of the Romanian state and pronouncing the condemnation of communism in Romanian Parliament symbolized a turning point and a critical disjuncture in Romanian culture. It marked the rebalancing of the power differential in Romanian politics and culture regarding the legacy of communism. Two divergent narratives defined the main patterns of retrospection to the past: i) the conservative narrative, embraced by the post-communist political elite emerged from the ranks of the former unique party, in which the communist regime was depicted in positive tones (as the golden age of Romanian historical existence, the epoch of great techno-logical and industrial achievements, and the age of national affirmation on the world scene); ii) the liberal counter-narrative, articulated by the anti-communist intelligentsia made up of the dissidents and victims of the former totalitarian regime, in which the communist past was painted in grave and gloomy dyes, as a tragic half of century of Romanian existence (Ciobanu 2009, p. 318). For more than 15 years from the overthrow of the communist regime, the conservative narrative dominated the public arena, politically sanctioned by the Party's successors who mastered the pivotal power positions of Romanian politics and thus

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[2] Peter Berger formulated this prescription referring to sociology and its practitioners in particular. I see no problem in generalising Berger's principle to all members belonging to any "community of inquirers" who collectively aspire to reach truths.

also exerted control over the control panel of domestic culture. The contesting narrative, liberal in flavour, although circulated within public sphere as far back as from the aftermath of the revolutionary events (see the Proclamation of Timişoara from May 1990), remained overshadowed by the conservative version of the past in terms of political support and political leverage enjoyed in the hybrid field of Romanian politics and culture. The tactical rather than strategic move made by T. Băsescu by condemning the communist regime resulted in the reconfiguration of power relations. It officialised the liberal narrative while publicly discrediting the conservative perspective of the past. Within the context of the politics of memory in post-communist Romanian culture, the Tismăneanu Report and the public condemnation of communism signal the success of democratic and anti-communist forces in imposing the interpretation of communism as illegitimate and murderous within Romanian historical consciousness. In conjunction with the other concerted actions (the creation of the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile [IICCMRE] as "historical prosecution office" in charge of researching the past in order to identify authors of crimes during the former regime and bring them to penal justice; the writing of a textbook on the history of communism in Romania; the plans for building a museum of communism and for instituting a commemorative day in the memory of the victims of communism, etc.), the officialisation of the Report symbolizes a tectonic movement within the Romanian mnemonic order: the overthrow of the conservative "truth regime" together with its entire discursive order and the establishing of the anti-communist "truth regime" where the master narrative of communism as illegitimate and murderous rules supreme, exercising hegemony over the interpretation of communist past (Foucault 1980).

The Report is meant to mark the rupture between totalitarianism and democracy by denouncing the Stalinist past, but it does it in a typical Stalinist fashion. One of the most recognizable hallmarks of the former totalitarian communist regimes was their scrupulosity in elaborating official historical narratives of the past. Perfecting a tendency specific to all state-sponsored histories, the communist regimes excelled at what James V. Wertsch (2004, p. 72) has called "the production of a univocal official collective memory." Numerous readers of the Report pointed out the resemblances between the production of historical truth in Stalinist regimes and the way in which the authors of the Report contributed in creating a "one-sided single official historical narrative by suppressing all possible competing narratives and erasing inconvenient memories" (Ciobanu 2009, p. 316). More caustic, Daniel Barbu (2008, p. 77) signalled the similarity between the Report condemning communism and the "Party's old reports." They both conform to the same logic of imposing a single official interpretation of reality, in perfect harmony with the political spirit of the time. In sum, the Tismăneanu report, displayed as the singular and exclusive "historical truth" about communism, institutionalised a new state-sponsored official historiographical orthodoxy.

3. Popular nostalgia: collective yearning after the communist past

The trial of communism, ended with the condemnation of the former regime as illegitimate and murderous, was supposed to mark Romanian democratic society's break with its totalitarian past. Democratic becoming is requires, in the Report's view, freeing of the burden of the communist past. As such, the Report was built upon the biblical principal "the (historical) truth will set us (politically) free." By openly reckoning with the communist past, through a critical self-introspection, the Report aimed at cutting the ties with the past as a pre-condition for democratic take-off and consolidation. Only that Romanian population continues to be intimately tied to the communist past through strong attitudinal bridges, expressed as collective nostalgia. Parallel to anti-communist elites' struggle to produce a paradigm shift in the official interpretation of the past, at the popular level, communist nostalgia was increasingly gaining momentum. As Romanian society was getting stuck in the slinky path of transition, occupational stability and job security, social protection offered by the paternalist state and socio-economic homogeneity appeared to the Romanians that took the hardest hit from the difficulties of post-communist life as good old landmarks lost in a current world marked by unpredictability and flagrant inequalities. The nostalgic reaction can be understood as an adaptive response of retrospective valorization of the past, in the context of a present perceived as degrading in comparison to the life in communism, difficult and ridden with shortages, but nonetheless predictable.

The anti-communist narrative developed by the Tismăneanu Report clashed into a passive but tenacious "nostalgic resistance" espoused by people whose lives were disrupted by the regime change and by the transformative transition that followed next. As revealed by the data presented shortly below, the Tismăneanu Report comes against the grain of a considerable part of public opinion, which, far from looking with condemning eyes towards the communist past, considers it a better alternative to the current transitional present.

The series of studies entitled "New Europe Barometers" (NEB), conducted between 1991 and 2004, offer a unique resource of statistical data in that it allow for examining longitudinally the attitudinal tendencies towards the communist heritage in the former communist societies of Central and South-East Europe (Rose 2010). Among the questions addressed in these surveys, one is of special interest to our purposes. Interviewees were first shown a vertical card with the following instructions: "Here is a scale for ranking how our system of government works. The top, plus 100, is the best; the bottom, minus 100, the worst. Where on this scale would you put the former Communist regime?" The answers to this question can be taken as discriminating between the category of nostalgic individuals (those who appreciate positively the former communist regime) and the category of "presentists" (those individuals who evaluate negatively the former regime). The answers collected for this question were coded in three generic categories: a) the

nostalgics (the respondents who gave positive scores to the former regime, scoring it with values ranging from +100 to +1); b) the neutrals (the individuals who scored the former regime with the value 0); c) the presentists (the individuals who gave negative scores to the former regime, scoring it with values ranging from 1 to 100). **Table no 1** presents the dynamics in time of the answers given to this question.

Table no 1. The evolution of Romanian public opinion regarding the appreciation of the former regime (N=7064)

	The presentists (%)	**The neutrals (%)**	**The nostalgics (%)**	**Total (%)**
1991	66,9	6,8	26,3	100
1992	55,6	9,0	35,3	100
1993	61,6	6,1	32,3	100
1995	60,8	13,1	26,1	100
1998	53,9	14,0	32,1	100
2001	31,4	13,6	55,0	100
2004	42,3	13,1	44,7	100

Source: author's calculation based on New Europe Barometers databases

If in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution of 1989 the balance clearly weighted in favour of the "presentists" (i.e. in favor of those who appreciate negatively the former communist regime) (67 versus 26 per cent), within two decades and a half the differential between presentists and nostalgics gradually balanced out, reaching in 2004 an almost perfect equilibrium (42 versus 44 per cent). In the long term, the observable tendency is that of a progressive revaluation of the communist past as we move away on the time axis from the moment of the overthrow of the communist regime. Data suggest an increasing retrospective appreciation of the former regime. In general, positive evaluations of the former communist regime (i.e. communist nostalgia) tend to amplify with time.

The fund of collective nostalgia towards the communist period and the intensity of the valuation of the former regime are revealed by other survey data collected during the last decade as well. For instance, the Public Opinion Barometers (POBs) that mapped out collective attitudes towards the communist past, especially the Romanians affinity towards the communist ideology, suggest similar results to the one reached by the "New Europe Barometers." One question that has been repeatedly asked, so as to allow us to examine the diachronic evolution of the attitudes towards communism, is the following one: "In your opinion, communism was: a) a good idea, well applied; b) a good idea, wrongly applied; c) not a good idea." Corroborating the results reached by POB surveys to the results reached by other studies conducted by IICCMRE, we get a picture of the dynamics of Romanian public opinion towards the idea of communism.

Table no 2. The dynamics of Romanian public opinion towards the idea
of communism (N=10198)

	A good idea, well applied (%)	A good idea, wrongly applied (%)	Not a good idea (%)	Don't know/No answer (%)	Total (%)
2002[3]	12,2	40,4	38,7	8,75	100
2005[4]	9,8	35,7	42,9	11,5	100
2006[5]	12,2	41,5	34,1	12,3	100
2007[6]	8,6	36	38	17,3	100
2010[7]	14,5	45,5	28	12	100
2011[8]	18	43	25	14	100

Source: POB and IICCMRE surveys (see *infra* notes 3-8)

Data show without a doubt that the majority of population manifests affinity towards the idea of communism. In 2011, for instance, 61 per cent of the respondents appreciated communism as a good idea, while only 25 per cent classified it as a bad one. Without entering into sophisticated statistical analysis, it can be said without too many reservations that collective nostalgia is the dominant mode of relating to the communist past in Romanian society. In the words of the historian Adrian Cioflâncă (2010), "communism lost the battle with history, but, at least for now, not the one with memory." This conclusion is strengthened by other survey data[9], revealing that a considerable per cent of Romanian population do not support the Report's conclusion on the basis of which the President pronounced the condemnation of communism. For instance, 31 per cent from those interviewed do not agree with the conclusion that the communist regime was illegitimate, while 42

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[3] The per cents represent the average values calculated from the two Public Opinion Barometers (POBs) realized in 2002, in June and October respectively. The June 2002 POB was based on a representative sample of 2212 respondents, with a margin of error of ± 2,3 per cent at a 95 per cent level of confidence. The October 2002 POB was based on a representative sample of 2128 respondents, with a margin of error of ± 2,3 per cent at a 95 per cent level of confidence.

[4] POB May 2005, based on a representative sample of 1800 respondents, with a margin of error of ± 2,3 per cent at a 95 per cent level of confidence.

[5] POB October 2006, based on a representative sample of 1975 respondents, with a margin of error of ± 2,3 per cent at a 95 per cent level of confidence.

[6] POB October 2007, based on a representative sample of 2000 respondents, with a margin of error of ± 2,3 per cent at a 95 per cent level of confidence.

[7] The per cents represent the average values calculated for the two public opinion polls done by The Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile (IICCMRE) in September and November of 2010. The September 2010 IICCMRE poll was based on a representative sample of 1133 respondents, with a margin of error of ± 2,9 per cent at a 95 per cent level of confidence. The November 2010 IICCMRE poll was based on a representative sample of 1123 respondents, with a margin of error of ± 2,9 per cent at a 95 per cent level of confidence.

[8] May 2011 IICCMRE poll, based on a representative sample of 1125 respondents, with a margin of error of ± 2,9 per cent at a 95 per cent level of confidence.

[9] September 2010 IICCMRE poll, see *supra* note 7.

per cent agree on the fact the in the aftermath of the Second World War, the communist regime seized power "by falsifying the will of the majority of Romania's citizens" (the remaining 27 per cent responded "Don't know/No answer"). The dissonance towards the Report's conclusion is even higher regarding the criminality of the communist regime: the majority of 41 per cent do not endorse the idea that the communist regime was a murderous one, while only 37 per cent agree on this matter (the remaining 22 per cent do not pronounced in this regard).

Cioflâncă's thesis, that communism lost the battle with history but not the one with memory, must be revisited. The Tismăneanu Report, as the culmination of the "trial of communism," shows that communism lost the battle with *public memory*, i.e. that image or narrative of the past officialised in state documents, transposed into history textbook, materialized in memorials, statues, and monuments, and re-enacted by rituals of commemoration, anniversaries, and other ceremonial forms of bringing the past in to present. As shown by the data gathered by surveys that mapped out the attitudinal universe of Romanian post-communist society, communism has yet to lose the battle with *private memories* of those individuals who, disillusioned by democratic promises, cherish nostalgic feelings. Using a terminological distinction introduced by John Bodnar (1992), communism finally lost the battle with state-sponsored *official memory*, continuing to resist in the strongholds of *vernacular memory* (i.e. the social representations of the past circulated in the non-public space of family and within the individual's lifeworld). The nostalgic resistance of Romanian population against embracing the official narrative of communism as criminal regime, although a passive resistance, reveals the attitudinal dissensus existing in Romanian society. It also highlights the anti-communist elites' successful struggle to define public memory of communism against the majority opinion. Putting communism on trial, post-communist Romanian state succeeded in ruling by decree the official memory of communism as illegitimate and murderous, against the backdrop of passive popular resistance, expressed by the large collective nostalgia towards the same communism criminalized by the democratic political power. In Charles S. Maier's terms, it can be concluded that in contemporary Romania we are dealing with a "state-mastered past" against the background of "unmastered memories" (cf. Maier 1998). It seems like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels' (2012, p. 33) [1848] famous sentence opening *The Communist Party Manifesto*, announcing that "A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Communism," turns out to be prophetical in the current Romanian society, quarter of a century after the breakdown of the communist order: indeed, a spectre is haunting contemporary Romania – the spectre of communist nostalgia.

4. Concluding remarks: Patterns of "settling the accounts" between the present and the past

This analysis cannot be brought to a close without situating the way in which Romanian society managed its totalitarian past within a comparative framework

that would highlight both the specificity and the similarity of Romanian solution in comparison to other available patterns of settling the account between the present and the past.

Post-totalitarian societies, be it post-war Germany engaged in the process of de-nazification or post-communist states emerging out of the totalitarian straps, are face with the problem of coming to terms with their pasts. Settling the accounts with the past seems to be a necessary stage in liberating from the burden of history that "weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living" (Marx, 1978, p. 9) [1852]. However, as it will be shown next, confronting the past by putting it to trial is not the only option available to the political actors having the power to decide how the post-totalitarian social order will come to terms with its past.

The problematic legacy of the past can be managed in two totally different manners: 1) by an *evasive strategy*, based on "the politics of amnesia" and a "methodology of oblivion"; 2) by *confrontationist strategies*, which imply reckoning with the past by establishing some "politics of anamnesis" in order to recuperate and preserve memory of wrong doing committed during the former regime. Confrontationist strategies differ in terms of their angle of approaching the past. At least two such strategies can be identified: a) *mastering* the past, bifurcating in its turn into: i) criminalizing the past, and ii) demonizing the past; and b) *working through* of the past. **Table no 3** presents the forms and characteristics of the various patterns of managing the legacy of the past.

Table no 3. Patterns of settling accounts with the past

The strategy of managing the past	The politics of memory	Specific patterns of managing the past		Emancipation from the past is done by:
Evasive strategy	Politics of amnesia	Oblivion	Natural	Ignorance
			Programmed	Repression
Confrontationist strategies	Politics of anamnesis	Mastering	Criminalisation	Condemnation
			Demonization	Symbolic exorcism
		Working through		Critical self-reflection

Source: author's elaboration

The evasive strategy includes two specific ways of managing the difficult past: i) promoting amnesia especially through decreeing laws of amnesty by which the political elite tries to "burry" the troubled past in collective oblivion. Indicative of this is the case of post-authoritarian Spain in managing its Francoist past. Instead of reckoning with the dictatorial past that lasted for 36 years (from the end of the civil

war won by general Francisco Franco's "nationalists" against the "republican" communists of 1939 until his death in 1975), Spain's post-Francoist political elite opted for "institutionalizing oblivion" (Grosescu and Ursachi 2009, p. 49) put into effect by legislating a general amnesty. ii) facilitating natural forgetting, occurring with the passing of time and the biological extinction of the human carriers of the memories of the problematic past. This latter strategy was used in post-Soviet Russia, whose political elite systematically eluded confronting its past. In both cases, the post-totalitarian state faced with the problem of managing a difficult historical legacy resorted to "politics of amnesia" by which the coming to terms with the past is either postponed in hopes that the tensions of the past will defuse by naturally occurring forgetting, or oblivion is instituted by decree. During the first phase of post-communism, from the Revolution of 1989 until the Romania's acceptance in European Union in 2007, Romanian political elites used the evasive strategy and the politics of amnesia in dealing with the communist legacy. For more than a decade and a half after the collapse of the totalitarian system, the voices requesting the official confrontation with the communist past had no echo on the corridors of political power, populated largely by former members of the Communist Party converted to some form of social democracy or extreme-right nationalism. The most systematic struggles to recover the traumatic memory of communism was those of the victims of the former regime, expressed through detention memorialistic literature. Until 2005, more than 150 testimonial of detention experience were circulating in Romanian book market (Cesereanu 2005). There would be no exaggeration to talk about a real "memorialistic boom" experienced by Romanian culture, which continued to gain momentum until the literary struggles of the victims of the former regime were took over by the Romanian state. In the moment that the President of Romania commissioned a condemnation report in 2006, Romanian state initiated the *glissando* from the evasive strategy towards a confrontationist strategy in managing its communist past. The option chosen was gaining *mastery* over the communist past by prosecuting, judging, and eventually sentencing it as illegitimate and murderous.

Mastering the past (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*) implies official struggles to settling the accounts with the problematic past inherited by current society following the transition towards a post-totalitarian political order. The conventional way of mastering the past is by criminalising it in the framework of "transitional justice." The prototype of transitional justice is given by the Nuremberg trials organized in the aftermath of the Second World War by the Allies to judge the responsible for Nazi war crimes. The other way of mastering the past is more spiritual than judicial. The traumatic past is being demonized, considered to be possessed by occult forces, and the horrors associated with this past are attributed to the devil's work. The therapeutic solution for escaping from the grip of the evil past is to "exorcise the demons of the past" (Tismăneanu 2013a). Passages scattered throughout the Report depict the communist regime, its Marxist-Leninist

ideology, but also the key institutions of the totalitarian system as demonical. The authors of the Report conceptualize the civil society captive to the communist regime as the victim of a "diabolical" apparatus of repression (Report 2006, pp. 166-167). In the same demonical language, the communist regime is depicted as the embodiment of the "devil," while the *Securitate* is described as a "diabolical organization" or "diabolical mechanism" (*ibidem*). If we add to all these the fact that the last book signed by the president of the "truth commission" is titled *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century* (Tismăneanu 2012), it becomes the more clear the strategy of demonization of the past used to portray Romanian communism in the Final Report. Even more revealing is Tismăneanu's insistence on the *ad litteram* understanding of his title reading "The Devil in History." In a series of public statements, Tismăneanu repeatedly affirmed that "the devil in history" "is not a metaphor, it is the synthetic definition of reality" (Tismăneanu 2013b).

The Tismăneanu Report combined the two strategies of mastering the communist past (criminalization and demonization). Central to the Report was the idea that breaking the spell of the past can be acquired only by exorcizing the demons of the communist past. Consequently, Romanian communism has been historically, morally, ideologically, etc. condemned by the Report, as it has been portrayed more or less allegorically in demonic strokes as possessed by the devil. In the same time, the IICCMRE works at bringing to penal justice the human protagonists responsible for the crimes of the former regime. Romanian political elite chose to settle the accounts with the communist past by mastering it in two ways: first by criminalizing the past that resulted in its condemnation, and secondly, on a more spiritual level, by demonizing the former regime and subjecting it to a symbolic purification.

Mastering the past by criminalizing, judging, and condemning it is not the only way of settling the account with the past. "Working through the past" (*Aufarbeitung der Vergangen*), as an alternative to its mastering, implies a continuous critical self-examination of the past (Olick 1998, p. 548). In an address from 1959, Theodor W. Adorno (1986, p. 115) pleaded for approaching the Nazi past through a "serious working through of the past," that would lead to "breaking of its spell" over the present "through an act of clear consciousness." Adorno rightly point out that coming out of the shadow of the past can be done only by reflexively assuming the past. The question now becomes: has the Romanian state proceeded on the way of reflexive and critical working through of the past? The answer can be only a negative one. Romanian state opted for the strategy of confronting the past by criminalizing, judging, and condemning communism in a pseudo-judicial trial ruled by historians acting on political command. Instead of a *sine ira et studio* analysis, without hate and zealousness, the Tismăneanu Report passionately prosecuted the former regime, and eventually condemned it *in corpore* as illegitimate and murderous. Instead of critical examination, founded upon analytical sobriety and terminological precision, the Tismăneanu Report reflects

rather a revanchist passion to set the historical record straight. In contrast to the *a priori* condemnation of communism, politically commissioned by the Romanian President and delivered as expected by the Tismăneanu Report, the reflexive working through of the past implies abandoning manicheistic thinking (in which communism stands for absolute evil while non-communism stands for absolute good) and rejecting the binary logic that underpin it.

The paradox of Romanian collective memory regarding the communist past is that while democratic political elites and liberal intelligentsia struggle in the public arena to criminalize retrospectively the communist regime, for the majority of the population, still longing nostalgically after pre-capitalist times, communism continues to be taken as the standard of normality. Popular nostalgia after communism, fuelled by the social and economic difficulties of the present, complicates the process of managing the past, calling into question the legitimacy of the political-intellectual power elite to criminalize the communist period. With the institutionalization of the narrative of communism as illegitimate and murderous by presidential decree, anti-communist elites won the battle over memory in public arena. It remains to be fought the much more laborious campaign against popular nostalgia, this time not on the public sphere, but in the subjective front of private memories. Yet the anti-communist elites' major problem is that against the "red nostalgia" expressed by a large per cent of Romanian population towards the former regime the weapon of official decree is all but powerless.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ROMANIAN POLITICAL BLOGS

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Rezumat

Ramură recentă a cercetării sociale, new media şi, implicit, termenul new media, indică unele transformări în modul în care se realizează relaţia dintre teorie şi practică sau modul în care este abordat obiectul de studiu.

Pe fondul evidenţierii impactului noilor mijloace de comunicare online folosite în campaniile electorale anterioare atât din ţară cât şi din străinătate, comunicatorii şi PR-iştii candidaţilor la alegerile parlamentare din 2012 au inclus printre mijloacele de comunicare şi Internetul, văzut ca o punte de legătură şi un mijloc de transmitere a informaţiilor între candidat şi alegător.

Lucrarea va identificarea numărul parlamentarilor prezenţi în mediul online cu site sau blog; detalierea strategiilor de comunicare pe care aceştia le utilizează în mediul online; identificarea blogurilor politice inactive ale politicienilor din actuala legislatură; exemple de bune practici în utilizarea blogurilor politice versus bloguri neinspirate. De asemenea, analiza calitativă a lucrării va evidenţia unele tipologii ale blogosferei politice româneşti.

Cuvinte cheie: blog, blogosferă, comunicare politică

Abstract

A recent branch of social research, new media and, implicitly, the term itself, indicates a series of changes in the way in which the relationship between theory and practice is realised or the way in which the research topic is approached.

In the context of the development of the new on-line communication media used in the previous electoral campaigns both in Romania and abroad, the candidates' communicators and PRs in the parliamentary elections of 2012 included the Internet among the communication mediums, considering it a means for transmitting information from the candidate to the voters.

This paper aims to identify the number of MPs present in the on-line environment with a site or a blog, to detail the communication strategies they use in the on-line environment, to identify the inactive political blogs owned by the politicians of the current legislature, as well as good practice examples in using the political blog, versus uninspired blogs. Moreover, the qualitative analysis included in this research will highlight some typologies of the Romanian political blogosphere.

Keywords: blog, blogosphere, political communication.

Résumé

Une sous-division récente de la recherche sociale, les nouveaux médias, y compris, le terme de nouveaux médias indiquent certaines transformations dans la manière dont se réalise la relation entre la théorie et la pratique ou la manière dont l'on approche l'objet d'étude.

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Dans le contexte de la mise en évidence de l'impacte des nouveaux moyens de communication en ligne utilisés dans les campagnes électorales antérieures en Roumanie aussi bien qu'à l'étranger, les communicateurs et les PR des candidats aux élections parlementaires du 2012 ont inclus l'Internet parmi les moyens de communication, un lien et un moyen à la fois de transmission des informations entre le candidat et l'électorat,

Ce travail vise à identifier le nombre de parlementaires présents dans l'environnement en ligne avec un site web ou un blog, à détailler les stratégies de communications qu'ils utilisent dans l'environnement en ligne, à identifier les blogs politiques inactifs des politiciens de l'actuelle législature, à trouver des exemples de bonnes pratiques d'utilisation des blogs politiques versus ceux non-inspires. En outre, l'analyse qualitative effectuée par cette étude vise à mettre en évidence des typologies de la blogosphere politique roumaine.

Mots-clef: blog, blogosphere, communication politique.

1. General Considerations / Introduction

Social networks, and, implicitly, blogs, have increasingly entered the daily life of every individual, leading to the emergence and development of the political blogs, which, one way or another, "will shift the gravity centre of public debates from the sterile disputes among the various ideologies, towards discussions regarding political projects and programs necessary to the citizens" (Sălcudeanu 2009, p. 40).

The socio-economic context of the 2012 elections in Romania was marked by the measures taken by the former rightist government in the context of the crisis – drops in salaries, increases in taxes, increase in the rate of inflation, etc – despite the tensions between the political parties and even between the president and the prime minister. Some of the parliamentary elections have proven that the electorate votes under the influence of the overall negative situation in the country. The campaign for the parliamentary elections in 2012 in Romania started on November 9th, and ended on December 8th, this being the second time when the Romanian MPs were elected based on the uni-nominal vote, on electoral colleges. The uni-nominal vote was first used in 2008, with a view to reduce the influence of the political parties in nominating candidates on the list and to raise awareness among the politicians, in relation to the electorate, by concluding a "contract" between the voters and the elected politicians for the highest legislative body in the state, with power of representation.

The parliamentary elections in 2012 constituted a great challenge for the candidates, who had to choose between the on-line and the traditional *face to face* communication, between the on-line political marketing with communication strategies based on Western models of the direct dialogue type with the electorate and the propagandistic model based on promises to the electorate. Despite the innovative electoral campaigns in the United States and even in Europe, Romanian politicians have not applied yet all modern political marketing methods and techniques.

This paper aims to present the dimension of the Romanian political blogosphere from a quantitative and qualitative perspective, taking into account the number of the Romanian MPs and their presence in the on-line environment. Moreover, it aims to briefly present and exemplify typologies of the blogs with a focus on the analysis of the Romanian MPs' blogs.

2. Blogs and the Romanian Blogosphere

The Internet contributes to the enormous transformation of our contemporary society, at all levels, and, unavoidable, it changed the premises and the infrastructure of the political sphere in several ways. Over time, we witnessed the "incubation of a heterogeneous universe made of a blogosphere, social networking websites, individual and collective productions, as well as the efforts made by the social movements and the activists belonging to all domains" (Dahlgren 2012, p. 180).

Without a doubt, the new strategies related to the new media are likely to have a considerable impact on the elections, but there is still certain disagreement regarding the campaigns and the elections, since their ground and execution are rapidly changing. At this point, in politics, the candidates take advantage to a certain extent of the new technologies and they try to put the new strategies into practice. Obviously, the Internet is a powerful instrument allowing its users to transmit messages to the entire world.

Compared to a website, the blog benefits from a chronological editorial structure and, in addition, it can be considered an intermediary between the personal website and a discussion forum. The relationship between the virtual and the real world, in blog terms, is even more complex and complicated, since it also involves the community (Barlow 2008, p. 51).

The blog can also constitute a marketing engine, both for the author of the blog, which means "personal marketing" (Fievet, Turrettini 2004, p. 46), and for some companies, media trusts who can adapt to new technological conditions. If the impact is unpredictable, *the permanence* (Levinson 2009, p 19) is a major aspect of the new media, and, in particular, blogs. The blog is "une forme de mémoire vivante ou, și l'on veut, de "mémoire active" (Fievet, Turrettini 2004, p. 47); the blog establishes contacts and obtains feedback for the topics posted thanks to the visitors; the blog is also a vector of the collective expression; the blog is a "média chaud" (Ruette Guyot, Leclerc 2009, p. 53); the blog fosters on-line traffic and interactivity. At the same time, the blog has an aura of authenticity and it outruns the newspapers which started to lose ground, especially during the electoral campaigns:

"For all the history made by newspapers between 1960 and 2000, the profession was also busy contracting, standardizing, and homogenizing. Most cities now have their monopolist daily, their alt weekly or two, their business journal. Journalism is done a certain way, by a certain kind of people. Bloggers are basically oblivious to such traditions, so reading the best of them is like receiving a bracing slap in the face. It's a reminder that America îs far more diverse and iconoclastic than its newsrooms".[1]

Blogs emerged after 1990, as mere web pages and thus, the first website available was http://info.cern.ch made by Tim Tim Berners – Lee, the inventor of the Web in The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), (Fievet şi Turrettini 2004, p. 8). In 1997, Jorn Barge, the editor at of Robot Wisdom called them *weblog*, a name that was accepted by everybody. The same year, Dave Winer started his first blog, *Scripting News*, which is "the Longest Continuously running weblog on the Internet".[2] If Winer created the first blog on the Internet on April 1, in July 1997, *Slashdot*[3] realized an information page for the community, regarded today as the most popular worldwide collaborative blog.

In the USA, in 2000 there were a few tens of thousands of blogs; in 2004, there were already 4.3 million blogs, and in 2008, their number was estimated at 133 million. According to the Pew Internet and American Life Project, 73% of the Americans were online, 12% of Internet users had already a blog, and 50% of the users had read another person's blog (Davis 2009, p 4).

The blog was first used for last minute news in 1998, when Charlotte Observer (Janice Marie Collins) sent the effects of Hurricane Bonnie.[4]

The first personal blogs in the francophone region appeared in 2000, with Karl Dubost[5], Emmanuelle Richard[6], Stéphanie Booth.[7] In Romania, the blogs *per se* only appeared in 2002, and there are still discussions regarding the first Romanian blogger.[8] It is however agreed that George Hari Popescu[9], Alexandru-Brăduţ Ulmanu[10], Sorin Matei, Manafu[11], Alex Mihăileanu[12] are among the first who created a blog, initially manually and in HTML format.

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[1] Welch M., "Blogworld and its gravity", *Columbia Journalism Review, 42(3)/2003 – September - October*

[2] http://essaysfromexodus.scripting.com/whatisscriptingnews, 1. 02. 2011. "*Scripting News.*

[3] http://slashdot.org/recent, 1. 02. 2011.

[4] Janice Marie Collins, *Gonna take you higher! news blogging in the 21st century*, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/7/5/7/6/pages375763/p375763-6.php, retrieved on 21. 05. 2013.

[5] http://www.w3.org/People/karl/, 18.01. 2011.

[6] http://www.emmanuelle.net/archives/week_2002_11_17.html, 1. 02. 2010.

[7] http://stephanie-booth.com, 18. 01. 2010.

[8] Iulian Comănescu, *Leapşa cognitivă: care-a fost primul blog românesc*, http://www.comanescu.ro/leapsa-cognitiva-care-a-fost-primul-blog-romanesc.html, 12. 12. 2019.

[9] http://www.cyberculture.ro/blog , http://web.ifrance.com/, 20. 11. 2010.

[10] http://www.jurnalismonline.ro/, 31. 01. 2011.

[11] http://manafu.blogspot.com/, 1. 02. 2011.

[12] http://subiectiv.ro/, 1. 02. 2011.

In Romania, the number of blogs increased over the last years, but bot as much as between 2008 and 2010, although very few are still active, that is, at least one article is published every week – argues the Zelist monitoring service[13]. In order to quantify the most accurately possible the evolution of the social media in Romania, Zelist developed a calculation index that monitors the weekly activity of the blogosphere Thus, according to the calculation method, eScor_week=no__active_ accounts*10+no_posts*3+no_comments,[14] it results that in Romania there are 67.058 blogs, compared to the number registered for September 2010, when there were 59.017 blogs.[15]

From a demographic point of view, in May 2013, Bucharest occupied the first position in the number of active accounts, reaching a percentage of 44.8, compared to Transilvania, with a percentage of 15.6%, Moldova 11.1%; at the opposite pole there are Bucovina (1.5%) and Maramureş (1.8%).16 The same study carried out by Zelist revealed that men are more active compared to women, recording a percentage of 54.8%, against 45.2%.[17]

At present, Technorati, one of the most popular search engines, revealed a number of 1.327.700 blogs, of which 15171 are political blogs.[18]

3. Political blogs

The political or governmental blogs first emerged in the US when the democrate Howard Dean[19] initiated his own blog in 2003. This model was taken over by John Kerry[20] and Georges W. Bush[21] for the United States of America, Alain Rousset in 2004, France[22], and, for Romania, in 2006, Ioan Mircea Pascu[23] is the first Romanian politician (PSD) who created a personal blog, EUROPOLIS, using however a nickname, Oshanu.

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[13] http://www.zelist.ro/ , 18. 12. 2010.

[14] In order to measure the evolution of this score (a number equalling a few hundreds of thousands), the reference period used was the first week of May 2009, which received the value 100. Thus, the weekly index is the ratio between the score recorded for the current week and the score registered for the first week in May 2009, multiplied by 100. roBlogs_Index= (Score_current_week/Score_week_May_2009)*100

 Practically, this score expressed the increase in the blogosphere compared to the period of reference. For example, an index equal to 130, indicates the fact that compared to May 2009, the blogosphere increased by 30%.

[15] http://www.zelist.ro/blogosfera, 9.06.2013.

[16] http://www.zelist.ro/monitor/insights/overview/blogosfera/2013_05, retrieved on 15. 06. 2012

[17] http://www.zelist.ro/monitor/insights/overview/blogosfera/2013_05, retrieved on 15. 06. 2013

[18] http://technorati.com/blogs/directory/, retrieved on 9.06.2013.

[19] http://deancalltoaction.blogspot.com/2003_03_09_archive.html, 15. 11. 2010.

[20] http://www.johnkerry.com/blog/, 02. 10. 2010.

[21] http://georgewbush.com/blog/, 02. 10. 2010.

[22] http://www.aquitaine-rousset.net/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=38, 02. 10. 2010.

[23] http://impascu.wordpress.com/2009/12/25/un-nou-inceput/, 02. 02. 2011.

As early as 1992, Bill Clinton and Al Gore made use of the online com-munication strategies for the first time in the history of electoral campaigns. However, three years later, in 1995, Senator Feinstein, D. Calif launched his first campaign site, while 1996 remains a benchmark in history since Republican Bob Dole was the first candidate who publicly announced the address of his website (Craig 2006, p. 122). Howard Dean and Wesley Clark were the first candidates to create political blogs in 2003, obtaining by means of this strategy certain notoriety both among bloggers and among their supporters. However, Barack Obama was the one who made the widest use of the internet, combining several applications developed over time; he has been in fact considered a pioneer regarding the latest tendencies in creating political campaigns.

In the landscape of Romanian politics, some politicians ensured their success and notoriety based on intuition and improvisation, which proved its "jungle-like"appearance. Ioan Mircea Pascu, Oshanu, the first politician to have embraced blogging, but not the first who assumed this role the moment the blog was created, was the one who "opened" the road to the on-line political communication. The Romanian politicians became active on the Internet, which is one of the most important means of communication used lately. Not infrequently, the blog was also an instrument leading to discussions within a political party or among colleagues, (e.g. PDL EMP Cristian Preda published on his blog that an independent politician will be elected for the Bucharest City Hall, in the person of Nicuşor Dan[24]), or used to express the bloggers' feelings at a certain moment (Adrian Năstase – *Thoughts for Friends*[25]), publish personal photographies or to present certain aspects of a public person's life (Elena Udrea – *Press-release* regarding the divorce)[26].

Far more than "transmitting" the latest news, blogging found a free niche in politics. The Internet and, implicitly the blog, are convenient instruments for politicians in emphasizing their own objectives. Emerging at the beginning of 2000, political blogs were seen as possible instruments in promoting democracy or as an opportunity for the democratic free expression of opinions (Richard Davis, 2009, pp. 5-6). Political analyst Joe Trippi argued that "*the revolution will not be televised; instead it will be blogged*" (Davis 2009, p. 6) and, at the same time, the blogosphere was considered a "mark of emancipation", as it allows formerly marginalized persons to publicly express their ideas (Davis 2009, p. 6). Called "netroots", the place of interaction between political ideas, politicians and audience, the political blogosphere takes the shape of two distinct forms: *common blogs* with a very small audience and a low, barely perceived influence, and *influent blogs* (Davis 2009, p. 35), those considered landmarks in mass-media and

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[24] http://www.antena3.ro/politica/prigoana-a-cerut-in-scris-excluderea-din-pdl-a-lui-cristian-preda-161874.html, retrieved on 01. 09. 2012.
[25] http://nastase.wordpress.com/2012/08/14/un-gand-pentru-prieteni/, retrieved on 05.09.2012.
[26] http://blog.elenaudrea.ro/category/blog, retrieved on 11. 06. 2013.

are widely read. Examples of this kind are *The Huffington Post* and *Adevărul [The Truth]*.

The creation of blogs also led to a fierce competition among political parties, politicians and even mass-media, granting in fact power to the readers and the ability to generate a series of major changes concerning aspects related to *agenda setting* and *media politics*. Besides the fact that the blog grants the politician an increase in trustworthiness and notoriety among the electorate, and also among the bloggers, the reader can offer the politician an entire range of debate topics, while interfering whenever (s)he has something to say in relation to the published materials and can influence the MP's attitude, mentality and actions. *Agenda setting* becomes crucial during the electoral campaign, when voters have to make a decision concerning the candidates.

In establishing the agenda setting, an important role is played by the audience, in direct and active relationship with the mass-media. Thus, three actors participate in the shaping of the electoral agenda, namely, the candidate(s), the media and the audience.

Political blogs are also classified based on several factors: Thus, Rebecca Blood mentions three types of political blogs: filters, personal diaries, notebooks. Filtering blogs emphasize events or things that are external to the blogger, while the blogs classified as personal diaries illustrate the blogger's inner thoughts and ideas (for instance, the thoughts of a blogger). The last category, the notebook is a hybrid between the first two categories[27].

Another category of political blogs is established according to the topics it deals with. The political blog can treat a single topic oriented towards a certain field (for example, the accession policy of the European Union, the war in Iraq, the homosexuals' rights, etc.) or it can be aimed at various political topics. Additionally, the geographical location is an important aspect of political blogs, despite the fact that the Internet is widespread. Some politician bloggers in a certain geographical area can be read or followed by persons in other areas due to their notoriety, visibility, or the function they have.

Another type of political blogs includes the electoral campaign and the electoral blogs, which are all designed to promote candidates and political parties. These blogs are highly popular during the electoral years and, especially, during the electoral campaigns, on an average term with the involvement of bloggers that provide comments and analyses. Eventually, some magazines, such as The New Republic (USA), Adevărul [The Truth] (România), created their own blogs, allowing readers a significant opportunity to participate in writing; unlike the traditional forms of mass media, print space is limited and the editor has the final say on the publication.

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[27] Rebecca Blood, "Weblogs: A History and Perspective", September 7, http://www.rebeccablood.net/essays/weblog_history.html. retrieved on 15. 12. 2012.

In our analysis we see that there are political blogs blogs that we call "watchdog" pursuing activities as other politicians or even journalists highlighting only their omissions, errors or inaccuracies presented. Finally, although this is not the last type of blog observed during our analyses, there is the political blog dedicated to the political values is promotes.

> "Bloggers interact on a regular basis with their readers, in such a way that this new communication environment can be characterised as being multidimensional, while prints are only bi-dimensional. Political communication in the blogosphere is unlimited in scope and extent. This aspect of political blogging contributes to the revival of the political discourse compared to other modern mass-media." (Pole 2010, p. 5)

4. Research concerning the Romanian political blogosphere

Objectives

From the point of view of the established objectives, this research was aimed at: identifying the MPs present in the on-line environment with a website or a blog; detailing the communication strategies they make use of in the online environment; identifying the interconnections between the Romanian MPs' blogs and the way in which virtual networks of political communication are established; quantifying the active blogs at the level of the entire country (Romania) (on counties and political organisations); identifying the inactive political blogs of the MPs of the current legislature; good practice examples in using the political blogs versus uninspired blogs; specific analyses starting from the blogroll, etc.

Research hypotheses

Within this research, we aimed to test the following hypotheses:
1. Among the Romanian MPs, active blogs usually belong to the younger members (lower age range).
2. The public function held (senator/ deputy) is associated with the status of the blog (active/ inactive).
3. The opening to other blogs through specific links is associated with the political orientation of the bloggers.

Research methodology

Considering the novelty of such an approach in the study of the on-line communication in Romania, and, more precisely, the parliamentary elections in 2012, this research can constitute an exploratory research and, subsequently, a starting point for further research.

This study comprises two complementary analyses: a quantitative and a qualitative one. The quantitative analysis was aimed at quantifying the number of

politicians present in the on-line environment with a site or a blog. Thus, of the 588 Romanian MPs, only 214 corresponded to the selection criteria. The focus of the qualitative analysis was placed on the notoriety of the politician and his/ her blog, the content and comments transparency, the confidence in the target audience as well as the type of blog or site, all based on the on-line communication strategies.

In order to demonstrate the three hypotheses, as well as for the qualitative analysis, we took into consideration only the active networks, that is the blogs or websites that had published at least one article until May 22, 2013; additionally, factors such as political party, county, age, gender, number of visitors on the site and blog, links to other links or bloggers they followed were also considered. The data was processed with the SPSS program.

Data analysis

Following the elections in 2012, the number of Romanian MPs increased from 470 to 488 representatives, of which only 214 are present in the virtual environment with a site or a blog, which proves the fact that politicians are still attached to the *face to face* communication, and have not yet made a central objective to capture the on-line public in their electoral campaign. Moreover, due to the reduced number of on-line MPs, we believe that the younger audience has not been targeted either, since, it is well known that the youth is more and more active on the internet and, implicitly, on the social networks.

The active websites and blogs represent 52% compared to the inactive ones (48%), which proves the fact hat only 112 politicians prefer the new on-line communication technologies. Despite the fact that the Internet also provides the highest visibility to the political environment and political structure, and given the weight it has through the word and the image, following this analysis, it results that politicians still prefer to avoid this communication means. This may be due to the nature of the electorate (they consider to be bot ready), or to the politician him/herself, who is not open to a direct communication with the electorate. Generally, the active candidates' official websites or blogs were created by the candidates' electoral staff, according to the standard definition, with a view to increase the quality of their interaction with the electorate, without, however, reaching their audience on a regular basis.

Following the analysis carried out, of the total number of on-line MPs, only 139 deputies and 75 senators, equalling 65%, respectively 35%, own a website or a blog on which they publish their electoral and parliamentary activity, their hobbies, open letters, Parliament debates, etc. The politicians who are active on the internet have understood that the political communication strategies should be combined with the need to reduce absenteeism in the polls, which led to increased civic participation in the state public affairs by identifying the age segments reluctant to political involvement. Generally, the objectives of the on-line electoral campaign in Romania are aimed at accomplishing three functions specific to the electoral

campaigns, namely, to mobilize voters to vote, to convert voters to a particular party, and to enhance trust among supporters. Studies in the field have shown that the impact of the internet on the political attitude and the behaviour of an individual during elections is focused particularly on the on-line dissemination of news among the potential electors and on persuading the hesitant electors to participate in the polls, rather than on recruiting political followers. (Gibson, Mcallister, 2006, p. 246)

As far as the politicians' gender is concerned, the results have shown that men (82%) were more responsive to the on-line environment and to blogging compared to women (18%), and, at the same time, are more active on social networking sites. This difference in the virtual environment is also explained by the higher number of men compared to women in the Romanian Parliament.

The Social Democrat Party (PSD), the National Liberal Party (PNL), the Conservative Party (PC) and the National Union for the Progress of Romania (UNPR) joined their forces and created an alliance called the Social Liberal Union (USL), sharing common governing objectives and priorities. Following the elections in 2012, the alliance gathered most votes both among the deputies and senators, so that, based on the analysis we can argue that it enjoys 65% of the politicians active in the online environment. PSD politicians outran the PNL politicians, with 37% compared to 28%, a rather significant difference also noticeable in the number of politicians in the Parliament; this also showed a higher interest in the on-line communication and information dissemination and a higher emphasis on the younger electorate.

Figure no. 1. Results concerning the percentage of on-line communication for each political party

The rather limited number of on-line politicians is also reflected in their classification by county. Bucharest remains leader as regards the number of on-line active politicians with 34 blogs and websites, of which only 23 are active, remotely followed by Iaşi, with 15 on-line MPs (of which only 8 are active), Cluj with 9

politicians (6 active) and Constanţa, Timiş, Dolj, Dâmboviţa with only 7 presences (of which Constanţa counts one active presence, while the other counties preserve 4 presences each). The rest of the counties present an insignificant number, as it can also be noticed in figure no. 2, which proves once again that the Romanian politicians opted for a traditional electoral campaign, and did not want to excel through innovation.

Figure no. 2. Bloggers' profile by county

In terms of blogs distribution and websites by gender and political parties, it should be noticed that in PSD men are more active (39%) compared to women (31%), while in PNL the situation is reversed, the women registering a higher percentage than men, namely 29% against 27%. A significant difference is noticed for PDL, where women prefer to be active and keep in closer contact with the electorate, by means of the on-line communication.

In order to analyse the first working hypothesis: the active blogs belong to the younger MPs (lower age average), we computed the age of each politician, and then, using the SPSS program, we carried out an average comparison parametric statistical test (Independent sample T-test). Thus, following the calculations, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed: there is a significant difference between the age averages of the MPs who have active blogs versus those who have inactive blogs (F=0.06, t=-1,8, p=0.05). The average age for the active blogs owners is 46.7, while for those with inactive blogs the average is 49.1 years old.

Figure no.3. Blogs distribution by gender and political party

4. Hypothesis 2 - Political function held (senator/ deputy) influences the blogs status (active/ inactive) - is rejected: the variable *type of political function* is not associated with the variable *type of blog* (χ^2=1.3, df=1, p=0.24). The threshold is > 0.05, which means that we have to admit the nullity hypothesis, and that the two variables are not associated. Had the threshold been < 0.05, then the hypothesis would have been accepted and, implicitly, it would have been a significant association. To conclude, it cannot be stated that the political position held influences the type of blog (active/inactive).

Legend:

χ^2 - association coefficient

df – degree of freedom

p - threshold

5. Hypothesis 3 - The opening to other blogs through specific links is associated with the political orientation of the bloggers - is rejected: the variable *political orientation* is not associated with the variable *blog opening* (χ^2=5.1, df=4, p=0.27). Thus, we cannot conclude that a certain political grouping is more open towards various blogs compared to other groupings.

5. Qualitative analysis

For the qualitative analysis of the sites and blogs owned by the Romanian MPs, we examined the communication strategies used in their relationship with the electorate, the chromatic used, as well as the types of messages approached.

The internet has spread rapidly in all fields. However, from a certain point of view, the political class adopted in a first phase with high enthusiasm the new medium of communication, leaving it shortly aside and not fructifying it sufficiently in relation to its effectiveness. Most Romanian MPs connected to the on-line environment publish especially press releases/ press conferences[28], Parliamentary debates[29] and, possibly, some open letters and questions addressed to ministers.[30] Very few Romanian politicians publish articles related to current political issues. The politicians were among the first who created blogs, but not all blogs have regular posts, related to the present-day political agenda. Most of them post messages only on occasions such as Easter, Christmas, March 8th, or other celebrations. In this case, the communication strategy is not the best because there is no consistency in the blog posts, nor can we talk about interactivity, dialogue with their own electorate. It is as if the politician checks the online action without thinking about the consequences produced by this versatility on short, medium and long term.

Alexandru Brăduţ Ulmanu, an expert in *social media*, argues that the political class reluctacy to the on-line communication is caused "on the one hand by a technological barrier, since many MPs were born in an era when the Internet did not exist, and they just do not feel comfortable using the new communication technologies. On the other hand, there is a psychological barrier. Many of these politicians cannot see the usefulness of this medium, they do not understand it, or they understand it to a very limited extent. This includes the lack of habitually to enter a real dialogue with the electors, which should be consistent and permanent, not just focused on the campaign duration. And I believe that image advisers are highly responsible for this situation, since they do not explain their clients that the *social media* instruments can be extremely efficient in creating a stronger connection with the public."[31]

Analysing the political websites and blogs and the MPs performance and use of the virtual environment in the political communication, we should add the fact that the Romanian politician are afraid of the on-line visitors' reactions and comments, which can often be acid, other times using bawdy, even trivial language. At the same time, they resort to blogging to create an image that complies with the new tendencies, although they do not consider that a systematic effort (far from insignificant in fact) to convince their own supporters, future voters, convinced that the blog strengthens already existent electoral options rather than changing them.

The notable performance of the politicians on the social networking sites, such as blogs, brought them a congeniality capital turned, during the electoral

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[28] http://www.romeoradulescu.ro/blog/, retrieved on 02.04.2013

[29] http://popgheorghe.ro/category/activitate/interpelari-adresate-primului-ministru-pdf/, retrieved on 02.04.2013

[30] http://www.raduvasilica.ro/, retrieved on 02.04.2013

[31] Florin Ciocotişan, *Politica în social media* http://impactnews.ro/Politic/Politica-%C3%AEn-social-media-49210retrieved on 25.02.2011.

campaigns, in political capital. In the context of a society under the influence of the digital and the information era, as called by M. Castells, a politician not having a webpage or a blog, a Twitter or Facebook account constitutes a major political error, since any indecision can become permanent at some point, not reaching the on-line environment (Boşoteanu 2012, pp. 140-141).

The degree of Internet usage in the electoral campaign, emphasized by the studies of B. Villalba (Gibson, Nixon and Ward, 2003), in that most candidates and parties used the internet solely for information transfer to the visitors of the websites, in other words a unidirectional communication, was subject to a major change during the European electoral campaigns in 2007 and 2009, by introducing multi-directional interactivity and communication due to the video dissemination websites such as YouTube and social networking sites.

The Romanian politicians' reluctance to the on-line communication is noticeable both in their reduced presence in the on-line environment with a website or blog, and in the fact that many of them do not want to publish materials, and update likely to stir discussions, comments and reactions. Moreover, not even the politicians who have blogs are eager to answer the comments others post on their pages, which shows that there is a direct dialogue with the electorate and the communication is unidirectional. The interactivity level is very low, lacking the *user to user* communication, since politicians do not answer their voters' comments. Generally, political blogs have been equally used for dialogue and information exchange, but also for promoting video recordings, but only during the campaign.

Since only 214 of all politicians are active on-line, we should point out the fact that most of them are political blogs that do not approach deep topics, the bloggers preferring instead the political blog/ site only during the political campaign, the candidate promoting his/ her campaign for a short period of time. Therefore, the preferred chromatic for these blogs was based on juxtaposing or joining the colours characteristic to the political party the bloggers belonged to, suggesting thus the their political adherence[32] However, in most political websites or blogs desplayed the party's logo, with a view to familiarize the audience from the very beginning

Generally, those who created political blogs only for the electoral campaign had the homepage structured as follows: Home/ About us/ Parliamentary activity/ Biography/ Events/ Program/ News/ Contact, often failing to allow users to post comments to the articles published, which proves the total lack of interactivity. The strategies used for preserving a direct contact with the electorate, through the website or blog interactivity were undoubtedly taken of their campaign plan.

Political communication has a double dimension: *discursive and institutional* (Beciu 2011, p. 227), available in most of the benchmark definitions. Thus, we notice that political discourse reveals, among others, the way in which political people relate to different "systems", such as: the electorate, the mass media, other

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[32] http://www.raduvasilica.ro/, http://andreigerea.wordpress.com/tag/andrei-dominic-gerea/, http://ion-raducanu.ro/, http://popa-octavian.blogspot.ro/, http://guduvasile.com/, http://tigaeru.ro/ etc.

political factors. The new media, the Internet foremost, claims even more from the political individual: forming the political message as an "interaction" with the voter – the social distance between the politician and the elector diminishes, the image of the politician – "friend" prevails over the image of the politician as a statesman.

A small part of the Romanian politicians have revered in the their discourse the standard norms that they need to observe and have understood the role of the new technology to the purpose of political communication. The greatest part of the political class uses the blog or the website only as a technique of type *spin – doctor* in order to turn the situation in the politician's favour , even if this entails appealing to false information, distorting certain contexts or creating false, artificial contexts, only in the service of the political individual's positive visibility. During electoral campaigns, we may notice how the phenomenon named digital guerrilla is developing progressively and helps shaping this *spin-doctor* strategy. Furthermore, many blogs in Romanian politics are used mostly to attack other persons, seeing that the politician cannot attribute direct incriminations to its contender. Press conferences, and even statements, are heralded on blogs just to create a good relationship with the journalists, but, at the same time, politicians forget what are the blog's functions and, maybe, most importantly, they forget about the electorate with whom they must maintain a relationship of "friendship". Their strategy of posting only the press statements is not one of the best because they don't offer an objective feedback, it cannot constitute a strategic content, and moreover it is not possible to obtain a position in the online political environment. Creativity, critical judgement, and knowledge are totally missing form the politician's communication strategies.

Figure no. 4. Dan Cristian Popescu's blog screenshot

The language used by the candidates has expressed the data necessary to use a perception on his/ her identity, through biographical elements and those pertaining to the political and ideological platform. The function and the role of the blog and the website isn't completely grasped and, for this reason, we were able to find in the posted articles the polite pronoun, the third person, singular, the impersonal tone, even for the blog's owner: *"PSD Senator Florin Constantinescu drew a short economic analysis of the Romania's situation."*

Romanian politicians are not eager to create online communities or to realise certain connexions among politicians, as those who own a blog either don't have a blogroll, or they only make references to the party it belongs and its structures, One of their advantages would be the references toward certain journalists, but in this respect as well the strategies of collaboration with the entire mass media are infringed, as the blogroll presents only those in the already positioned televisions. Frequently, a strategy that awards notoriety seems to be used by the politicians that wish to break through anonymity, and it consists in making references toward as many links as possible containing the structure's top politicians. This system has a very important role when we discuss political blogs, as in this case the bloggers at the top of the political structure experience a certain pressure due to the relentless supply of fresh, relevant and first-hand information (Sălcudeanu, 2009, p. 37). Once the popular bloggers receive and transmit important news, these get to the entire mass media, which feels bound to publish them.

Figure no. 5. Deputy Dan Șova's blog

Figure no. 6. Deputy Dan Șova's blog with blogroll

From the total number of online Romanian politicians, we may construe a few blog typologies that, one way or another, fall into the great classifications, despite the multitude or the lack of *information* they display. Thus, we are presented with blogs where the profession and the hobbies (music, fishing) are more important than the political activity (deputy Mihai's blog, deputy T. Ciuhodaru's blog, deputy Alexandru Petru Frătean's blog). Politicians in this category discuss with their own electorate on medical subjects or musical subjects, hence giving them the possibility to be more informed in these domains. The most numerous of their postings don't benefit from comments, as they lack their associated box.[33]

Blogs dedicated to *gossip* or *entertainment* are very much accessed by the Romanian political class. Even the categories where they place their posts have funny names (for ex., Wings, bricolage, Demos, Crack the bell, Gourmand/ Gourmet, and so on) which actually emphasizes certain defining features of the politician (deputy Alexandru Petru Frătean's blog). Politicians frequently prefer to name their blogs using words with a certain connotation and implication, like deputy Cristian Badea – *Bad Dog*, or Radu Zlati: *Welcome on* **Radu Zlati's Blog,** *follower of* **Gondolin's Yellow Blog**. *It's a* **blog** *because it is… the which is (quoting the eternal Vanghelie: "carele" instead of "care"). It's* **galben** *because yellow is one of the colours of the Liberal National Party… and it is yellow also because gold is yellow, and* **Zlati***'s root contains, in Slavic languages, the term*

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[33]http://cameliabogdanici.ro/, http://marinburlea.blogspot.ro/, http://medicalnet.ro/blog/ciuho/, http://www.mihaisturzu.ro/blog/

gold (golden). The blog belonged to **Gondolin** *because the person writing for you has chosen, many years ago, to use the name Gondolin for its apparitions in the web space. Gondolin was me... but I am somewhat more than him (or at least I hope so).*[34],[35]

To these types of blogs we can also add phenomena pertaining to the media discourse centred essentially on trivia: politicians publicised as "contestants" that need to pass a series of "tests" and distinguish themselves through their capacity to withstand the tests imposed by a media device (Beciu 2011, p. 242). Moreover, one more important item for the communication strategies is represented by the technique of type *storytelling* by invoking certain values, symbols that should represent them as politicians. Romanian politicians generally resort to the same strategy and technique of storytelling, that is, his position as a family man, a normal individual who shares the same interests with the common individual.

Figre no. 7. Radu Zlati's blog

However, Romanian politicians usually fall short and, after acquiring the blog domain, they block the account and fuel false hopes for the electorate by using the following post: "site under construction". We used a symbolic name for this type of site or blog: *abandoned blogs*. (Cătălin Boboc, Vasile Blaga, Liviu Codârlă).[36]

The last type of blog spotted in the Romanian politicians' blogosphere is precisely the *political blog* where the political activity is predominant. This is the

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[34] http://www.alexandru.fratean.ro/
[35] http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:j1y4EvVI2JAJ:yellowgondolin.wordpress. com/+&cd=1&hl=ro&ct=clnk&gl=ro, retrieved on 23. 05. 2013.
[36] http://dumitruioana.blogspot.ro/, http://tudorchiuariu.ro,

place where current issues of the Romanian politics are debated according to the ideologies shared by politicians. Among the names offering a certain notoriety and visibility of the Romanian political blogosphere we mention Elena Udrea, Victor Ponta, Alina Gorghiu, Călin Popescu Tăriceanu, Mircea Geoană, Petre Roman, Rovena Plumb, but they often fail to provide the necessary force. The active politicians are those who reward their target audience, possibly voter, by offering "benefits" such as: Elena Udrea will go out for coffee with one of the fans of her page when she reaches the threshold of 50,000 visitors. This type of strategy attracts more readers, more fans on the blog, and offers a certain notoriety and visibility to her political page.[37]

In Romania, the blogosphere didn't have a very powerful impact, but due tot the problems existent inside political parties, between parties, or between the Government and the President, blogs were quoted more and more as sources for information dissemination. Some political activists have resigned from the party or from a political function and have announced this option on the blog, others have posted information that was considered valuable at that time.

Despite the technological evolution highly noticeable in all the domains and, especially, in politics, the Romanian electorate is not trained, adapted to take information from the blogs. At the same time, Romanian politicians don't adapt their style toward novelty and don't give the electorate their due importance. This type of example is also represented by the communication strategy embraced by deputy Liviu Codârlă, who hasn't updated his page since the parliamentary elections in 2008, when he was elected for PDL. In 2012, he won the deputy mandate in another college and for PP-DD. From the lack of interest shown by the politicians toward the electorate and toward the new strategies of communication it ensures that the stake of the proper electorate is reduced to traditional marketing. The technological advance and the expansion in the use of the Internet as a means of information, communication, and mass entertainment, the trend in electoral marketing was constituted by the premises of the online strategy only in certain candidates for the parliamentary elections in Romania 2012.

6. Conclusions

Issues related to new media and on-line communication strategies constitute nowadays a great challenge for the society as a whole, but also to a very high extent to the political life. The internet, engine and promoter of new media, revolutionised the mentality and the daily activity of the modern individual, innovating and transforming the institutional practice of our society, diversifying the techniques and strategies of political life.

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[37] http://www.alinagorghiu.ro/, http://www.tariceanu.ro/, http://blog.elenaudrea.ro/, http://blogponta.wordpress.com/,

The weblog, a website consisting of new, various writings, on-line diaries, adopted in various social environments, tends to generalise but also to acquire a more professional or specialised dimension. If initially, the opinion makers and politicians created blogs, nowadays each user who considers (s)he has something to communicate and wishes to integrate into a virtual community can create his/her own blog, both on free and paid platforms.

In Romania, politicians integrated rapidly into the new technological wave, inscribing in the application of its various forms of communication by creating sites and blogs even if their interest was, and still is not systematic. At the same time, the reluctance of the political class towards the new communication mediums is obvious, on the one hand, because of the technological handicap, age constituting both an obstacle and an advantage, on the other hand, of the mental impediment. At the same time, the Romanian MPs feel both uncertain and insecure in this on-line environment, due to their incapacity to anticipate the visitors' reactions. Acid, bawdy and direct comments of the internet users are not likely to encourage them to move past these obstacles. Not even the image advisers or the PRs managed to convince them to adhere to an intense exploitation of the virtual environment in the electoral campaign. Nevertheless, during the first decade of the new millennium, we notice an increasing tendency to fructify the potential on-line environment in the electoral campaign.

To conclude, we should point out the fact that, despite the political class emancipation through the adoption of new communication techniques and strategies, the Romanian politicians do not make enough use of the on-line environment and do not know how to communicate with the electorate by means of blogs or websites. The Romanian politicians are reluctant to the on-line com-munication, and, consequently, when they create blogs or websites, they prefer to be always assimilated to the political structure they belong. Even if we live nowadays in the era of technology, we cannot discuss about a professionalisation of the political communication as a specialisation process of the various activities composing the interaction among politics, electorate, media and civil society.

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FAMILY SOCIAL WORK IN ROMANIA
– BETWEEN PRESENT AND FUTURE –

Cristina ISPAS [*]

Rezumat

Asistenţa socială a familiei reprezintă un domeniu distinct al asistenţei sociale. Cerce-tarea de faţă surprinde viziunea specialiştilor cu funcţii de conducere (şefi de birou) care activează în domeniul asistenţei sociale în judeţul Caraş-Severin (România) despre asistenţa socială a familiei analizată prin prisma a şase teme de interes: A) Definirea conceptelor, B) Relevanţă, C) Eficacitate, D) Eficienţă, E) Impact, F) Sustenabilitate.

Cuvinte cheie: asistenţa socială a familiei, relevanţă, eficacitate, eficienţă, impact, sustenabilitate.

Abstract

Family social work represents a distinct domain of social work. The research presented in this paper contains the vision of management specialists (office managers) that activate in the social work domain in Caras-Severin County (Romania) regarding family social work analysed from the point of view of six interest themes: A) The defining of concepts, B) Relevance, C) Effectiveness, D), Efficiency E) Impact and F) Sustainability.

Keywords: family social work, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability.

Résumé

L´assistance sociale de la famille représente un domaine distinct de l´assistance sociale. Notre recherche surprend l´opinion des spécialistes ayant des responsabilités (par exemple les chefs de bureau) qui travaillent dans le domaine de l´assistance sociale du département de Caraş-Severin (Roumanie) en ce qui concerne l´assistance sociale de la famille étudiée à travers six thèmes d´intérêt: A) Définition des concepts; B) Importance; C) Efficacité; D)Efficience; E) Impact; F) Soutenabilité.

1. Introduction

The history of family social work, as practice activity, unorganized, may be mistaken by human history. The affirming of family social work as organized professional activity, specialized, is considered more recent and can be placed at the level of the 20th century. In Romania the domain of family social work is far too little exploited, the problem of family social work is being approached more collaterally and little through ideas referring to this subject. This state is in fact easy to observe by analysing specialty literature in this domain.

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On a national plan, studies referring to family social work are extremely reduced in number and theme approached. This fact leads us to think that the decisions taken domain of social politics that aim at the family aren't complete in the plan of their scientific foundation. Thus, without any further discussion, the quasi-absence of a solid theoretical-practical support based on family social work is also sensed at the level of those activating in this domain.

Our research addressed manager specialists (office managers) that activate in the social work domain of the most important institutions from the Caras-Severin County: *The General Direction of Social Work and Child Protection Caras-Severin* and *the Public Service "The Direction of Social Work"* of *Resita City Hall*. Four persons from these institutions were interviewed.

2. The specific objectives of this research

The specific objectives of this research realized with specialists from the social work domain that exercise managers functions (office managers) are:
  a) The defining, the analyse and the integration of the social work concept of family social work I the theory and practice of social work;
  b) The identification of the relevance degree of family social work;
  c) The analyse of elements that determine the effectiveness of family social work programs;
  d) The analyse of aspects that determine the efficiency of family social work programs;
  e) The evaluation of the impact of family social work programs;
  f) The identification and the analyse that insures the sustainability of family social work programs.

3. Research methodology

Data were collected through the method of *social enquiry*, and the technique used was the interview. The application of the *Hermeneutic method* allowed us to interpret the data collected. The interview guide was conceived ad used by us and it is structured o six interest themes (that reflect in a synthetic manner all research objectives proposed) regarding family social work, respectively A) The defining of concepts, B) Relevance, C) Effectiveness, D) Efficiency, E) Impact and F) Sustainability.

Each of these themes were detailed through open questions, meant to surprise as faithful as possible the opinion of the person interviewed.

The codification of interviews – in order to process and interpret the data obtained, each interview received a code which contained the initial "I" (from the word "interview") followed by a cardinal number, thus obtaining: I1, I2, I3, and I4.

4. Data processing interpretation and presentation

This research approach is a mainly qualitative one motivated by the interest towards opinions advanced by specialists in social work, who, at the moment of the interview, management functions in social work. During the data processing and the presentation phases we chose for the variant of reproduction of questions and answers obtained from the people interviewed (by mentioning between comas the code attributed to each person interviewed) followed by the interpretation of the data obtained. The questions which didn't receive an answer are highlighted by the expression "*He doesn't answer*".

4.1. The defining of concepts

This theme has been detailed through four open questions, with the purpose to decipher the sense attributed by the people interviewed to key concepts used in this research.

- **What does family social work mean to you?**

According to the opinion of the persons interviewed, family social work represents "*all measures, interventions, services or professionalized activities that have as purpose the removal of causes that stop the proper function of families and expose it to the risk of social exclusion*" (I2) or "*social work focused on families found in risk situations due to socio-economic-cultural and psycho-biological.*" (I3). We express our total agreement regarding the two definitions given ad our disapproval regarding the affirmation according to which family social work identifies with „*the support offered to some/one family member in order to overcome a moment or a situation which leads to social exclusion of it*" (I1). Such an approach is characteristic to social work centred on persons, because the accent is put on the individual and not on the family as a whole. In the same manner, the following definition "*family social work is the main agent of social work which meets the social, educational and health needs of its members, because inside the family characters are formed, essential roles are taught and children are socialized in order to obtain a responsible participation to social life*" (I4) – is considered as being confuse and we propose a reformulation with clearer terms.

- **In what measure family social work is found in social work theory as distinct domain?**

In specialty literature (mainly in foreign countries, where there exists a large sample of studies, articles, books that treat this domain) family social work represents a distinct domain. This opinion is also found in the answers of some of the people interviewed, who consider that "*in great measure*" (I2), family social work is „*in theory, found as a distinct domain*" (I1).

- *In what measure family social work is found in the practice of social work as distinct domain?*

"The adoption of an approach centred on family in social work implies a philosophical reorientation of the entire system of services, starting from the re-evaluation of traditional practice focused on children and of the practice oriented towards the problem and its movement towards practice centred on family and based on its strong points " (Neamţu and Toma 2010, p.162). Family social work is already found as distinct domain "*in great measure: the offerings and social services are destined to individuals and to the family, the activities of social workers being realized for the purpose of consolidation family relations, the reestablishment of family social functionality*" (I2), "in great measure, through social prevention and primal intervention politics *for families found in*" (I4), but "*less than in theory"* (I1).

In our opinion, in the practical activity from our country we find partial aspects of family social work. We have underline that the organization of General Directions of Social Work and Child Protection, were we can find the department with attributions in the family social work domain called *Child and family protection*. The activities of this compartment are focalized first of all on the child and afterwards on the family.

4.2. Relevance

- *How long have you been activating in the social work domain?*

Each of the persons interviewed have a large practical experience, which vary from "*9 years*" (I4) – "*10 years"* (I1), till "*14 years*" (I2 and I3).

- *How long since you occupy management functions in the social work domains?*

The managers in the social work domain interviewed have an experience of "*5 years*" (I1, I2 and I3), respectively "*7 years*" (I4).

- *Which is your specialization?*

The initial education of the persons interviewed is different: "*judicial sciences*" (I1), „*economist*" (I2) and "social work" (I3 and I4). In our opinion, even if we don't contest the importance and the relevance of some specializations like the economic and/or judicial for the practice of social work, we sustain the professionalization of the activities of social work through the absorption in the system of those who studied *university specialty studies in the social work domain* (bachelor and/or masters levels).

- *How relevant is for you the problem of family social work?*

For the persons interviewed family social work is "*very relevant"* (I2) (I3) (I4).

- *How relevant do you consider is family social work for the beneficiary families? But for the community?*

According to the persons interviewed, social work "*has a high relevance*" (I2), being "*important for the family and for the community*" (I1), establishing even a certain order: it "*has an important relevance first of all for the family, and afterwards for the community in which it is found*" (I3).

4.3. Effectiveness

- *Which are the short term, medium and long term objectives in the family social work domain?*

The effectiveness of family social work programs supposed that these reach their purposes/objectives. That is why our interest was to identify that set of objectives that coordinate the activity of family social work. Apparently simple it is essentially difficult. According to us, the quasi-absence of integrated family politics, coherent and functional represent repercussions on the identification and the assuming of objectives in the family social work domain.

According to the opinion of the persons interviewed family social work has the following objectives: "*the support of families and their informing regarding the services of support existent in the community in order to remove the causes which lead to child separation from his family, the reduction of the number of children separated from their families*" (I2), "*the prevention of child separation from his parents and the sustaining of family in the growth, caring and education of their children*". (I4) – these objectives, very important ones, strictly refer to dysfunctional families in connection to which the measure of child protection has been established through a separation from his family. Thus we consider that the objectives of family social work cannot be limited only to this category of families (which obviously need social assistance).

Another answer, as prudent and as inspired as possible, sends us government documents, because the objectives of family social work are "*those provided in the national strategy in the domain of social work*" (I1).

Another opinion considers that the objectives of family social work are represented by: "*the offering of corresponding specialized services according to the family individual needs, information and promotion campaigns of services we offer, and on long term, the collaboration between state organisms or private authorized ones, in the structure of which there are similar profile units and the facilitation of the exchange of personnel experience*".(I3) We appreciate the opinion of the person interviewed focused of themes of real interest: the quality of services axed on needs, the promotion of activities realized, inter-institutional collaboration, including personnel mobility.

- *Which are the concrete measures and services developed in order to reach objectives in the domain of family social work?*

The persons interviewed identify a large frame of measures and actions meant to contribute in reaching the objectives highlighted, as: "*social services provided by*

OUG no. 68/2003" (I1); "information campaigns *regarding child rights, the parents responsibility and the offering of social services"*(I2); "*the respect of civil rights and freedoms, in order to offer appropriate profile services, as: psycho-logical, social, judicial, educational counselling and respectively medical information, including relational support during the investigation*" (I3); "*the constant implication in order to find the best ways ad work instruments that will insure specialized services in the domain of family social work; the profes-sionalization of different suppliers and central and local institutions implicated in the offering of social services offered to the family; the resizing of social protection measures of families with low incomes*" (I4).

- **How do you appreciate the quality of family social work offered by your organization/institution?**

The quality of the services offered by the institution in which the persons interviewed is appreciated as being "*good*" (I2) or *"medium*" (I4), "*based on a close collaboration in the inside and the outside by closing collaboration conventions*" (I1).

- **How do you appreciate the material base owed by your organization/ institution in order to realize in the best condition the activity of family social work?**

According to the persons interviewed, "*the material base was OK, the present economic constraints limit its exploitation at maximum capacities*" (I1), thus it can be appreciated as being *"good"* (I2), "v*ery good*" (I3) or "*satisfactory*" (I4). The answers gathered from the persons interviewed certify the fact that public institutions dispose of a material base appropriate for the developing of the activity of family social work.

- **The specialists (personnel) that activate in the family social work domain benefit from a specialized education in the domain of family social work? If yes, when and how take place these activities of formation? Who sustains the financial costs of personnel professional development?**

The professionalization of human resources represents one of the conditions of the qualitative social work domain. In the public sector, and in the private sector (here things are more accentuated), an important number of unspecialized persons is registered or of those who limited in basic initial formation (sometimes not even in the social work domain). The problem of continuous professional development of those that activate in the social work domain demand measures of logistic and financial support of this activity, because it is less probable that social workers agree with the payment of costs for professional development, due to the low level of salary incomes of these categories of professionals.

The persons interviewed affirms that they have participated "*until the year 2009*" (I3) in programs realized "*periodically, through formation programs, with*

an external financing or insured by the institution, through the integral payment of costs" (I2), but "*during the last years this type of formation hasn't been realized, there aren't any funds for this sector, and we weren't involved in any POSDRU project that would facilitate the formation/perfecting free of charge*" (I1). One of the persons interviewed sustain in a concise and simple manner that he hasn't participated at such courses.

- **How do you appreciate the work volume of professionals involved in the domain of family social work?**

Regarding the work volume realized by social workers, the persons interviewed appreciated as being "*high*" (I2) or "*very large*" (I4). Thus, "*the poor digitization of the system determines the excessive allocation of human resources; and human resources are scarce... this leads to a considerable work volume for social workers*" (I1), otherwise said "*the work volume of professionals is large; according to present normative acts we are in lack of personnel in our institution*" (I3).

- **How do you insure the supervision of the personnel activity which activates in the family social work domain?**

"Supervision represents a distinct professional activity, in which education and formation have as purpose practice based on science, facilitated through an interpersonal collaborative process. This process involves observation, evaluation, feed-back, the facilitation of auto-evaluation of the person supervised ad the acquisition of knowledge and abilities through training, modelling and mutual solving of problems. In addition, by building the recognition of strong points and of the talent of the person supervised, supervision encourages auto-efficiency. Supervision insures the fact that the intervention is realized in a competent manner in which ethical standards, legal prescriptions and professional practices are used to promote and protect the client's well-being, that of the profession and of the society in general." (Popescu, http://www.cie.roedu.ro)

Supervision represents a form of support for professionals in their practical activity with beneficiaries, a form of control of services quality offered to them. I public institutions of social assistance a supervision is insured "*according to approved schedules, on one side and having at its base work reports, information*" (I1) or "informal, at an internal level, through periodical meetings *during which subjects regarding the difficulties met by the social worker in managing cases are discussed*" (I2) or "*by a work chief or a centre chief, corroborated at the same time with the management of the institution*"(I3); "the supervision of the personnel activity which activates in the domain of family social work is realized by managers from the Public Service "The Direction of Social Work" (I4).

- **According to you, how motivated, in a personal, professional and financial plan is the personnel that activates in the domain of family social work?**

Most of the opinions expressed directly by the specialists interviewed lead to the direction of a low degree of motivation (especially a financial one). Thus, in

general, the personnel are "*poorly motivated*" (I4), "*the degree of motivation is zero, for those in the public sector who "enjoy" the status (bad luck!) of social workers*" (I1), because under a financial aspect = *totally demotivating, as such for specialists who still activate in the domain have an intrinsic motivation* (I2). Still there exists another opinion according to which "*the personnel from our institution are at present motivated at a personal and at a professional level*" (I3).

4.4. Efficiency

The efficiency of the social work system is given by the results obtained from the sources used. The ideal is represented by the obtaining of the best results with little resources.

- **Which are the indicators used to measure the degree, in which objectives have been reached in the domain of family social work?**

Indicators represent indispensable instruments for a performance management. The indicators used in family social work offer the possibility of measuring the results obtained in this domain and the appreciation of an efficiency of the programs realized. These can be expressed in numbers (quantitative indicators – cardinal numbers are used or percentages) or under the form of descriptions which surprise the standard of quality aimed for (qualitative indicators). Some of the persons interviewed appreciate that "*the indicators we use must surprise first of all the essence of the problem and be clearly expressed and validated from a statistical point of view, to be appropriate*" (I3) – we have to underline the fact that the person interviewed passes over the fact that a direct answer, through a formulation with a general character, which in our opinion can resemble the variant of answer "*I don't know*", (I2) used by another person interviewed.

According to another opinion formulated, the indicators refer to the "*state of permanent or temporary poverty of families; the access to public and private basic services; the dependence on family social benefits*" (I4).

- **In what measure do you consider that the objectives of the domain of family social work have been reached?**

In the absence of clear indicators, known and used by those who activate in the domain, to which the activity of family social work can report to, we consider the appreciations regarding the degree in which objectives have been fulfilled are approximated, being influenced by a large dose of subjectivity. In this context, with one exception ("*I don't know'*" - I2), the answers offered by the persons interviewed are generally listed on the same: *the objectives of the family social work domain have been fulfilled "usually in a partial form" (*I3), or these *"haven't really been reached*" (I4) or "*are relatively fulfilled; the implementation of specific "batteries" is needed, because now measures are relatively chaotic."* (I1)

- **What was the help offered to families through the activity of family social work?**

The measures of family social work refer to the offering of benefits and/or social services to some unfortunate categories like families with low incomes, disabled persons, children, aged people etc. The specialists interviewed underline the main measures of help offered to vulnerable families: *"benefits of social assistance and measures of protection for adult disabled persons"*(I1); *"evaluation, information, counselling, instruction regarding social protection measures for children, the complex evaluation of children and adults that demands their introduction in a disable category, assistance and support in order to help them recover and develop the family's capacity to overcome difficult situations"*(I2); *"social, psychological, educational, formal and informal counselling, medical information, family integration and reintegration"* (I3); *"financial help for families with special needs: collaboration with foundations/associations with the right to offer socio-medical services at the home of beneficiaries, aged persons"* (I4).

- **How do you appreciate the number of beneficiaries of family social assistance in comparison to the community's needs? If there is a difference please explain which could be the causes that lead to this situation. Which is the concrete demarche of your organization/institution in this case (the reduction of the difference between the needs of the community ant the services offered)?**

The answers received for this question vary from *"I don't know"* (I2) till answers like: *"the number of beneficiaries of family social assistance in comparison to the needs of the community is different. The difference resides in the lack of information from certain communities and the lack of education. In order to reduce these differences our institution tries to inform communities through mass-media regarding the social services offered to families."* (I4) at the same time it is considered that *"the public coordinating authority (The County Council) has the responsibility to find solutions and to implement politics to attenuate the differences you speak of; we only insure the implementing of social measures. Obviously, the number of beneficiaries is strongly connected to the needs/ development of the community."*(I1) and this is why *"there should be a stronger connection between our institution and the local communities from our county"* (I3).

- **In your opinion, how do you appreciate, under a qualitative report, the beneficiaries of family social assistance destined for them? If it was necessary, do you believe that the beneficiaries of family social assistance would agree to pay for these services? Please motivate your answer.**

In general the beneficiaries of family social assistance programs, besides other specific problems are usually confronted with a low level of incomes, which determines the number of services demanded to be absolutely greater than the number of social services demanded. We agree with the fact that the specialists interviewed sustain *"poverty limits in a huge manner the beneficiaries' con-*

tribution" (I1) (obviously, regarding directly the financial contribution), and "*the beneficiaries of social assistance but only in small numbers are more receptive to social services and only a small appreciate the specialized services offered*". I *don't believe there is a will from beneficiaries to access family social assistance by paying for it, because, most of them, have a low living standard*" (I2). The same idea is also found in other specialist participants in our research: "*I don't believe the present social situation Romania would allow beneficiaries to financially contribute for social services.*" (I3); "*I don't believe the beneficiaries of family social assistance would agree in paying for these services. I consider that there is a need for an improvement of family social work*". (I4)

- **How do you appreciate the budget de care you dispose for family social work? The budget contains a distinct category for family social work?**

The development of any program of social assistance involves costs insured by the state budget, by local budgets or other funds (donations, subventions, non-refundable European funds etc.). According to the people interviewed "*there isn't a separate budget*" (I1) for family social work, but for the "present *needs and* demands *for social assistance there are sort of enough funds*" (I3), while other opinions suggest that the "*budget is insufficient for family social work*" (I4).

- **Which was the tendency during the last 3 years regarding the budget for family social work? It was diminished, increased or maintained at the same values?**

One of the people interviewed was optimistic about the budget for family social work and he considers that the tendency for the last 3 years was of "*increase of funds*"(I3), while the others appreciate the tendency as being of "*diminishing*" (I2 and I4). The official data for the year 2012 confirm the tendency to diminish the funds offered to family social work in general and mainly in particular.

- **What activities did you give up due to the reduction of the budget? Or what activities did you develop/diversify in the domain of family social work i the case the budget was increased?**

The first effect of the reduction of funds offered to family social work is sensed by the personnel from the system of social work by "*limiting the field movements and the judicious planning of these activities*" (I2). One of the persons interviewed mentioned that the funds are offered "*according to the services offered*" (I3).

4.5. Impact

- **Which were the results obtained in the domain of family social work?**

The results obtained in the domain of family social work are appreciated as being "*very good*" (I3), because these have led to "*children's integration/reintegration in their biological families or in the extended on, to child adoption, their integration in the young's community that leave the system of social protection*" (I2). At the

same time, *"the results were positive regarding the reduction of children leaving the system, children from unorganized families or with financial problems."* (I4), even if "*there aren't any qualitative indicators, clearly developed to rapport the activity to*" (I1)

- **How many beneficiaries of the family social work system have come back to ask for help? How do you comment this fact?**

A concerning reality is represented, in our opinion, the beneficiaries' dependence on social assistance. Thus, "*most of them come back, the measures applied are not continued sufficiently, the community and the economic environment don't add values so that these measures can be efficient"* (I1). "*The state of poverty and the beneficiaries' dependence caused by low incomes of families lead to their coming back and demanding family social assistance*" (I4). Thus, "*most of them" (*I3) become for long periods of time beneficiaries of the social work system, in contradiction to the philosophy of social assistance programs which recommend that the support to be offered during a short period of time. The conclusion is simple: the programs of social assistance are not efficient and encourage dependence or these give birth to the obtaining of benefits without realizing an activity.

The answer "*I don't know"* (I2) offered by one of the specialists interviewed reflects a certain lack of interest towards the effectiveness of social work programs destined to families.

- **Is there a profile of families beneficiary of social assistance (age, education, residence etc.)? Which is it?**

According to the persons interviewed, one of the basic characteristics of beneficiaries of social assistance is represented by the low level of education: "*most families beneficiaries of social assistance have a low level of education*" (I4), "*a reduced level of education and an economic reduced one"* (I1). A special category of beneficiaries is represented by "*children with parents working abroad in order to survive*" (I3).

- **What progress have beneficiaries made, in comparison to their initial situation?**

The progress registered by the beneficiaries of programs of family social assistance are appreciated as being "*reduced*" (I1), or as being "*good*" (I3), because "*part of the young which have left the system of social protection have autonomy; the children reintegrated in families haven't returned in the system"* (I2), and "*the beneficiaries have become aware of the importance of education. They have participated in classes of formation/qualification/ requalification of the work force*". (I4)

- *How do you appreciate the genera impact of family social assistance on direct beneficiaries (family) and indirect (community), on a short, medium and long?*

"*The general impact of family social assistance on direct beneficiaries was positive on a long or on a short term*" (I4). Because this has generated the "*improvement of family conditions and its valuing in the Romanian society*" (I2) we may underline the idea that "*on a short and medium term the impact is positive, especially on families*" *(*I1).

- *Which are the positive effects of family social work?*

The main positive effects of family social work are represented by the "*overpassing of the situation of need, for the moment in which we offer services*" (I2) and the "*reduction of child abandon come from disorganized families or with financial problems by offering them primal social services*" *(*I4). We consider that one of the important challenges for family social work is represented by the maximization of those moments of well-being, through the support of the family to look on its own for resources that insure a proper social functioning.

- *Which are the main difficulties which you confront in the domain of family social work? Which of these difficulties have a history of more than 2 years?*

The difficulties underlined by the specialists participants in this research referred to:
- "*child abandon, due to the lack of family financial and material resources*"(I3)
- "*the lack of a modern legislative frame and balanced to European standards. The insufficiency of funds offered in the domain of family social work*". (I4)

- *Which are the strong points of the activities from the social work domain developed by your organization/institution?*

The strong points of the activity of family social assistance and which can be developed in the practical activity with beneficiaries are represented by: "*the direct contact with the beneficiaries, professionalism, the approach with serenity of situations in which the child is found in a risk situation; the existent work relations*" (I2), which favour "*children's reintegration „in family of professional social workers*" (I3), but especially "*the insurance of quality, flexile social services respecting the general standards of this domain.*" (I4)

- *Which are the weak points of the activity of family social work developed by your organization/institution?*

According to the specialist's opinions, the weak points of the activity of family social work are represented by "*insufficient human and material resources for the*

activity of prevention and the observation of risk situations in proper time" (I2). The belief that there aren't any weak points in this type of activity is unreal and exaggerated (I3).

- **Which are the opportunities of the activity in the domain of family social work developed by your organization/institution?**

According to the opinions expressed by the persons participant in this research, the opportunities for the activity of family social work are found in offering "*services of support according to the needs and necessities of families with problems"* (I3), in "*the implementation of programs or prevention of social marginalization, of risk situations and of the dependence towards the system of social protection.* (I4), and the development of specialized services for certain categories of beneficiaries, as "*the opening of a centre of services for families with children with autism*" (I2)

- **Which are the activity threats in the domain of family social work developed by your organization/institution?**

The main threats for family social work are represented by: "*insufficient personnel, great causes, insufficient qualified personnel for the implementation of projects, the access of European funds*" (I2), to which we can add the "*lack of professional development and insufficient personnel"* (I3).

4.6. Sustainability

The sustainability of a program of family social work is offered by the insurance of conditions that make possible the continuation of that program in time. This is why this research focused on the following aspects:
- The objectives proposed in the domain of family social work are realist, realizable?
- The results obtained through the activity of family social work are the ones decided for?
- Are there available financial resources for the development of family social work?
- Which are the main activities of family social work which will be realized in the future?
- The positive experiences obtained with programs in the domain of social work may be translated to other domains (sectorial, regional, local, institutional)?

These were the themes discussed with the specialists managers in the domain of social work participants in our research and their ideas will also be presented.

- **In what measure were objectives in the domain of family social work been fulfilled and were the results obtained the desired ones?**

According to the specialists' opinions, the objectives of the family social work domain were "*in a great measure"* realized (I2), (I4), thus obtaining the results aimed at. The following observation is interesting: "*I believe that our county is*

situated in front of other counties concerning the fulfilling of objectives in the domain of family social" (I3) – the roots of this observation, according to us are found in the traditional culture according to which "Banat is the forehead". We do not necessarily agree to this position. Because many demanders come back to ask for help (as the persons interviewed sustained) we consider that the objectives of family social work are partially realized.

- *Which financing resources, for the activity in the family social work domain, do by your organization/institution access?*

"The financing resources for the activity of the family social work domain are insured by the state budget" (I4), from "*the local budget (county)"* (I2) or represents "*funds of state and European budget*" (I3).

- *What activities, in the domain of family social work, will by your organization/institution develop in order to insure the continuation, the valuing and the integrative approach of the results obtained until now?*

According to the specialists interviewed the continuing of activities and the results obtained in the domain of family social work may be realized through "*the implementing of programs financed by European funds in the domain of family social work"* (I3), but also by "*starting and diversifying the existent community social services. The extension of daily caring centre networks for children found in risk situations. The starting of daily caring centres for aged persons*". (I4)

According to us, the idea of accessing European funds (beyond all the bureaucracy involved) is extremely welcomed, because thus professional development courses may be organized, the costs of which can be sustained through the project, the institution material base cane improved, modern social services may be started, at European standards. Otherwise said, strong problems may be solved that affect and (sometimes) lock the system of family social work.

- *In what measure the results obtained in the domain of family social work may be transferred at different levels (sectorial, regional, local, institutional) or can be integrated in family social politics and strategies by your organization/ institution*?

Some of the persons interviewed affirmed that the results obtained in the domain of family social work must be transferred "*at the highest level"* (I3) (we recognize that we don't necessarily understand to what he refers, his idea being much to general) while another, for the same question decides to answer with "*I don't know* (I2).

5. Conclusions

We may draw the conclusions that according to the persons interviewed family social work addresses families found in risk situations in order to remove the causes that affect social functioning and may favour social exclusion. Still, family

social work is found as a distinct domain in theory, but less in practice, because these plans intersect with each other, sometimes even overlap. Family social work is relevant for specialists in the domain and for direct and indirect beneficiaries. The efficiency and effectiveness of programs of family social work applied in Romania still remain open points for a better management and development, through the analysis of the weak points and the discovery of viable, sustainable solutions with a positive impact on the entire society.

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USING NLP IN SUPERVISION

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Rezumat

În lucrarea de față am considerat necesară trecerea în revistă a tehnicii modelării în NLP pentru a exemplifica rolul mentorilor în desfășurarea activităților subalternilor, în oferirea și îmbunătățirea abilităților asistenților sociali. Reușita unui sistem depinde, în mare măsură, de abilitatea angajatului respectiv de a împărtăși celorlalți calitățile sale. Utilizarea NLP în supervizare poate sprijini accelerea capacității de învățare, dezvoltarea continuă a noilor căi de gândire, indiferent de schimbările din lumea exterioară, renunțarea la tiparele și obiceiurile vechi, tradiționale, care restricționează dezvoltarea profesioniștilor. Folosirea NLP-ului ajută supervizorii în conturarea propriilor formule pentru a răspunde la lumea tehnologiei înalte, de a construi relații de calitate cu oameni, fie că e vorba de o întâlnire cu ceilalți profesioniști ori cu beneficiarii serviciilor sociale. De asemenea, NLP permite dezvoltarea flexibilității, punând la dispoziție mai multe alegeri și mai multă putere situațiilor diferite cu care se confruntă specialiștii. În ansamblu, scopul învățării NLP este acela de a genera învățarea viitoare.

Cuvinte cheie*: supervizare, modelare, NLP, dezvoltare personală.

Abstract

In this report I considered necessary presenting the modelling technique in NLP to emphasize the role of the mentors in subalterns' developing activities and in improving the skills of social workers. The success of a system depends largely on employee's ability of sharing his qualities to others. Using NLP in supervision may support increasing the capacity of learning, the continuous developement of the new ways of thinking, regardless of changes in the outside world, giving up on old and traditional habits or patterns, which restrict the developement of the professionals. Using NLP helps supervisors to define their own formulas for responding to the new high technology world to bulid quality relationships with people, be it a meeting with the others professionals or with the beneficiaries. Also, NLP allows the developement of flexibility, offering more choices and more control in different situations. Overall, the meaning of NLP is to generate future learning.

Keywords*: supervision, modelling, NLP, personal developement.

Résumé

Dans cet article, j'ai consideré nécessaire de souligner l'importance du modélisation en NLP pour exemplifier le role des mentors dans les activités des subordonnés, en fournissant et en ameliorant les compétences des travailleurs sociaux. Le succès d'un système dépend en grand partie de l'abilité de l'éployée de transmettre aux autres ses compétences. L'utilisation du NLP en supervision permet l'accélération d'apprentissage, le dévéloppement des nouvelles idées, malgré le monde extérieur, la renunciation des vieilles habitudes et tendances, qui limite le dévéloppement des professionels. L'utilisation du NLP

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aide les superviseurs à trouver des solutions, d'établir des bonnes relations avec les professionnels et avec les bénéficiaires. Aussi, NLP permet le dévéloppement de la flexibilité, offre plus de choix et de puissance pour les situations différentes qui les specialists rencontrent. En ansemble, le but du NLP est de générer le future de l'apprentissage.

Mots clés: supervision, modélisation, NLP, développement personnel.

1. What is NLP?

The evolution taken by NLP, from the first formulated ideas, and till its actual status, it is sort of amazing. Still, it is easier for us to understand the meaning of this affirmation by shortly following its history. Practically, the birth year of the NLP is 1970, and the place - The University from Santa Cruz, California where its two founders John Grinder, linguistic teacher, and Richard Bandler, a mathematician and expert in informatics, met. Neuro-linguistic programming was created by this two contemporaneous moderators, John Grinder and Richard Bandler when they started to study who 'successful people' are functioning, but also how this strategies, values and faiths can be transmitted (O'Connor, 2010, p. 390). NLP is a system of personal development based on methods very practical. NLP studies the quality, and in general everything that is exceptional – how the individuals do to get noted and the organizations to have exceptional results. The methods can be taught to others in such a way that these to obtain similar results. This process is called modelling. Modelling means more 'how' rather than 'why' (Knight, 2007, p. 199.) In order to model, NLP studies the way in which we structure our subjective experience – what we think about our values and beliefs, and how we create our inner world, starting from our experiences to which you attribute a meaning. No event has a meaning in itself, we are giving them a significance, and different person can give other meanings to the same event.. So, NLP studies the inner experience. NLP started by studying the best communicators and reached the systematic study of human communication. It evolved by adding practical tools and general methods through modelling the skills of some exceptional persons. These tools are used on international scale in sport, business, training, sale, justice and education. Despite all this, NLP is more than a simple collection of techniques. It is a way of thinking, a vision based on curiosity, exploration and amusement (O'Connor, 2010, p. 11). The name of Neuro-Linguistic Programming comes from the three domains which it reunites: N neurology (the brain and how we think), L linguistic (how we use the language how this affects us), P programming (the word is borrowed from IP, especially to underline the fact that our brain was "programmable", meaning that we can modify the strategies, the ways, the techniques, the methods we have with others which are more competitive, which will take us in the right direction. NLP explores the relationships between how we think (neuro), how we communicate, verbally and non verbally (linguistic) and our methods of behaving and emotion (programming)

(Collingwood and Collindwood, 2001, p. 7). NLP reunites more techniques developed along the years and combines them with new discoveries. It consists in studying the greatest experts of change but also in recognizing the talents which exists in each person. NLP is a discovery trip (Knight, 2007, p. 30). The elements of NLP do not fit perfectly in the categories 'programming', 'neuro'and 'linguistic'. Even though, these denominations act as an umbrella under which the subject can be inserted. The first 'technical umbrella' is neuro. Neuro deals with the way in which we use our mind, body, and senses to think and to give meaning to our experiences. The more conscious we are about our ways of thinking, the more flexible we are, and as a result, we have much more influence over our destiny. The way in which we use our language to facilitate the change represents a big part of the old working of John Grinder and Richard Bandler, the creators of NLP. In business, the language is one of the best method of influence. NLP is a reproduction process of a model of our exceptional talent or of others. The programming, the essence of NLP, offers the possibility of learning the NLP abilities, to set off and codify the exceptional talent and also for the discovery of our own resources in accomplishing our true potential (Knight, 2007, p. 3).

2. The reproduction of our own models with NLP

With the help of NLP, we can learn the structure of our strategies which we apply on ourselves, we can reproduce the models which we use. We first learn how to reproduce our own models with the help of NLP, we become a model with principles that influence the people around us. For example, once we learnt to set our goals, we are more capable to help others to set their own goals (Knight, 2007, p. 237). The techniques from this section come from the reproduction of those model people who reached the excellence concerning the capacity to be guided by themselves. By attaining this competences, we will also develop new ones, which fit our personal, unique circumstances. The competences and the entrepreneurial style become more and more significant for this era. No matter if we work for us or for an organization, we need more than ever to have the capacity to lead ourselves. NLP is the modality to give a meaning to our own direction, to set free the resources which pertain naturally to us and the capacity to influence others, to realize state of optimal creativity creating thus the biggest number of behavioural solutions (Robbins, 2002, p. 32). One of the NLP assumptions is that we all have the same neurological talents, so that every one on this world can do everything, meaning that we also can, if we lead our nervous system in the same way. This process of discovering what exactly people do to obtain results is called modelling. We reach to the conclusion that if it is possible for others in this world is also possible for us. The problem is not if we can obtain the results which the other person has obtained; here is about strategy - how does the other person to obtain

results (Robbins, 2002, p. 33). The capacity to chose the best emotional state, to fit to the circumstances, is one of the most powerful and still less considered competence which we have. The emotion is important in a efficient thinking as well in taking the wise decision but also in allowing a clear thinking (Goleman, 2001, p. 41). When we can choose our mood, we can choose the techniques and the type of influence we wish in a situation. Each of us have their own values and beliefs, which lead each move we do and each word we utter. Sometimes, the respective beliefs are what we want them to be, other times they are not. Our own convictions influence and determine our behaviour. They form the screenplay of our life – our convictions dictates us how to act in front of the situations and the people we meet during our life. In most cases we don't realise that these convictions reflect in every aspect of our life and in the same time influence them. And, each conviction has its own structure, which we can influence if we chose to do so (Knight, 2007, p. 293). The convictions creates our social world. The fact that NLP considers convictions as some axiom means that it perceives them as behavioural principles. We act as if they are real, and if the results suit us, then we can go one acting as if they are real. If our beliefs don't bring us good results, then we have the possibility to change them. We need to act according to our convictions, only in this way they are meaningful, thus, convictions are principles of taking action, not empty ideals (O'Connor, 2010, pp. 36-37). If we want to reproduce the model of a performance we want to reproduce it in such a way so that it can influence our behaviour. Also, to have access to those inner resources which inspires us, specifically in a context, we have to be capable to 'decrypt' the conviction which helps us in a certain situation (Knight, 2007, p. 294).

Why is it important to learn to imitate the models? We need to know to imitate the models if our work depends on our ability to influence others. We all have strategies of learning, taking decisions, buying and motivating ourselves. If we want to influence ourselves or others, we can do this if we use a relevant strategy (Bandler, 2008, p. 51). If we already have a good capacity in influencing others and we never encountered the concept of modelling, then probably we do it unconsciously. Even so, we can't leave this abilities to rely on luck or intuition – we need to excel in our domain. The most competent and respectful people with power of influence know how to identify the person's strategy they come in conflict with and know how to use this strategy and adapt their communication so that it suits to the person (Knight, 2007, p. 227). Modelling is a way to guarantee the certitude and the consistency of the results we obtain. "Modelling is the map of the implicit knowledge in explicit knowledge" (Bostic St. Clair and Grinder, 2001, p. 271). Our way of behaving is determined or motivated by a result, we realise we attain the desired result according to some set of criteria. We constantly compare our present mood with our desired mood, to discover it they match. When they become equivalent, we know we reach a point, for example, we obtained our result. If our present mood is completely different from the desired one, we need to start

another operation to discover if this brings any change (Bandler, 2008, p. 24). We all live extreme events, but what we do about them depends of our subjectivity. If we want to reproduce the result we recognize in ourselves and in others, then what we can study is the structure of that subjectivism. Not only that we learn to reproduce those abilities, but we respect the uniqueness of the individual interpretations we give to life. If we can learn to respect the individual culture, probably we can start to do the same with the people in general (Knight, 2007, p. 232).

3. Learning through modelling

NLP is an accelerated learning strategy to identify and to use the models in the outside reality. In NLP (Neuro-linguistic-programming), the term of modelling has a totally different meaning from the usual one, the one we find it explained in the DEX. Modelling according to NLP is learning by reproducing the models of others (Dilts, 2007, p. 15). As we well know, modelling is part of the arsenal methods of psychology. Though, in NLP, modelling not only plays a first role but also contains some specialised elements, NLP being the one who contributed in a significant way at the development and extension of the possibilities in applying this method. Modelling reunites two big measures. The first one is analytical and regards the profound identification and investigation of these patterns of efficiency. In this way, we have models regarding the use of language, models of negotiation, models of efficient learning. This technology which we use to create models can be use in modelling the personal performance. NLP counts on the assumption that we can model are own experience and accordingly accelerating the learning process in an extraordinary way). A part of our fundamental abilities were learned through reproducing the models of others. If we go back in time with the mind or if we look carefully around us, we will discover that the true experts in reproducing the models are the babies and the small children. We did the same during that period of our life, but while we grew up we adapted to the traditional methods of learning by accumulating the cognizance, loosing though this ability. Is it good or bad? Other time I wouldn't even ask myself this question. An ability which we consider long forgotten can represent the shortcut to success which we are always looking for (Knight, 2007:198). Being all in a continuous searching for success, we inevitably notice that are extremely few those who know how to truly use the inner resources. Do we want to develop in this direction? If the answer is positive, the first step is to trust in ourselves, in the way we learn, we develop, coordinate, take initiative, and deal with the constant changes. What can help us? Modelling. Modelling is the methodology which leaves behind a set of techniques, presented by Richard Bandler. It is a systematic way of learning of a new aptitude which someone rooted so much that even they don't know who they did it. Modelling is not something necessary to learn, but rather something we should remember (Bandler and Grinder, 1982, p. 50).

Sue Knight in her book The techniques of Neuro-Linguistic-Programming, describes the modelling as being the way to wisdom and real personal fulfillment, more than that, it is a model of respecting and valuating our unique qualities which we have. Modelling is a state of curiosity and altruism. It is the wish to listen, watch, respect others, to learn from others, but also to find our own inner resources of which we are not always aware, to get them to light and especially to value them for our own good. It is an interest for process beyond the content. It is not only a technique, but a life style, thus everywhere we will be and whoever is around us, we can learn and grow up continuously (Knight, 2007, p. 199). Interesting is that we can apply successfully this things in business where changes are spectacular and welcome when they assure the success. But we have to admit that a system rooted already in the tradition of a company is hard to be changed without a certain strategy. Now, many companies have a system of guidance where the leading members, in one of the stage of their development, are distributed to an older employee with much more experience, from whom they will learn. The success of this system depends mostly of the certain employee ability to share to the others his qualities. Often, they don't know their most important aptitudes, don't know to talk about them, and don't even know to explain what exactly of what they do have big importance in obtaining the success. If though, the student is familiarized with the NLP system of reproducing the models with different aptitudes, he can select the aptitudes which he needs to learn, regardless the conscious level of these by his mentor. Including the person of which the model is reproduced can benefit from this process and learning from the reactions of others towards the way he structures his experience. In this way, the mentors themselves can reach a high level of their aptitudes they have. Modelling in business led to significant progresses regarding the way in which the aptitudes are learn (Knight, 2007, p. 208). There are unique patterns which work in a company, in a department, or in a market segment, and patterns which don't work in other fields. Modelling allows us to analyse this specific patterns of a certain context for reproducing the excellence in a certain domain (Dilts, 2007, p. 208). By identifying those person who succeed in your organization, not only we will be able to reproduce their success, but we will be able to help those people to maintain a consistency in their realizations. Someone said that modelling in the secret weapon in today business, with the condition to be well used. It is easy to access the strategies you wish, even if their use in business haven't become a common practice. Each individual or organization who uses this way of thinking will continue to lead the game many years from now on.

The idea is that modelling represents a different way of thinking and working, from the present one. Offering a chance to the people from a company to reproduce the model of some aptitudes means offering them the methods of reproducing of some models to find solutions in any situation they are in. We can apply the process of modelling to our own person, by reproducing one ability or competence from a certain area of our life or work with the purpose to use it in another context.

Usually we obtain results through the programmes we unroll in our mind and through our actions. When we walk, drive the car, talk, read, laugh, is less probable that we are aware by the way we are doing this things. The programmes which make them possible are coordinated by subconscious (O'Connor, 2010, p. 180). They are known under the name of strategies. If we want to reproduce a personal model of excellence or a model of someone else, we need to activate also the conscious and the unconscious strategies which allows us to do what we are doing. As an example: when we know someone's strategy who knows how to lead his life, then we hold the key for reproducing that experience in our personal life.

Sue Knight in The techniques of Neuro-Linguistic-Programming, describes an exemple very eloquent of what the complexity of a strategy really means. When a chef cooks the perfect dinner, he doesn't only respect the recipe, but he also respects a recipe of thinking and behaviour. For example, it's possible that he imagines the way the food would want to look like (visually), what smell it should have (olfactiv) what would be its consistency (sensitive) or how the guests would manifest their delight (acoustic) (Knight, 2007, p. 204). Understanding a strategy gives us the strenght to choose when and how to use it. For example, if someone likes to influence a decision of ours, will succed only if he understands our strategy and not trying to impose his strategy (O'Connor, 2010, p. 182). A strategy involves creating a imagine of we want, searching inside us an answer regarding the viability of the result. It is important to remember that when we ask someone "how do you do this"? we ask in fact the awareness of his own strategy and it is unlikely that the person to be able to give a direct answer. Be it he will say I don't know, be it he'll say what he thinks he's doing. Infrequently his answer coincide with what he really does. To succed extracting a strategy, the person whoes model we want to reproduce has to follow or to relive the experience that we want to study. Only this way we can come in direct contact with what he's doing, thinking, feeling and living in that moment. We can identify usefull stategies behind any behavior. What we're doing always involves a valuable process, even if the situation is different regarding its content (O'Connor, 2010, p. 181). We have to analize all behaviours that we consult for discovering the strategy behind them. Thus, we can discover that behind our weaknesses there are very valuable strategies, when they are used in right circumstance.

4. The importance of modelling in supervison

As we previously mentioned NLP is a personal developement system based on very practical methods, is the systematic and effective use that exist in every person to remember, to forget, to enhance informations and representations, to perceive and to react for succeeding to live their life to the highest level (Bandler, 2008, p. 18). The social work supports the social change, the solving of relation-

ship problems and the people's empowering to enhage their welfare. The practical perspective directs the social worker to specific factors in the social intervention. The supervision may be seen as a collaborative process between two or more improvers that may be part of the same domain or different domains (Cojocaru, 2005, p. 111). This process aims to encourage the developement of professional skills and abilities, of quality customer service by implementing quality standards. These are maintained by the discussions of the situations of a part of clients or by interventions who use elements of reflection (Ponea, 2009, p. 12 cited in The Chartered Society of Physiotheraphy, 2003, p. 3). The supervision is an administrative and educational process used in social work to support the social workers for developping their own skills and providing to customers quality services. The main purpose of supervision is the observation of watching over the interests of the beneficiaries and their welfare. Through their roles the supervisors have to ensure the best sevices to customers regarding quality and quantity and also to be consistent with the policies and procedures of organizations (Ponea, 2009, p. 20 cited in Smith, 2005, p. 8). The supervision is considered an „activity that transfers knowledges, skills and attitudes from an experienced person to one with less experience. (...) Gerald Caplan said that supervision is a long process between a proffesional with a special skill an one or more proffesionals without that special skill" (Lundén, 2007, p. 162). Thus, „the supervision is an activity who can also contribute to the professional developement of improvers, whose importance is recognized by the authorities in the field. This process always helps the practitioners to improve their reflection skills, narrowing the „gap" between theory and practice, and to allow an easier understanding to be a good professional" (Ponea, 2009, p. 11). The supervision is a professional meeting developed in an organized and negociated frame, aimed to increase capacity of the supervised to relate with the beneficiaries, and also the professional developement of the supervised in this process (Muntean, 2007, p. 78).

The supervision hepls to be aware of how to act, it requires the implementation of changes not only in knowledge but also in behaviors, emotions, and attitudes related to each personality. The change causes a certain anxiety. In addition, the relationship with the supervisor may evoke a authority report and so it may pose a threat to his independence and autonomy. The relationship in supervision involves dealing with emotions, intimate attitudes, and sometimes those must be avoided, because the relationship between supervisor and supervised should stay professional, without involving personal attachment. The supervised should want to discover the meaning of his professional activities, to discover his own professional identity, to have an adequate distance from the work's events who influence his personal life. This itself regular sistematic return back is not fruitful only when there is an authentic professional relationship with the supervisor and supervision group members. The supervision is seen in the world as a growing specialization, with a degree of dinamic formalization and institutionalization, with a pronounced

tendency to generalize across all social and human services. The professional supervision is a complex method of professional coaching done by profesional supervisors with a special training (Kessel, 2007, p. 146).

The supervision doesn't mean surveillance, hierarchical control, evaluation, not just a raport and following a work schedule, the supervision means the oportunity to promote a quality services offer too, avoiding as possible a burnout. If an institution of social system would provide the higest quality service, where clients would find the solution of all their problems and the social work objectives would be achieved, then we couldn't talk about supervision. But the social work envisages different categories of beneficiaries, with their specific problems, cultural differences, changing needs and expectations (Cojocaru, 2005, p. 135). Therefore, the supervision in the institutions within the social services system aims to streamline the work and to increase the involment of the social workers. The role of supervisor is different from that of a therapist; the supervisor listens differently, responds differently, has different responsabilities. The supervision work involves the transmision of professionalism to the superviseds. To accomplish the supervisor's objectives, you must have a good training in the field (theoretical) good practical experience in supervision, and finaly to own qualities and abilities for being a good supervisor, a professional one (Ponea, 2009 cited. Smith, 2005, p. 8). Also we can talk about the appreciative inteligence of the supervisors. The appreciative intelligence doesn't mean only to have a positive way of seeing things (Barett, 1995, p. 23). „Knowing yourself, being yourself, realiving to others your personality, are the three vital ingredients that contribute to the effectiveness of leadership" (Goffee, Jones, 2010, p. 65).

Using NLP in supervision may support increasing the capacity of learning, the continuous developement of the new ways of thinking, regardless of changes in the outside world, giving up on old and traditional habits or patterns, which restrict the developement of the professionals. This approach helps to create possible strategies for the future and to assign concrete plans for change, using their talents and potential, working within their system of values and using the basics of their beliefs to design a good future (Thatchenker and Metzker, 2008, p. 108). Using NLP helps the supervisors in shaping quality relations with people, be it a meeting with the others professionals or with the beneficiaries. Also, NLP allows the developement of flexibility, providing more choices and more control in order to solve encountered problems (Knight, 2007, pp. 21-22). Supervisors may implement NLP in a specific personal mode, and even in professional field, which will provide a formula for success in communication, strategic thinking, motivation, negociation, leadership, empowerment, view. Well mastered, NLP is the answer of many encountered problems in the relationship between supervisor and supervised. Overall, the main NLP purpose is generating the future learning. This could not be for many people to understand, especially in the case of those who want quick

answers (Knight, 2007, p. 23). Many traditional changing and influencing methods looked to make a change by manipulating other people and the environment. The truth is we cannot change others, if we can't change ourselves. Our environment is defined by the mental models that we have. For example there are people that see only what is good in others. They don't have a representation of what's evil. In their world, evil doesn't exist. Our thoughts mark our facts, usually unconsciously. These thoughts inform people about their desires and believes. Therefore, the key for influencing answer is the changing of the internal signals. NLP offers the opportunity to manage these representations and internal signals. Doing so, the supervisor or the supervised, who learned to control their own thoughts, would be able to change the way of react to different context (Knight, 2007, p. 37). The main question in NLP is what you really want. The professional may apply any of multiples models, techniques or combinations of models in NLP to be assimilated and implemented in order to change (O'Connor, 2010, p. 20). NLP is related to discover the way which the performers get the best results. This excelent modelling process bring to light their sequence of actions and internal processes. Once we undestand how someone does something we can replicate the strategy and achieve similar results (Szekely, 2003, p. 7). Modelling involves constructing ways to teach others, helps to form some skills, is the process of identifying a set of ideas or behavior patterns that will allow someone to perform a task. Practically, modelling involves three steps: first is observation of the model which will be modeled, second is extracting those elements of individual behavior pattern and the last one is building ways to teach others, to help forming some skills (Dilts, 2007, p. 34). During the code phase, the model is developed in the elegance that it is, using a minimum number necessary and sufficient to demonstrate the effectiveness of talent (Grinder, DeLozier and Bandler, 1977, p. 29). As we all know, a necessary skill for the social workers is persuasion, the capacity to influence the beneficiaries for improving their ability of an independent life. We must learn how to reproduce models, if our work depends on influencing others. We all have strategies for making decisions, buying, motivating ourselves. If we want to influence ourselves or others, we can do this only if we use a relevant strategy (Bandler, 2008, p. 15). Supervisors may implement this method both in the social workers activities, especially in relation to direct or indirect beneficiaries. Modelling is one of the most important ability that a supervisor may hold, offering the posibility to improve learning, to find more solutions, alternatives for encoutered problems to subordinates. More then that primary is thrusting in our own capacity for dealing with constant changes. Even if a professional works for a big organisation, the chances of success don't depend on the offered support, but rather it is aspected that professionals to be confident when they will have to deal with challenges (Knight, 2007, p. 200).

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FROM A MATRIX OF PUBLIC POLICIES ANALYSIS AT NEW RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES

Dorina ȚICU [*]

Rezumat

Analiza politicilor publice s-a realizat de-a lungul timpului din perspectiva unor paradigme diferite: instituţionalism, developmentalism, neo-instituţionalism sau sistemism, paradigme care au ridicat semne de întrebare în privinţa posibilităţii de a oferi o imagine exhaustivă asupra ciclului şi a procesului politicilor publice. Dincolo de cadrul general de cercetare, diferitele modele ale luării deciziei în spaţiul administrativ (modelul actorului raţional, modelul incremental, modelul organizării birocratice, etc.) aduc cu sine posibili-tatea construcţiei unei matrici de analiză pe o serie de dimensiuni care îşi propun să ofere o imagine cuprinzătoare asupra ciclului politicilor publice în contextul global al unei lumi caracterizate prin incertitudine. Dimensiunile identificate la nivelul acestui studiu – actori, procese şi mecanisme, criterii decizionale şi modalităţi de a raţiona şi valori şi principii – plasează politicile publice într-un cadru nou de analiză care le implică, conturând un univers analitic ce vizează o serie de paradigme noi: cea a comportamentului organizaţional şi a guvernanţei colaborative.

Cuvinte-cheie: politici publice, modele decizionale, matrice analitică, actori, raţionalitate

Abstract

Public policy analysis was done over time from the perspective of different paradigms: developmentalism, instituţionalism, neo-sistemism, institutionalism , but these paradigms have raised question marks about the possibility of providing a comprehensive picture of the lifecycle and process of public policies. Beyond the general framework of research, various models of decision making in administrative area (the rational actor model, incremental model, the model of bureaucratic organization, etc.) bring with them the possibility of building an array of analysis on a number of dimensions, which aim to provide a comprehensive picture of the public policies cycle in the context of a world characterized by uncertainty. Dimensions identified in this study- the actors, the processes and mechanisms, decision-making criteria and ways of reasoning and values and principles-place the public policies in a new frame of analysis that involves them, defining an analytic universe that concerns a number of new paradigms: the organizational behavior and the collaborative governance.

Keywords: public policies, decisional models, analysis matrix, actors, rationality

Résumé

L' analyse des politiques publiques a été fait au fil du temps, du point de vue de dif-férents paradigmes: developmentalism, institutionalism, systemism ou neo-institutionalism, des paradigmes qui ont soulevés des points d'interrogation quant à la possibilité de fournir

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une vue d'ensemble du cycle et des processus des politiques publiques. Au-delà du cadre général de recherche, divers modèles de décision en matière administrative (le modèle d'acteur rationel, le modèle incrémentiel, le modèle d'organisation bureaucratique, etc.) apportent avec eux la possibilité de construire un tableau d'analyse sur un nombre de dimensions, qui visent à fournir une image complète du cycle de la politique publique dans le contexte d'un monde caractérisé par l'incertitude. Les dimensions définies dans cette étude - les acteurs, les processus et les mécanismes, les critères de décision et les modes de raisonnement. les valeurs et les principes - lieux des politiques publiques dans un nouveau cadre d'analyse qui les impliquent, définir un univers analytique qui concerne un certain nombre de nouveaux paradigmes: de comportement organisationnel et de la gouvernance concertée.

Mots clés: les politiques publiques, les processus décisionnel, la matrice analytique, les acteurs, la rationalité

1. Decision models – overview

Models can be generally defined as simplified structures of a phenomenon, process or as action trying to explain certain processes mentally. Dicţionarul Explicativ al Limbii Române (The Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language) shows the polysemy of the term, defining the model as: what may serve as orientation, pattern; theoretic or material system by means of which one may study in an indirect way the properties and changes of another more complex system; simplified representation of a process or system; ideal, logic and mathematic system by means of which one may study, by analogy, the properties of another system; theoretic scheme elaborated in different sciences in order to represent the fundamental items of one or more phenomena or things (Coteanu, 1998, p. 95).

Adrian Miroiu defines the models of the public policies as "simplifying representations of some selected aspects of the issues conceived with precise objectives. Such an issue may take very different forms: from an image of the issue in the analyst's mind, to precise concepts, diagrams, mathematic equations or computer simulations" (Miroiu, 2002, p. 45).

Starting from the dimensions of the definitions above, some critical notes are meant to be mentioned. In the specialised literature, there are many decision models, but the vision on them is heterogeneous, which makes difficult their research. A short review of them relates to the following types, either they are taken from the field of the public policies or not.

The limited rationality model has the role of placing within the decision process items which belong to the incertitude and the incapacity of the decision maker to always arrive to the best decisions by fault of information, of techniques, of resources and of political support. The incremental model asserts that the decision is not necessarily rational, but satisficient: one does not activate that objective totally rationalised process in order to choose the best public policy, but this is the result of several negotiations and it relates to the context, to the limited time, to the

examples activated in this administrative space until that moment. The model of the bureaucratic organisation speaks about the cold rationality of the classic bureaucrat, but asserts that in the decision process, there are also other interventions, those of the organisms and their hierarchies, special relationships between the bosses and their *staffs*, rough negotiation games and political background. The mixed model relates also to a global rationality of the action, of the decision model, and also does not ignore the need to introduce in the decision process, contextual, contingent, particular decisions which pass beyond any logic of the global decision. The overcode model asserts that the decisions are not the result of a rationalised decisional process, but only some decisions that the decision makers take at one moment in time according to common expectations, to the common language used, to the common label, without seeing and global finality in all the decision approach. The model of the punctual equilibrium asserts that the decision process at the level of the public policies is the result of the environmental influences, the environment being especially the politic influences. The garbage can model asserts that the decision is not rational, but it is the result of a random selection of the actors involved in the decision process of some public policy projects, according to the current opportunities. The critical convergence model places the decision process in the sphere of success as long as the actors involved are correctly identified and are involved on each stage of the design of a public policy. One may not recognise a holistic rationality neither at the level of this model, but one may recognise particular rationalities of those involved and of their subsequent involvement. The game model places the decision and the decision process in a world of incertitude, where fault information, insufficient resources at a certain time are modelling the decision process within a game showing both winners and losers or tricksters. From their short presentation, the next aspect which becomes logic at the level of the research is that concerning the research in this field. Their multitude makes difficult their operationalisation, as their degree of relationship and difference between them. The need of an analysis matrix is imposed at a level at least operational.

2. The need for an analytic matrix

The article intends to analyse three models: the rational actor model (Anthony Downs), the incremental model (Charles Lindblom) and the bureaucratic orga-nisation model (Graham Allison), so at the next levels of the analysis (developed in the next chapters), it will place the decision within the space of the personality and of the motivations, of the politics and of the ideologies.

The current perspective, such built, is based on several motivations. First of all, as we previously showed, the specialised literature did not clearly established until now a glossary of the decision models within public policies. Different authors

propose different models, different taxonomies etc. Some are excluded from the very beginning, other are minimised.

Secondly, some models appeared on the field of other disciplines and were taken here, at the level of the public policies, which causes a more or less accepted paternalism of them within the area.

Thirdly, we tried to identify those clearly differentiable models, which are not improvements of some of them, even if we previously insisted on the fact that making a hierarchy approach between them seems to us completely inadequate. Nevertheless, we cannot deny that the limited rationality model is extremely close to the classic one (of the rational actor), or we do not see it necessary to include at the analysis level the mixed model as long as it means a position between the rational and the incremental model. From the analyst's point of view, we consider that, at the level of an empiric research, the final results could help us arrive to conclusions identifying valences of such a model by the operationalisation of the other two. We consider that the same approach may also apply in the case of the limited rationality, especially as we asserted here that it does not seem to us a standalone model. In fact, such a principle was stipulated also by Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, starting from the comparative analyses of the politic systems (Dogan, Pelassy, 1993, p. 23). Methodologically speaking, the comparison cannot be made between extremely similar systems simply because the results are predictable: the results of such an approach will help us to arrive at the conclusion that those systems are similar, and such a conclusion which is meant to be epistemic is no longer like that.

Fourthly, we considered that the analysis and the operationalisation of the models must refer to those models providing a logic scheme on the entire cycle of the public policies and cannot be subsumed only to a single stage. Or from this perspective, the three models – of the rational actor, incremental and bureaucratic organisation – satisfy this requirement. As long as in the specialised literature, there are authors considering for example that the model of the politic window is a model of agenda settings, even if others do not consider like that, we consider that here, the incrustation of the model becomes problematic and would generate differences between what we proposed to submit to the analytic matrix. Or, as we already mentioned, we want to avoid such differences.

Fifthly, the methodological restraints of the research oblige us to undertake fewer models as long as we propose a vertical research, with clearly established dimensions, subsumed to each individual model.

And sixthly, every research supposes a certain degree of originality specific to its initiator. Not even this analytic approach intends to be a discordant note.

The analytic matrix that we propose here is a systematic and systematised approach of the research itself which has the role to operationalise the models we referred to. The idea of the analytic matrix comes in order to study the general decisional theory, on the one hand, and on the other hand, that of the difference at

the level of the universe of public policies between the cycle of public policies and the analysis of public policies.

What the specialised literature proposes us in the field of decisional theory is the identification at the level of the decisional process of some dimensions: the decision maker, the criteria, the stages and the mechanisms of the decision process etc.

Is the cycle of public policies proposes public policy in action with all its stages (the identification of the issue, the penetration on the agenda, the formulation of solutions in order to solve the issue, the choice of a solution, its implementation and evaluation), the analysis of public policies is an approach which can be external to the public policy, but which can also enclose it at its level, and the analyst of public policies may also identify with the decision maker directly involved (we shall consider here that there is no superposition of functions between both of them). The analysis of the public policies "is a customer oriented advice, relevant for the public decision considering the social values" according to Weimer and Wining's affirmation (Weimer, Wining, 2004, p. 32). We shall consider here that the analytic matrix is a logic scheme of the public policies analyst (which may interact or not with the directly involved decision maker, in order to come with advices, according to this matrix), necessary to research processes particular to public policies (especially the decisional process), which may provide funded prediction possibilities and which starts from the analysis of public policies.

The relationships between the analytic matrix and the analysis of the public policies provides to the matrix an orientation to the necessary analysis dimensions starting exactly from the second part of the report. Weimer and Wining used to consider that the analysis of a public policy must focus on how a public policy is performed, that is which is the decisional process, which are the objective, if they were achieved or not, what criteria were considered in order to achieve them, who was involved, which were the initial options, which were the values we related to, how is everything assessed in the end (Weimer, Wining, 2004, p. 35). These dimensions of the analysis become dimensions of the matrix.

Strictly methodologically, Rui Mata, von Helversen and Rieskamp are dealing with the need of research strategies when it is about making a decision (Mata *et al.,* 2010, p. 300). The authors identify a series of dimensions that a particular research has to enclose. An analysis of the decisional process means identifying the participants at the decisional process, which is the form of the process (*the design* of making the decision), which are the tools ("the materials") (Mata *et al.,* 2010, p. 303) and the necessary relating information, which are the procedures, which are the purposes or the results, which is the classification of strategies, which are the costs and which are the implications of each individual model adopted. What one should remark is the fact that when it is about the values subsumed to the analysis of the models, the authors apply only economic values and the criteria subsumed: costs, efficiency etc.

Starting from the abovementioned aspects, the dimensions relating to the analytic matrix proposed by us will be: the involved actors, the processes and mechanisms, the typology of decisions and the typology of rationality, the principles and values. The choice of such a matrix supposes the assumption of a clearly determined logic. This is supposed to answer to the classic questions: who? what? where? when? how? why?. At the level of the matrix, one must identify the involved actors (who?), the processes (when? where?), the mechanisms (how?), the decisions (what?), the rationality, the principles-criteria and values (why?). Moreover, the concentration on the two dimensions – of the rationality and of the decision – is enhanced by the universe itself of the current analysis. Synthesising in this way the dimensions of the matrix, from this moment it is imposed the operational analysis of each one individually.

3. Dimensions of the analysis matrix

The dimensions relating to the analytic matrix proposed by us – the involved actors, the processes and mechanisms, the typology of decisions and the typology of rationality, the principles and values – will be presented hereinafter in our study.

3. 1. Actors

The model of the rational actor proposed by Anthony Downs places to centre the individual mainly seen as economic agent beyond the other feelings or personal sides. This analysis, as the author says, is made in order to legitimate the rational behaviour of the human being. He does not deny the existence of the other dimensions of the individual (motivation, skills etc.), but considers that they do not substantiate the individual's rationality, rationality understood according to the economic rationality terms. At the same time, the author does not place emotions or feelings outside the individual sphere or outside the sphere of the actor considered to be rational, but asserts that all these dimensions are particular to every individual, so the rational individual has preconceptions and feels emotions. What individualises this type of actor – decision maker is the way he acts, the direction to canalise the subjective part of his personality. It is about that actor (with experiences, feelings, emotions, motivations) who wishes to achieve his objectives in such a way to use, by his competence, the most reduced possible quantity of resources per unit relating to the result he wants to achieve.

Charles Lindblom (2003) proposes to identify the actors involved in the process of decision and of elaboration of the public policies starting from social, economic and politic real situations. By asking himself the common question: who is elaborating a policy? the author answers: "because the presidents, prime-ministers, Council secretaries, ministries, mayors, governors, law givers and bureaucrats are

the most visible parts of the process of elaboration of a policy, they receive a larger attention (…). Obviously, the goods and services are produced by a complex economic system. All of them result from the contribution of millions of people interacting ones with the others" (Lindblom, 2003, p. 15). At individual level, what is primordial at the level of this model is the different optics applied to the individual in relationship with the model of the rational actor. If the first model provides a total trust to the rationality of the individual, here it is supported the incapacity and the impossibility of the individual to solve the issues, to always take good decisions or which aspire to perfection. "Human brain capacity to formulate and to solve complex issues is very reduced, in comparison with the dimension of the issues that he wants to solve in his objective and rational behaviour of real life" (Simon, 1957, p. 138). The individual is characterised by limits of knowledge, of information, of assimilation, of the capacity to choose between good and bad, limits which if you are not aware about can allow the performance of a decisional process and of the elaboration of a policy only in conditions of higher costs than possible. Undoubtedly, the individualist direction is also present at the level of this model and receives a different explanation formula. But beside this, the author recognises the merit that the "leaders" (Lindblom, 2003, p. 12) have in the deci-sional process; by this term, one may understand the governmental authorities, the interest groups or other entities which may appear anytime during the decisional process both within the institutional sphere and outside it.

According to Graham Allison, the actors involved at the level of this model are not only the politic leaders which are found at the head of organisations, not only the Governs, not only the individuals, but all together and even more than them (see **Table no. 1**) (Allison, 2010, p. 42).

According to this model, the actors involved in the decision process are the institutions or groups of institutions or even institutionalised individuals, even if the model moves the accent from the dimension of the individual to the insti-tutional or institutionalised dimension. Within this model, the actors are not viewed in a rigid manner, strictly bureaucratised and do not perform their activity only at international level (because the model starts from a historic fact specific to international relationships), but only at the level of the decisional process viewed as national strategic process, regional or local. Nevertheless, the major role at the level of this model is played by the governmental actors together with the individual actors (but institutionalised) or together with the groups.

3. 2. Processes and mechanisms

The second dimension of the decisional matrix, that of the processes and mechanisms proposes to identify how functions the cycle of taking decisions within the area of public policies, particularly synthesising the differences intervening from a decisional model to another.

Table no. 1: The Actors

ACTORS		
RATIONAL MODEL	*INCREMENTAL MODEL*	*BUREAUCRATIC ORGANISATION MODEL*
1. constant individual or collective actors	1. as individual and collective actors, new other actors may be involved	1. institutional actors or groups of institutions
2. actors with economic logic	2. actors with a logic of small steps, the economic logic belonging particularly to the interest groups	2. the logic is clearly established by regulations
3. decision makers are clearly defined, established	3. decision makers are not clearly established from the very beginning	3. the groups has a clear identity
4. decision makers are governmental, institutionalised	4. the decision makers may also be from outside the institutions	4. the decision makers are clearly delimited by each department, structure, individual group
5. they are not independent (they are parts of the systems)	5. there is a certain degree of decentralisation	5. each department is quasi-independent

The rational actor model bases the decisional process starting from the actors who are specific to him (that we previously analysed), that is from the individual-decision maker. From this point of view, the decisional process is performed when the individual:

- clearly established his purposes, the objectives that the decision must achieve
- and has at hand different means to achieve those purposes.

Starting from the two previously enounced actions, the decision at the level of this model is a teleological one, being substantiated by the rationality of the decision maker and, by default, of his action. The distinction between means and purposes is fundamental at the level of this model in order to understand and analyse the behaviour of the decision maker. The purposes have a primordial character in relationship with the decision and means, the last ones being chosen by the actor-decision maker in order to achieve the first ones. The decisional process supposes for the actor to achieve those purposes with the most efficient existent means and to relate to all the possible means in order to achieve the purposes. The choice of the means supposes the existence of a decisional process characterised by rationality.

The decisional process, according to the incremental model, is put from the beginning in the light of ambiguity the public policies are confronted with several times. According to this model, the decisional process is: "imperfect; it cannot fully solve the value-based conflicts and the conflicts of interest; it is too slow and too expensive; one should not say definitively what issues to attack" (Lindblom, 2003, p. 39).

It results from here that the decisional process is not necessarily a comprehensive and operational one, and the decisional objectives may disappear if they have not a certain type of politic support. The process is performed step by step and it develops decisions which improve the current situations even if it supposes the constant come-back and modification of the strategies and means of application, even after they have been started. In a simplified manner, the decisional process supposes the identification of the issue, the search for an alternative which have already been implemented (known), the issue is redefined, the alternative is implemented, and if not functional, another alternative is searched in order to differ very little from what is already known. According to Charles Lindblom, the first issue appearing at the level of the decisional process is the incapacity of the decision makers to arrive at a consensus both between them and relating to the hierarchic superiors and to the citizens who chose them for those titles (Lindblom, 1959, p. 80).

Both in the case of the rational actor model and in the case of the incremental one, there are several models of the black box type, that is one does not take into account the impact that the structure of the public policies has on the decisional process. The bureaucratic model or the organisational model or the model of the bureaucratic organisation proposed by Graham Allison proposed to underline how much the process influences the product. Allison asserts that there may be three different perspectives which may influence the same action or the same decision:

- the perspective of the rational actor according to which the actor – decision maker has clear purposes, the actors, generally, are clearly established, at their turn, they have clear purposes and they choose the best way to achieve them.
- the dimension of the organisational process, according to which the decisions are the result of specialised organisms with different purposes and methods to solve the specific issues, the final solution being found at the crossway of these interactions.
- the bureaucratic policy according to which the decisions are results of the politic processes of negotiation between different power relationships.

From the interaction of these dimensions, practically, it results that complex model of the bureaucratic organisation stressing the impact that the values have on the decisions, as well as the behaviour models met within the large organisations.

The decisional process reflects more the culture of the department, of the origin agency of the decision maker or of the agency he manages, than the rational analysis or the objective evaluation. From this point of view, the decisional process does not involve anymore only the monolith type State decisional actors, the idea of unique purpose and unique interest, but means that the decisions originate from a competitive arena where the balance of the advantage is continuously moving (see **Table no. 2**).

Table no. 2: Processes and mechanisms

1. it is identified the issue – the purposes are hierarchised – there are identified all the alternatives – it is chosen the best – it is applied – the purposes are achieved	1. the issue is identified – it is searched the alternative which has already been applied (known) – the issue is redefined – the alternative is put into practice – if not functional, another alternative is searched which may differ very little from what is already known	1. defining the issue – searching for an alternative following a process of negotiation – the choice of an optimal solution recognised by everyone according to some routines – implementing it
2. the change is intended	2. keeping the existent policies	2. drastic change is not agreed
3. there are evaluated all the alternatives and then all the consequences	3. it is evaluated the alternative differing the less by what has already been applied	3. it is evaluated the alternative which is primary for the group

3. 3. Decisional criteria and typologies of decisions

The decisional criteria at the level of the rational actor model must be deduces, also as in the case of the other dimensions of the matrices analysed until now, but which shall be analysed also from now on, from the processes, mechanisms, typology of the specific rationality of each individual. A characterisation of the decisions specific to the model of the rational actor is deduced starting from the economic rationality, for the incremental model, the decisions will be correlated with the appeal made at a logic of the experience, and for the bureaucratic organisation model, the decisions will follow the line of the processes specific to the power relationships at the highest possible level. The decisions of this rational actor mean the choice of some actions leading to solutions which shall intend the total benefits, irrespective of the present or the future. The decision is a rational one since it intends the achievement of clearly established purposes which belong to a series of values, such as: utility, profit and wealth (see **Table no. 3**).

The decision within the incremental model seems to be a simplification of the complexity of the decisional process within the rational actor model. The decision follows a dominant common purpose which is a combination of the individual or group purposes, but also the "own vision of the decision maker on the public good" (Lindblom, 2003, p. 43). It supposes the improvement of the most pressing issues and not necessarily the finding of the most innovatory solutions for their resolution, this fact supposing that the final decision is not the result of an exhaustive process, but it supposes only the focus on several political options, even if they are not

extremely attractive. From this point of view, the decisional environment is recognised as imprecise, dominated by incertitude in relationship with the existent information, the decisional process is not necessarily continuous, but it supposes mechanisms of trial and error and then the correction of the error and a new trial, which leads to a possible fragmentation of the process between the partisans and even to mechanisms to contest the authority and the hierarchy.

For the third model, the decision appears like the result of some negotiations of the high level power games and complies with the routines and the norms specific to this level. The main characteristic of the decision is the strategy, following the games appearing between the politic leaders involved in the process; it must be enough precise for solving the issue existing in the public agenda. The stress is not on the idea of innovation, from the point of view of always finding new solutions, but effectively on the resolution of the issues needing solutions especially because of the decisional environment which does not support delays or errors, because the repercussions may reflect on some multiple actors (especially because the model itself starts from the concrete case of the international relationships area).

Table no. 3: Criteria to take decisions

CRITERIA TO TAKE DECISIONS		
RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL	INCREMENTAL MODEL	BUREAUCRATIC ORGANISATION MODEL
1. efficiency	1. progressive improvement (remediation)	1. complying with the rules and procedures, isomorphism, objectivity
2. costs and benefits of all the alternatives	2. continuity and stability	2. the benefit of the group beyond the economic logic
3. general benefit	3. mutual benefit between the members of the decision making group	3. strong ethic codes
4. it does not suppose individual ethic principles	4. the individual ethic principles can be manifested, they can have consequences at the level of the group beyond a general ethics	4. the individual ethic principles are those of loyalty for the heads

3.4. Typologies of rationality

The rationality that the rational actor model promotes is the economic type rationality or the instrumental type rationality. This approach supposes the definition of rationality as "efficiency and supposes the maximisation of the results which may be obtained from a certain quantity of resources or the reduction of the quantity of resources necessary to achieve a certain result" (Downs, 2009, p. 37).

The rational individual, according to this model, is that type of individual who does not suppose necessarily the performance of actions or value based judgments by the appeal made only to logic type arguments or according to that type of classic logic, with logic phrases and deductions. This type of individual is not deprived of feelings or emotions, but what prevail for him and for his decisions are the criteria which belong to the economic rationality. The economic rationality is a certain type of instrumental rationality because it is defined in relationship with the means and with the purposes of the action of the decision makers involved in the area of the public policies. According to the rational behaviour, the behaviour of the decision makers supposes a rational process of deliberation and of performance of the actions. The rationality of the decisions and of the decision makers supposes that each actor, according to calculations reducing the costs and maximising the benefits, to take a decision. This decision is the best decision. But in order to arrive to such a rational decision, one should comply with three conditions: the decision makers shall have the individual preferences totally ordered, to own full information about the decisional process and not only and a perfect calculation of costs and benefits.

According to this incremental model, the specific rationality of the actors may be limited, daily or in other words adaptable to every situation and context, erotetic or traditional (see **Table no. 4**).

Table no. 4: Typologies of the rationality for decisional models

Rational actor model (Downs)	Incremental model (Lindblom)	Bureaucratic organisation model (Allison)
Formal rationality, cognitive rationality; strategic rationality; technological rationality; instrumental rationality	Every day rationality; Limited rationality; Erotetic rationality; Traditional rationality	Hermeneutic rationality; valuable rationality; rationality as consistent choices; communicative rationality

The rationality specific to this model supposes the adaptation to every day situations, it does not start from preconceived purposes established for the decisions which have to be taken, but adapts them and adjusts them incrementally according to each individual situation. It may modify the purposes according to their availability and to the means or vice versa and supposes a rationality of the tiny steps relating to the decisions which must be taken. This type of reason does not intend to make major changes, but insists on previously implemented solutions for the projects of policies, a selection criterion of good decisions being their previous success. This type of rationality is a practical one, because it does not relate to the great theories or to theoretic examples for explaining the behaviour of the decision makers. "The intellectualist approaches of some issues seem to

consider sometimes minor analytic categories or statistic analyses brought to dangerous extremes" (Lindblom, 2003, p. 16).

The bureaucratic organisation model or the mixed model enounced by Graham Allison develops, starting from the theory of international relationships, a specific rationality of the actors-decision makers (Allison, 2010, p. 305). The specific rationality of this model is, firstly, a rationality of internal consistent choices. This type of rationality is folded on the structure, on the group the decision maker belongs to. It is a development of the relationship manager-agent supported by this model. From this point of view, a rational decision is a decision which is included in the atmosphere of the group the actor belongs to, if it is compliant with the interests of the group or of the privileged people, if it satisfies the interests of that formation. Relating to other groups involved and with their decisional criteria, the decision may appear as totally irrational. The rationality of the decision maker specific to this model is "the rationality resulted following the negotiations within the executive area" (Allison, 2010, p. 333). of the different groups involved, rationality which may be influenced by the perceptions and by the different priorities, by their purposes and objectives, but also by their different hierarchic positions and stakes. From this point of view, the rationality of the decision maker is a rationality of the communication (communicative), it does not suppose *a priori* calculations with strict economic character or to keep the *status*, but a hermeneutic rationality because it supposes a strict interpretation of the situations and communication relationships which take place within official environments and with exclusivist character.

3.5. Principles and values

The last dimension of the analytic matrix proposed here relates to the identification of the values relating to each individual decisional model and of the particular principles these three models proposed operate with.

Downs considers that we may speak about the utility both at the level of the individual actions and at the level of the governmental activities. We may assert that all the citizens at the level of a community receive benefits following the governmental activity and only the sender of the action may be identified as being governmental. On the market, the existence of the utility value is, also, existent and manifested. Relating to the efficiency and efficacy, they also derive from the idea of utility. The efficiency supposes the idea of decision and of action which shall have more benefits in relationship with the costs, and the other value supposes the achievement of the purposes proposed in relationship with the initially established objectives. The clarity, the concision and the novelty are other values which must be deduced from the characteristics of the mechanisms and processes relating to this model. Since the decision is taken after having defined clearly all the alternatives, after having discussed in terms of decisional context whish shall use

the total necessary information, the appeal made to clarity and to concision becomes clear. The decision makers take decisions only after they have defined all the alternatives, after they have a global, clear, concise image on them. Nevertheless, Downs does not assert that the decisional environment is one of absolute certitudes, but of total information, but, at least at the theoretic and ideal level, the decision maker relates to such principles or his behaviour tends to them. Even the practices suppose at the level of this model the research of all the decisional alternatives, of the concision, of information as exact and complete as possible (see **Table no. 5**).

Table no. 5: Values

VALUES		
RATIONAL MODEL	INCREMENTAL MODEL	BUREAUCRATIC ORGANISATION MODEL
1.reward, utility, efficiency, efficacy, clarity, concision, novelty	1. inequality, adaptability, continuity, stability, experience	1.non-ideologisation, strategic objectivity, loyalty, power

At the level of the incremental model, a primary identifiable value is that of inequality (Lindblom, 2003, p. 20). If the model of the rational actor used to stress the individual, as we previously affirmed when we analysed the dimension of the particular actors, the incremental model put forth the issue of the representative character and the idea of inequality that derives from here. For Charles Lindblom, the inequality manifests within the decisional process as a form of absence of representation. "The persons taking the decisions represent a very small ratio of the entire population" (Lindblom, 2003, p. 21). From this perspective, a discrepancy may appear here between the decisions wanted by the population and the decisions of the actors involved in the decisional process. The decisional process may appear as a process favouring some people and disadvantaging the entire population or as a process where different unequal actors arrive to decisions which may favour them more relating to the others. More than that, different groups of interests, political groups or other non-formal actors may increase even more the social our political inequalities. Taking a decision becomes a long and interactive process which supposes a high degree of adaptability of those involved and may generate excluded persons.

The model of bureaucratic organisation supposes the existence of several values, such as: non-ideologisation, objectivity and loyalty. When we bring up the value of the non-ideologisation, Allison considers that the optics over this complex model must be returned (Allison, 2010, p. 334). The existence of so different persons participating at the decisional process beside the government or the president passes beyond any politic ideology. The decision is nothing but the result

of several severe negotiations between the individuals with power, pressure groups which have own interests, several times divergent. From this point of view, this model overpasses the characteristics of the rational model, because it is necessary to additionally define the rationality of the process of choosing an option (the comprehensive rationality of the perfect actor, with perfect information and which must not take into account the time factor in the choosing process), as well as a more exact detail of the actors involved in the decisional process. Then, even the economic ideological credo does not determine anymore the process of decision taking when it is about the values relating to the decisional process specific to the bureaucratic organisation model. The values characterising the best this model would be, from this point of view, the strategic objectivity and loyalty. The strategic objectivity supposes the fact that the decision is not a solution chosen rationally for answering to several issues, but the result of strong negotiation and compromise processes. Allison asserts, starting from the historic fact of the Cuba's crisis of rockets, that the decision within the international relationships area (and not only) is a group decision, of leaders with enough authority which do not action neither according to the parties they belong nor according strictly to the governments they belong to.

4. Conclusions

The identification of all the characteristics of each dimension of our analysis matrix consequently leads to two conclusions: the outlining in this form of the matrix brings a different analysis tool, original at the level of the research and of the knowledge of the domain itself, on the one hand, and the position of the decisional process in this form on the other hand, at the level of these decisional models supposes the activation of all these matrix dimensions. This fact supposes the activation of the motivations, of the individuals' values, of the evaluative and axiological criteria. All these and not only are reflected on the decisional process at the administrative level and influences it (its research by default).

The paradigms which integrate the best the strictly rational and administrative line with the line of the humans, of the group, of the decision maker (with the motivations, with its experiences, with its feeling, with the values assumed) are those of the organisational behaviour. Placing at the level of the environment the administrative framework, beyond Weber's point of view over the administration, as paradigm including – as well – the human dimension – the collaborative governance provides another answer to the cognitive approach. From this point of view, the two paradigms reopen new lines of research over the area of research and of knowledge of the decisional process within the public policies.

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DEFINITION OF GUSTISM
– THE APPLICABILITY OF THE GENERATION-BASED BIOGRAPHICAL RESEARCH ON THE BUCHAREST SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGY –

Balázs TELEGDY [*]

Rezumat

În prezenta lucrare doresc să aplic diferite definiții ale generației cu scopul de a determina apartenența membrilor școlii sociologice de la București prin intremediul cercetării biografice. Mă interesză în mod particular să văd dacă definițiile generației pot delimita o grupă de indivizi care, deși diferiți în ceea ce privește multe aspecte, au creat o generație omogenă numai pentru a fi adepții monografiei sociologice în calitate de discipoli ai profesorului Dimitrei Gusti.

Pentru a răspunde la această problemă voi prezenta mai întâi o scurtă abordare teoretică a generației și apoi voi aplica categoriile stabilite, școlii sociologice de la București.

Grație acestei abordări doresc să consider discipolii profesorului Gusti ca făcând parte dintr-o generație care a existat cu adevărat, după toate rigorile și cu toate caracteristicile prezentate în diferite abordări teoretice. Putem afirma că această generație este cea care a constituit, în perspectiva lui Mannheim, o unitate de generație a anilor 1920-1930. Exceptând „unitatea de bază" dirijată de profesorul Gusti, câțiva membri au continuat să coexiste atât ca parte a aceleiași generații, dar și alăturați altor unități.

Cuvinte cheie: Dimitrie Gusti, școala sociologică de la București, cercetarea biografică, teoria generației

Abstract

In the current paper I am going to apply different approaches of the "generation" aspect, in order to determine the belonging of the members of the Bucharest School of Sociology from the biographical analysis perspective. I am particularly interested in the question whether, through the definition of generation, is possible that a group of people, very different in many aspects, could create a homogeneous generation, only because they were adepts of the monographic method and followers of the Professor Dimitie Gusti.

To answer the question, I am going to present the main theoretical approaches in the conceptualization of the notion of generation, after which I will apply these definitions to the different categories affiliated with the Bucharest School of Sociology.

From this point of view, I will consider the followers of D. Gusti as belonging to a single generation, a generation existent by the above mentioned theoretical points of view. As for this particular generation, it could be affirmed that they formed, in the Manheimian perspective, a generation unit in 1920-1930, and afterwards, beside the existence of a

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"core" led by the Professor, some representatives of the initial group went on coexisting as a part of the same effective generation, but in different generation units.

Keywords: Dimitrie Gisti, Bucharest School of Sociology, biographical research, generation theory

Résumé

Dans le présent ouvrage je vais appliquer les différentes définitions de la génération, afin de déterminer l'appartenance des membres de l'École Sociologique de Bucarest par le biais de la recherche biographique. La question qui m'intéresse particulièrement c'est de voir si par la définition de la génération on peut délimiter un groupe d'individus qui, bien que très différents par bien des aspects ont créé une génération homogène uniquement pour avoir été les adeptes de la méthode de la monographie sociologique en tant que disciples du Professeur Dimitrie Gusti.

Pour répondre à la question posée, d'abord je présenterai brièvement les approches théoriques de conceptualisation de la notion génération, puis j'appliquerai les différentes catégories établies sur l'École Sociologique de Bucarest.

Grâce à cette approche je vais considérer les disciples du professeur Dimitrie Gusti comme des personnes qui ont fait partie de cette génération, une génération qui a réellement existé avec toutes les rigueurs et traits caractéristiques présentés dans les différentes approches théoriques. On peut affirmer sur cette génération que c'était celle qui a constitué, dans la perspective de Mannheim, une unité de génération des années 1920-1930. Excepté „l'unité de base" dirigée par le Professeur, certains membres ont continué à coexister en tant que partie de cette même génération effective, mais jointes à d'autres unités.

Mots clés: Dimitrie Gusti, École Sociologique de Bucarest, recherche biographique, théorie de la génération.

Beyond the quantitative – qualitative antithesis, the biographical research appears as a method of the contemporary sociology with a very high explanatory power, helping us to understand the analyzed subject by the context of the social reality perceived by the social actor. This approach can "reconstruct" a person, not in the psychological sense of the word, but from the sociological perspective, where people are seen as social constructs. If these constructs are similar in case more people, we can formulate the hypothesis that – at least for people with similar bibliographical characteristics – they share a particular "habitus" in the sense used by Bourdieu.

In this paper I will verify the applicability of the different definitions of generation, whose conceptualization was conducted by Staiculescu and Jitcov referring to the French society (Staiculescu and Jitcov 2005, Staiculescu 2012). In my paper, I will use this approach to determine the appurtenance of the Bucharest School of Sociology members in the light of biographical research. I am particularly interested in whether the definition of generation can define a group of people who, though very different in many aspects, created however a homogeneous

generation only because they were followers of the sociological monograph method and disciples Professor Dimitrie Gusti.

To answer the question, I will present in short the theoretical approaches to conceptualizing the notion of generation, and then apply the established categories to the Bucharest School of Sociology.

Continuing the idea presented at first, following the idea of habitus, I get very close to the definition presented by Staiculescu (2012), being attributed to Claudine Attias-Donfut to conceptualize generation.

In Staiculescu's approach, the definition of generation is more comprehensive than the definitions based on demography, where the main landmark is the age or the year of birth, i.e. the word generation is used as a synonym to cohort. In a wider approach, generation receives a symbolic side, which is composed of the following three traits:

- collective memory, in the sense that it is produced and maintained by the group members participating in its development,
- generation awareness, i.e. the common experiences of historical events that will later become landmarks of the social time spent together,
- "the time stamp on the generations regards the level of social production of knowledge and ways of thinking, at the interface between individual and social time" (Staiculescu 2012).

Applying this model to address the Bucharest School of Sociology, we can state that the members of this group, who were not necessarily interconnected during the actual existence of this institution, in the physical sense of the word, can be considered a generation. This can be said despite the fact that in the demographic perspective, focusing our attention only on the dates of birth, it seems that even the main collaborators of Professor Dimitrie Gusti were never part of the same generation. For example, while the Professor was born in 1880, his closest and most renowned collaborators in the Bucharest School of Sociology, such as George Vlădescu-Răcoasa (1895-1989), Henri H. Stahl (1901-1991), Mircea Vulcănescu (1904-1952), Traian Herseni (1907-1980), and Anton Golopenția (1909-1951) were 15-30 years younger. In this demographic context, we can even identify two distinct generations, the first being the founding Professor, while his collaborators, or more precisely his disciples would be a distinct second generation.

If we look beyond the limits of the cohort, applying the model of Attias – Donfut, then the members of the Bucharest School of Sociology can be considered a distinct generation because all three above listed traits prove to be valid in their case. Every discussion, every monographic campaign helped in developing and maintaining a collective memory. The feeling of being part of Dimitrie Gusti's team has created a sense of "being the best", which first materialized in an internal contest between participants to the monographic researches. Un example of internal competition, rendered by Marcela Focşa was the differentiation that took place in the Fundul Moldova monographic campaign where participants formed

two camps: those from Fundul de sus, and those din Fundul de jos, where the criteria for participation were not purely random, but: "in (f)undul de sus were all guys who surrounded Gusti, and had the most friendly and professional relationship with the Professor: Stahl, Nel Costin, Mitu Gheorghescu, Vulcănescu" (Rostas 2003, p. 129).

Also from the accounts of participants in the first monographs we know that after the formalized work, which ended with the evening meetings, for the young participants then began a second program of relaxation and cheerfulness, which further strengthened the generation consciousness, who united the young, but also distanced them from the Professor. This distinction appears again in Marcela Focşa's stories, which say that, after Gusti learned about the youth's nightly meetings, he also wanted to participate. After a few nights, everyone realized that the presence of the Professor had a negative effect on the atmosphere, and therefore the Professor retired from these meetings of his colleagues.

After institutionalizing the village work by the introduction of the Social Services, the generation awareness of young intellectuals who were forced to participate in the work in order to get their bachelor's degree was formalized. The time stamp appears, at least in my opinion, in the confessions of the participants in the monographic campaigns who, after many years, regardless of the path they followed after 1920's, were all convinced of the extraordinary experiences of the monographic movement and of the intellectual and organizational excellence of Professor Gusti. This situation is not diminished either by the fact that some members of the School, such as HH Stahl or A. Golopenţia had reformative ideas on the monographic method or on the methods of publishing the results (Rostas 2000, Sandu 2012, Golopenţia 2012).

Another method of distinguishing social generations is the one of F. Mentré (Staiculescu 2012), who introduced two categories:

1. the spiritual generation, where the affiliation to the group is provided by the physical presence in the same space at a certain time (class, group of volunteers etc.), and
2. the historical generation, "which characterizes the creative periods, fertile in great men, heroes or prophets of a generation" (Staiculescu 2012).

If the above presented model can be again seen a significant differentiation for the Bucharest School of Sociology. If we accept the first option to define the generation, it is clear that there are two or even more generations, the first being made up by the Professor, and the latter by his collaborators or disciples who, being involved in various projects of the School can be in turn considered also different generations. For example, from this point of view, I consider the people who started working with the Professor in the first monographic researches, and the people who conducted field work within the Social Services as different generations. Another differentiation in the generations can be also applied in case of the institutional development of the monographic method led by Professor,

starting from members of the Association for Science and Social Reform, the members of the Romanian Social Institute, the members of the Royal Cultural Foundation "Principele Carol", members of the Romanian Institute of Social Sciences, and members of the National Council for Scientific Research.

On the other hand, if we apply the definition of historical generation on the Bucharest School of Sociology in the interwar period, then all the people who participated in the Professor's projects, even if they parted from this metho-dological orientation after a certain time, constitute a single generation, as the periods of creation and public affirmation overlap.

A third model to define the generation presented by Staiculescu (Staiculescu 2012) is the one developed by Karl Mannheim. To follow the changes of generations, Mannheim distinguishes "four tiers that successively include: the potential generation, the actual generation, generation units and specific groups. Moving from one tier to another is conditioned by social processes through which social change and social interactions occur" (Staiculescu 2012). Therefore, the first tier is the one of the demographic perspective, i.e. the belonging to a specific cohort. Yet, the birthday itself has a marked effect because it actually represents that particular social context, through all its complexity, to which one must adapt as a member of that society. In this respect, even if people differ, for example in terms of their social origins, they still share the same context in which they interpret the perceived reality. Returning to the previous idea, a group membership without any personal influence or volition does not create an "actual" generation. For the latter, after exposure to the ideas, ideological and intellectual trends of that characteristic time, the members of this cohort will be integrated in different groups of antagonistic ideas, where between the members of each group are links which ensure that the group coherence of an actual generation will be created. These groups are called "generation units" by Mannheim, which differ from a generation itself, the difference being given by the fact that "Youth experiencing the same concrete historical problems may be said to be part of the same actual generation, while those groups within the same actual generation, which work up the material of their common experiences in different specific ways, constitute separate generation units" (Manheim 1998, p. 184).

Using these four tiers to analyze the Bucharest School of Sociology on the "natural data" → "class consciousness" → "actual generation" → "generation units" axis can be said that the members of this group constituted an actual generation and even a single generation unit in the 1920's. Expanding and developing the Monographic School implicitly led to the increasing of the volume of people participating in monographic campaigns. To support my claim is enough to look at the members participating in various monographic campaigns chro-nologically "Goicea Mare, Dolj county, 1925 ... , 11 participants ; Ruşeţu, Brăila county, 1926, ..., 17 participants; Nerej, Putna county, 1927, ..., 41 participants, Fundul Moldovei, Câmpulung-Bucovina county, 1928, ... ,60 participants; Drăguş

Făgăraş county, 1929, ..., 89 participants; Runcu, Gorj county, 1930 , ...,67 participants; Cornova, Orhei county, 1931, ... , 55 participants" (Rostas 2003, p.13).

As evident from the data presented, the pinnacle of the monographic campaigns was reached in 1929, after which the splits within the School, which was polarizing into several factions followed, "... at the same time with the deepening of the «sociological monograph» reform, the institutional expansion of the Romanian Social Institute, the refuge of its members in folklore and the deepening conflict between the Iron Guard dissidents and the rest of the monographers." (Larionescu 2006, p. 342) As a result of the events described, I think that in the 1930's the actual generation of the 1920's fell apart and turned into several generation units as presented from the perspective of Mannheim.

Following these models of generation conceptualisation, the answer to the question raised at the beginning of the essay would be: first we must distinguish two successive generations, the first being the one of the Professor, and the second that of his disciples. This delineation is beneficial and acceptable because the existence of a School implies a mentor – mentored link, as representatives of two different generations, the latter being interested in maintaining this relationship in order to be part of that institution. If the case of the youth (here by youth I refer to Professor's disciples who were born after 1900) there is a distinction:

a. They may be characterized as a generation in all three models as follows:
  - applying C. Attias-Donfut's category, due to the presence of a collective memory, generation consciousness, and a common time stamp;
  - a historical generation by F. Mentré's definition, as the public display period and the intellectual fruition was manifested in the same period;
  - an actual generation by K. Mannheim's definition, because within the Gusti School all were in direct contact with the ideas and ideologies that circulated within the institution, while having an interpersonal connection between them.

b. since the 1930's, remaining at K. Mannheim's definitions, one can say that there were more parallel generation units, and therefore they can not be considered the same generation.

In this paper, I accept the arguments presented at point a., and I consider Professor Dimitrie Gusti's disciples as people who were part of the same generation, a generation that truly exists, with all the rigors and characteristics shown in various theoretical approaches. About this generation it can be said that they have formed, in Mannheim's perspective, a generation unit in the 1920-1930years, after which, in addition to the existence of that "core" unit, led by the Professor, some members continued to coexist as part of the same actual generation, but in different generation units.

Also, as a final clarification, I should mention the following fact: for the Bucharest School of Sociology to be truly considered a School also from the theoretical point of view, the relationship between the founder and his disciples,

despite any differences should not follow the "Matthew effect in Science" coined by Robert Merton (Merton 1968), and presented by Stan as a feature of the relationship between teacher and Petre Andrei (Stan 2012).

According to this effect, after the master accepts the disciple as a collaborator, after the latter proves his extraordinary capabilities, he is trying to express himself, even by leaving, or attacking his mentor's paradigm with which he initially realized himself. Since this approach automatically leads to the dissolution of the link between mentor and disciple, I will consider as a generation unit only those people who, even though they had some differences with the teacher, remained his followers.

Conclusion

In conclusion, applying the different theoretical approaches of the generations presented in this paper, we can say that in the Bucharest School of Sociology there were at least three distinct generations:

The first generation is the Professor and mentor Dimitrie Gusti, who both demographically, specifically in terms of cohort and in terms of social and scientific role of occupies, as sole participant this generation, the generation of the founder.

The second generation consists of those persons who were the first and the foremost disciples of the Professor, and even with some modifications, became the persons responsible for certain activities or institutions initiated by Gusti.

The third generation is that of those persons who, either learning the methods of the Bucharest School of Sociology indirectly, by means of the second generation, or were the Professor's collaborators after the first monographic campaigns and helped in strengthening the existing institutions or participated themselves, as starters of new institutions initiated by Dimitrie Gusti.

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CARAGIALE AND GUSTI: SOCIOLOGICAL INTERSECTIONS

Adriana GHIȚOI [*]

Rezumat

Ideea lucrării de față s-a născut dintr-o constatare a lui Dimitrie Gusti: „*1907* este şi astăzi de actualitate. Este singura lucrare de «sociologie» a lui Caragiale, ce stă cu onoare alături de marile analize ale societății româneşti, săvârşite în piesele şi nuvelele sale". Pornind de la spusele gustiene, m-am întors la text, singurul care putea infirma suspiciunea că afirmația lui Gusti ar fi putut fi doar o dovadă a prieteniei ce-l lega de Caragiale. *1907* relevă un Caragiale cu un profund şi ingenios spirit socio-analitic, deşi autorul nu era sociolog *en titre*, competența – în acest caz particular – fiindu-i recunoscută de însuşi Gusti: „Eram convins că studiul lui Caragiale va însemna una din cele mai strălucite cercetări asupra spinoasei şi complexei «chestii agrare»". Prin poziția pe care o are față de răscoala din 1907, dincolo de o profundă implicare afectivă şi morală, prin analiza lucidă şi pertinentă a motivelor care au declanşat revolta țărănească şi, mai ales prin soluțiile pe care le propune, Ion Luca Caragiale îşi dovedeşte afinitatea pentru principiile şcolii sociologice gustiene. *1907* relevă o altă dimensiune a personalității proteice a lui Caragiale, cred, insuficient exploatată încă, dar demnă de noi abordări.

Cuvinte cheie: istoria gândirii sociologice româneşti; Dimitrie Gusti; I.L. Caragiale; răscoala țărănească din 1907.

Abstract

This paper was initiated by a statement I found in D. Gusti's work: "*1907* continues to be valid even today. It is the only 'sociological' writing produced by Caragiale and with honor it stands beside the great analyses of Romanian society, realized in his plays and short stories." *1907* reveals a Caragiale endowed with a profound and ingenious socio-analytical spirit, although the author was not at all an *en titre* sociologist. His competency, however, is recognized by Gusti himself: "I was sure that Caragiale's study will be one of the most brilliant pieces of research on the difficult and complex 'agrarian issue.'"Through his standing vis-à-vis the 1907 revolt, through his lucid and articulated analysis of the reasons that lead to this peasant rising, and especially through the solutions that he offers, Caragiale demonstrates an affinity for the principles of the Bucharest Sociological School. Therefore, *1907* shows another facet of Caragiale's protean personality – one that has not been sufficiently explored, but which is, I believe, worthy of further analyses.

Keywords: history of Romanian sociological thought; Dimitrie Gusti; I.L. Caragiale; Romanian peasant 1907 uprising.

Résumé

L'idée de cet exposé est née d'une réflexion de Dimitrie Gusti: „*1907* reste toujours actuel. C'est la seule oeuvre de «sociologie» de Caragiale, qui puisse être range parmi les

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grandes analyses de la société roumaine, réalisées dans ses récits ou dans ses pieces de théâtre."

Prenant comme point de départ l'affirmation de Gusti, nous avons pris en considération le texte, le seul capable d'infirmer la supposition qu'il pourrait s'agir, au fond, d'une preuve de l'amitié pour Caragiale.

1907 nous révéle un Caragiale doué d'un esprit socio-analytique profond et ingénieux, malgré que l'auteur ne soit pas sociologue en titre, bien au contraire, sa compétence étant reconnue par Gusti lui-même: „J'étais persuadé que l'étude de Caragiale serait une des recherches les plus brillantes sur «la question agraire», tellement ardue et complexe." Ce qui sera d'ailleurs confirmé plus tard.

Par ses convictions au sujet de la révolte de 1907, au-delà d'une profonde implication affective et morale, par l'analyse lucide et pertinente des causes qui ont déclenché la révolte paysanne et, surtout, par les solutions qu'il propose, Ion Luca Caragiale prouve son affinité pour les principes de l'École sociologique de Gusti.

1907 met en valeur une autre dimension de la personnalité de Caragiale, qui est, à notre avis, pas encore exploitée, mais qui attend de nouvelles recherches.

Mots-clés: Dimitrie Gusti, Ion Luca Caragiale, révolte paysanne de 1907, l'histoire de la pensée sociologique roumaine.

Like any endeavor – be it scholarly, literary, essayistic or of any other kind –, the one presently analyzed has a certain genesis and is subject to various concerns. And since the "genetic factors" had to have a name, those who stimulated my elective affinities for the sociological perspective on the Caragiale phenomenon are my professor, Zoltán Rostás, and my former student and present colleague, Theodora-Eliza Văcărescu. I owe them my sociological „amateurism", to which I should add my constant need and preoccupation for Caragiale. However, I am not referring to an "iconic" Caragiale, permanently accepted as a cultural value, even if sometimes contested as such, but to a necessity for an always "different" Caragiale. Situating his work within the field of "perennial" cultural values amounts to accepting the idea that, beyond the settings imposed by time and the weight of various verdicts passed on by authorities in the field, Caragiale's work has the living capacity to uncover itself in a "different" way, to speak to us of "different" things. The "living" character of this work looms over the quest for an almost suicidal act: the search for intersections between Gusti and Caragiale that are justified not only by a warm friendship and mutual appreciation, but also by a conceptual affinity.

Where and how did these intersections occur? The fulcrum of this relationship resides in Caragiale's unique piece concerning the Great Peasant Revolt titled "1907. From Spring Till Fall." Gusti considered it "one of the most astute pieces of research on the thorny and complex 'agrarian question', and as such, the only sociological text by Caragiale." (Gusti, 1971, pp. 167-168). Gusti's statement pushed me to embark on this research project.

The problematic was the lack of any thorough analysis of the above mentioned text, as well as an obvious paradox. For when one looks at the map of Caragiale's universe, one sees so many signs that it leaves the impression that there is no more room for another presence. Caragisle's exegetes were both numerous and authoritative. This is because I.L. Caragiale became a subject that important names in Romanian culture felt compelled to acknowledge. From Titu Maiorescu and Gherea to the latest bibliographical books and articles, Caragiale seems to overwhelm his readership. Both Călinescu and Vianu. Both Ibrăileanu and Lovinescu. Pompiliu Constantinescu, Streinu, and Șt. Cazimir. Both Marin Bucur and I. Constantinescu. Both Eugen Simion and Florin Manolescu. Mircea Iorgulescu, Cioculescu, and Nicolae Manolescu. Zarifopol, Tomuș, and S. Iosifescu. Both I.M. Sadoveanu and I. Cazaban. Both Iorgu Iordan and Bulgăr. Both Ioana Pârvulescu and Gelu Negrea. And the list could continue. Studies, books, analyses – modern or more traditional –, new documents, biographical investigations, republications – more popular or scholarly. The volume of Caragiale output grows in waves, occasioned, for instance, by various anniversaries and commemorations – such as "2012 – The Caragiale Year". These events create impulses that subsequently decelerate, only to reveal anew their inexhaustible energies.

Within this massive interpretative output, "1907" passes almost unobserved. It is observed as being "something else", a text in which Caragiale leaves behind his good-natured humor and playful comic from his literary works and identifies himself with a grave voice about a "burning issue:" The Great Peasant Revolt of 1907. During the upheavals unfolding in Romania, Caragiale was in Berlin, self-exiled since 1904, following the Caion trial. The news from his native country horrified him. His son remembers:

> „He just sat for days on end with his head in his hands. When someone spoke to him, he would wake as if from a dream and answered the questions in a drained voice. Later, the despair would be overcome by revolt. […] He wanted to leave, to see for himself what was going on in his country, then despair would again paralyze him… One night, feverish and irritated, he wrote the «1907» brochure […], he sent the first part, translated by Mite Kremnitz, to *Die Zeit*, and he locked the Romanian manuscript in a drawer" (Caragiale, 1920).

Gusti's accounts from 1945 (Bădina, Neamțu, 1967, pp. 61-62) about the events of 1907 also portray Caragiale as extremely preoccupied and affected by what he learned about the revolts from the newspapers. More than once he manifested his anxiety by postponing reading the news and apprehensively addressing Gusti: "I wonder what is going on."(Bădina, Neamțu, 1967, p. 62).

The article that he would write about the revolt was discussed in detail by Caragiale with the young Doctor of Philosophy, Dimitrie Gusti, who was also in Berlin. Gusti remembers:

"Invited for lunch, I was asked by Caragiale to express my opinion about the way he understood to write the requested article.

And I listened to him until 5 in the morning.

Those afternoon and night were unforgettable. I was witnessing the unfolding of a great and difficult problem, engaged with by a thinker who was not a professional, but who analyzed it with surprising depth and subtlety. I was sure that Caragiale's study will be one of the most brilliant pieces of research on the thorny and complex «agrarian question».

I left before daybreak, after I was assured that in one or two days I will be called back to take a look at the writing.

It was only on the third day that I could see him. I was greeted by a desolate atmosphere, and by a tormented Caragiale, sleep deprived, and with desperate look. I worrisomely wondered what happened.

I felt relieved when I learnt that Caragiale could not write a single line. Because his verbal articulation – so accurate and eloquent – could not attain a correspondingly written form, Caragiale had chosen not to write anything.

After many days of hard work, the article was sent to the newsroom. It was also published in Romanian, under the telling title «1907»" (Gusti, 1971, pp. 167-168).

The text's genesis comprises several stages. (See „Note şi comentarii" [Notes and Comments] in Caragiale, 2001, p. 1048).The first part is dated "1907, March" and was published in the daily *Die Zeit* from Wien, year IV, no. 624, April 3, 1907, pp. 1-2. It was titled „Rumänien, wie es ist" (Romania as It Is) and signed by "A Romanian Patriot." The newspaper can be found in the manuscripts fund at the Romanian Academy, I.L. Caragiale file I, prints 1.

Paul Zarifopol, in the preface to the third tome of his critical edition of Caragiale's work, explains the provenance of the article's translation: "The German translation of Caragiale's text was done by a Berliner *literati*, Hermann Kienzl, who belonged to Mrs. Mite Kremnitz's circle." The perspectives about the text's translation are multiple. Caragiale's son, Luca Ion, maintains that the first part of the article was translated by Mite Kremnitz herself. Zarifopol, on the other hand, states that the translation belongs to Hermann Kienzl, while Stancu Ilin and Constantin Hârlav put together the following scenario: "Mite Kremnitz asked I.L. Caragiale, through Paul Zarifipol, to write an article on the topic of the peasant revolt for the Wiener newspaper *Die Zeit*. Caragiale accepts and writes the part dated '1907, March', that he sends to Paul Zarifopol in order to give it to Mite Kremnitz. The latter takes care of the article's translation, by requesting the services of the Berliner *literati* Hermann Kienzl. The German version returns to Paul Zarifopol, who might have brushed it up a little, sending it back to the author in Berlin. I.L. Caragiale sends the German version of the article to Wien, with an accompanying letter. One can easily see that the translation of the first part of the pamphlet is a collective work: Mite Kremnitz – Hermann Kienzl – Paul Zarifopol. This was the starting point of the contemporaries' contradictory testimonies." (Caragiale, 2001, pp. 1052-1053).

After its publication in *Die Zeit*, the Romanian version appeared in Craiova, only three days later, in *Monitorul*, year II, no. 114, April 6, 1907, pp. 1-2. It was also signed "A Romanian Patriot" and it indicated the article's origin "From the Wiener newspaper *Die Zeit*." The text was preceded by a editorial note: "How Foreigners Judge Us: 'We republish from the newspaper *Zeit* [*sic*] from Wien the article below, so that our readers could see how foreigners judge us. Although the assessments about us and our nature are pessimistic, reading this article, one has to admit that, for the most part, the author is right. The truth hurts, but it can also serve to correct and that is the reason we printed it.'"(Caragiale, 2001, p. 1049).

Mihail Dragomirescu was the one who took the text from under the protection of anonymity and published it with the mention of the author's name, in *Suplimentul politic* (Political Supplement) of the journal *Convorbiri* (Conversations). Caragiale's text is printed here under the title "The Causes of the Peasant Revolt," in year I, no. 19, October 1st, 1907, pp. 765-771. It was accompanied by Dragomirescu's eulogistic words: "It is a magnificent chapter in Tacitus […]. In Romanian, in this way, only one writer has written before: Mr. Titu Maiorescu in some of the 'Introductions' to his 'Parliamentary Discourses'." (Caragiale, 2001, p. 1050).

In addition to the first part, dated "1907, March," the author added a second part, dated "1907, September," as well as a third one, "1907, October." These three parts were published together as a brochure at the beginning of November 1907. It appeared at the printing house of the newspaper *Adevărul* (The Truth). The brochure reached a record circulation: three editions, ten thousand copies. A fourth edition was therefore needed!

Their common preoccupations for the "peasant question" are traced, as far as Gusti is concerned, to his graduate studies in Leipzig, which continued his experience from the University of Berlin. At the University of Leipzig, Gusti persistently pursued the project contemplated before leaving the country:

> "to study society, being convinced that it constitutes a separate research field […] this why I decided to study closely, as a specialist and not as a dilettante, the sciences: philosophy, psychology, history, economy, legal studies, statistics, and, only afterwards, to be able to start the research of society as such. As a specialist and not as a dilettante!" (Bădina, Neamțu, 1967, pp. 48-49).

His desire for expert knowledge was the reason why Gusti opted for the most severe and exigent professor in political economy from Leipzig, Karl Bücher. At his seminar, Gusti gave a talk about the "History of the Agrarian Question in Romania." The importance that Gusti assigned to this paper is emphasized in a letter sent to his friend, Ion Al. Rădulescu-Pogoneanu, and derives not only from the fact that it was presented before Bücher, but also from Gusti's own preoccupation for the "agrarian question."

"From this paper it was obvious that Gusti was not a supporter of extant property arrangements, especially that of the landed gentry, but, irrespective of how paradoxical it would seem, taking into account the time and the milieu that he grew in, he supported the elimination of serfdom. Gusti admits himself to be on the side of effective individual freedom, ensured by land availability and the possibility of promoting the necessary means for a high agricultural productivity." (Bădina, Neamțu, 1967, pp. 49-50).

He articulated certain theses that he would later reiterate in his theoretical and practical activity, anticipating in this seminar, ever since 1900, the later atmosphere of social effervescence.

Within the 1907 generalized "critical and ruthless attitude of Romanian society", as Henri H. Stahl considers it in the dialogues with Zoltán Rostás published in *Monografia ca utopie* (Rostás, 2000, pp. 129-131) , Caragiale appears not at all unfamiliar with Gusti's conception about the way agriculture was carried on, and the means whereby peasants' work was exploited in an eminently agrarian country, where

"The country's land, Caragiale maintains, is in the possession: 1. of large owners […], 2. of middle owners, and 3. of small owners, [namely] the great peasant mass, put in possession of land in [18]64 and [18]88.

All peasants are ploughers, they cultivate their small holdings, as well as their small and middle properties. For these small owners (almost 5 million people out of a total population of 6 million people), their properties were not sufficient because, on one hand, the living needs and the taxes grew and continue to grow, and, on the other hand, their land shrank and continues to shrink, passing to their children in smaller fragments, through inheritance according to common law. Alienating one's land was prohibited by law, only compensation exchange from peasant to peasant being permitted, [leading] to land fragmentation in such small pieces until they became so infinitesimal that they could have only served for an intensive and refined agricultural practice – a type of impossible work here because of the ancient habits, lack of special skills and patience, ignorance with respect to methods for savant husbandry, and also because of the lack of capital and credit [system]." (Caragiale, 2001, pp. 122-123).

Caragiale is not shy about confronting the land tenancy system that had obviously lead to the peasants' misery and to the prosperity of land tenants, banks and credit institutions, to the enrichment of large land owners, not to mention the growth in state's income. Caragiale's analysis is extremely detailed, meticulous, and realistic.

Gusti argued that the possible causes of the 1907 revolt were to be found in "the lack of a profound knowledge and appropriate assessment of reality"(Gusti, 1919, p. 291) on the part of state authorities. Caragiale was not unfamiliar with this reality, nor was he unfamiliar with its reasons: "However, one who closely knows, like us, the organs of this state and their functioning is surprised now not by what is going on, but – if there was (as one would have good reasons not to believe it) such energy in those masses – by the fact that this enormous public scandal did not

occur much earlier."(Caragiale, 2001, p. 122). Therefore, the main guilty party is the state, with its "intellectual politics, administration and culture."(Caragiale, 2001, p. 126). The political parties were, in Caragiale's acute perception, not

> "founded on tradition, on old or new class interests and thus on programs and principles. The two so-called historical parties that regularly alternate in power are but in fact two factions that do not have partisans, but rather a clientele. The clientele is the plebe incapable of work […], impoverished merchants from the slums, small and dangerous agitators in villages and around towns, truncheon-wielding electoral agents; and finally the hybrid product of schools of all levels, semi-cultured intellectuals, lawyers and shysters, professors, teachers, and small-minded institutors, free-thinking and lapsed priests, illiterate primary school teachers – all of them beer-hall theoreticians; followed by high officials and petty bureaucrats, in their greatest part immovable." (Caragiale, 2001, p. 126).

In this context, the immense peasant class has no representative in the Chambers, for the representatives are recruited from the illustrious political clientele already mentioned.

In "Apelul pentru Constituirea Asociației pentru Studiul și Reforma Socială" (The Appeal for the Establishment of the Association for Social Study and Reform), publicized in Iași in April 1918, Gusti – in much the same way Caragiale did eleven years earlier – articulated a trenchant critique against the governing system and asked for its dissolution. Gusti attacked "the intrusion of party political interests and of persons who neither know the needs of the groups they make up reforms for, nor the feasibility of the means used for their accomplishment; however, they seek, through the promoted reforms, personal or party interests." (Gusti, 1919, p. 291).

It is true that the two friends diverged when it came to the method of applying these principles for social recovery and reform. Gusti, with his intellectual finesse, was confident that the use of social research data and results in the governmental acts of social reform was the solution, while the more forthright Caragiale believed that only a coup d'état could put an end to the despotic oligarchy, and could remake a new system "from the bottom, on the principle of the rational and equitable empowerment of producers and the deterrence of profiteers of all kinds."(Caragiale, 2001, p. 132).

Neither education, nor public culture escape Caragiale's critical stance:

> "the schools are just factories that churn out functionaries, a plethora of half-ignoramuses, characterless, heartless, true knights of intellectual industry who covet as many meritless honors and as much effortless gain as possible.
> These factories feed the public oligarchy that exclusively rules over the Romanian country. These factories produce an opportunistic oligarchy […] Lots of nerve, lack of

any scruples, renunciation of personal dignity, of family honor, infamy even, but also some luck – and a great career is all but assured.

In the Romanian country, this is called, very seriously, the democratic system... And this oligarchy, semi-cultured or, at best, falsely cultured, is as incapable of useful production and thought as it is greedy for gains and honors. Moreover, it arrogates for itself the full power of the state: with a cruel and outrageous shamelessness, it denies the peasants (the immense, submissive and dutiful mass that produces the national wealth) any right of interference, be it only consultative, in the ruling of their interests, in the guiding of their destinies. This is done under the pretext of their ignorance and lack of political maturity." (Caragiale, 2001, pp. 129-130).

I do not believe that it is a stretch to read in Caragiale's writing Gusti's later conceptualization of an intellectual elite who matured and became autonomous after having had contact with the School's and the Professor's formative thinking, had the mission to contribute to the rising of the masses. What Caragiale envisioned in the realm of ideas was later institutionalized by Gusti.

The solution and the most important point of convergence for the issues put forth by both thinkers was political reform.

"The country needs political reform. [...] The abolition of the usurpation political configuration, the eradication of the most odious boyar system, without many established boyars and petty boyars, but with uncounted fleecers and parvenus, and the entry of the entire country in its rightful sovereignty, with the ability to decide about its wealth and honor, about its fate and destiny, according to God's will, entirely through its own will. [...]

And then what? Then the entire country, called upon to exercise its holy right! And if it doesn't yet know well enough what to do, then... it should learn! The country should learn with sorrows and sacrifices – just as the entire civilized world did. There is enough time for this: God, praise His name!, hasn't fenced in the future..." (Caragiale, 2001, pp. 140-141).

Finally, both Caragiale and Gusti were ruled by a warm feeling, mostly discredited today, but theorized yesterday by Gusti, i.e. patriotism. One could also consider the hypothesis that, at least to some extent, Caragiale contributed to Dimitrie Gust's return to Romania and, thus, to the enormous benefit brought about by the Gustian School's social research and reform activities.

In *Autosociologia unei vieţi* (A Life's Self-Sociology), Gusti remembers the moment Caragiale roused him from his indecision to repatriate:

"What, Doctor, are you still pondering? Don't you understand you don't have a choice, but only to fulfill your duty to your country? For, however this country would be, it is still your country. Just like your mother would be, even full of vices, drunkard, even murderous, you can never forget she is your mother! Don't look askance that I'm here, for I left after having fulfilled my duty, and only after I was convinced that it doesn't

want me anymore. But you, Doctor, in the beginning of your life, you are not allowed to desert and, especially, to become a prodigal son who doesn't want to acknowledge his country, his mother." (Caragiale, 1971, p. 175).

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PAPANDREOU'S DECISION ON 2011 BAILOUT REFERENDUM FOR GREECE – A TWO-LEVEL GAMES ANALYSIS

Roxana HÎNCU [*]

Rezumat

Acest articol examinează, prin aplicarea modelului jocurilor pe două niveluri, decizia Primului Ministru al Greciei în favoarea organizării unui referendum în privința celei de-a treia tranșe de ajutor financiar din 2011. În articol se argumentează că explicația acestei decizii se găsește în primul rând în domeniul politicii interne. Cauzele de la nivel internațional au jucat un rol semnificativ însă nu decisiv deoarece referendumul era menit pentru a câștiga avantaje în negocierile de la Nivelul al II-lea al jocurilor pe două nivele. Procesul identificării motivelor deciziei de a organiza un referendum pentru acceptarea sau respingerea unui nou împrumut acordat de Uniunea Europeană, Fondul Monetar Inter-național și Banca Central Europeană urmează modelul jocurilor pe două niveluri, propus de Putnam (1988) pentru a analiza dacă motivele deciziei în cauză pot fi identificate la Nivelul I sau la Nivelul al II-lea al negocierilor. Cauzele deciziei primului ministru sunt identificate prin evaluarea diferitelor opțiuni și a consecințelor lor. Concluzia acestui articol este că motivele de prim ordin au fost din domeniul politicii interne. Organizarea referendumului a avut ca scop evitarea unor alegeri anticipate. În plus, a vizat creșterea susținerii publice pentru Mișcarea Socialistă Panhellenă (PASOK) prin adoptarea unei poziții anti-austeritate (în cazul în care Parlamentul vota negativ în privința organizării referendumului) și prin acordarea grecilor posibilitatea de a vota în legătură cu viitorul țării lor (în cazul în care referendumul ar fi avut loc). Analiza se bazează pe un studiu de caz, folosind date de ordin calitativ în preponderență. Datele cercetării au fost obținute din rapoartele media de la nivel internațional.

Cuvinte cheie: referendum, modelul jocurilor pe două niveluri, politică internă, negociere.

Abstract

This article examines through the two-level games model the case of Greek Prime Minister's call for a referendum on the third 2011 bailout loan. It argues that the clue to understand his decision lies primarily in domestic politics. International causes played a major part but the analysis proposed here shows that the referendum was aimed at gaining negotiation leverage at Level II negotiations. The process of identifying the reasons for Papandreou's decision to call for a referendum on the third European Union, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank bailout agreement is conducted within the "two-level games framework" proposed by Putnam (1988) in order to assess whether the decision is better explained by constraints on Level I or Level II negotiations. The causes for his decision are identified by evaluating various options and their consequences. This paper concludes that the primary causes were of domestic kind. The referendum aimed avoiding snap elections. In addition, it sought an improvement of public support for

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Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) by committing the opposition to the austerity measures (in case of Parliament "no" vote on referendum) and by giving the Greek people a chance to vote on the future of the country (in case a referendum took place). The analysis employs the case-study research method and the qualitative data type. Evidence was gathered mainly from international media reports.

Key words: referendum, two-level games model, domestic politics, negotiation.

Résumé

Cet article examine à travers le modèle de jeux à deux niveaux le cas d'appel du Premier Ministre grec d'un référendum sur le troisième prêt de sauvetage en 2011. Il faut valoir que l'indice pour comprendre sa décision réside essentiellement dans la politique intérieure. Les causes internationales ont joué un rôle majeur, mais l'analyse proposée ici montre que le référendum visait à obtenir un effet de levier de négociation au deuxième niveau des négociations. Le processus d'identification des motifs de la décision de Papandreou de convoquer un référendum sur le troisième accord de sauvetage de la part de l'Union Européenne, de Fonds Monétaire International et de la Banque Centrale Européenne est mené dans le cadre de „jeux à deux niveaux" proposé par Putnam (1988) afin d'évaluer si la décision est mieux expliqué par les contraintes de première ou de deuxième niveau des négociations. Les causes de sa décision sont identifiés par l'évaluation des différentes options et leurs conséquences. Cet article conclut que les principales causes étaient du cadre de la politique intérieure. Le référendum visait éviter les élections anticipées. En outre, le référendum cherchait une amélioration de l'appui du public pour le Mouvement socialiste panhellénique (PASOK) en commettant l'opposition aux mesures d'austérité (en cas d'un vote négatif de la part du Parlement à référendum) et en donnant au peuple grec la possibilité de voter sur l'avenir du pays (en cas le référendum avait eu lieu). L'analyse utilise la méthode d'étude de cas et le type de données qualitatives. Les données ont été recueillies à partir des rapports des médias internationales.

Mots clés: référendum, modèle de jeux à deux niveaux, politique intérieur, négociation.

1. Introduction

The Greek debt crisis tested many leaders because of the interconnected problems that it posed. The heads of top economic powers in Europe were challenged to contain the Greek debt crisis and negotiated with the Greek counterparts three bailout agreements within a period of two years. The seriousness of the crisis led commentators to assess that being the Greek Prime Minister in these circumstances was the toughest task that a politician could have taken. George Papandreou "took up" the job in November 2009, while the extent of the economic problems became obvious and eventually resigned in November 2011 as Greece fell far deeper into economic hardship. Furthermore, his political career ended after he resigned as the leader of PASOK party in January 2012 stating that he would not seek re-election.

2. The Two-Level Games Framework

This section emphasizes the usefulness of the two-level games framework for the research task assigned here. Firstly, it stresses the broad importance of the two-level games construct in integrating domestic politics in international negotiation process analysis. Secondly, it emphasizes the utility of the two-level games construct in guiding empirical research on the decision-making process related to international negotiations. It discusses the concepts coined by Putnam and his arguments concerning the "general equilibrium analysis" in which national and international games are accounted for simultaneously.

Putnam's influential article (1988) constitutes a theoretical endeavour which aims to structure the analysis of international negotiation. His approach of two-level games accounts for the complexity and interplay between the domestic and external forces in interpreting successful or failed negotiation agreements. Basically, the model Putnam proposes is a distinct conceptualization of international negotiation. Although the novelty of his observations is doubtful, the innovation of the two-level games stands in "drawing together a number of previously disparate observations and emphasizing the effects of interaction between domestic- and international level variables" (Knopf 1993, p. 600).

On the other hand, Putnam's idea of two-level games is contested because it failed to reach the realm of theory. For this reason, many works drawing on Putnam's article formalized and broadened the two-level games model with new hypotheses. Milner (1997) has used it in explaining successful or failed cooperation using the interaction of the domestic actor's preferences, given their political institutions and levels of information. Knopf (1993, p. 600) develops "three-and-three" framework distinguishing three forms of separable spheres of domestic-international interaction- "transgovernmental", "transnational" and "cross-level".

Despite various interpretations, it is useful to stress the logic of Putnam's original article arguing that its main utility is integrating domestic and international factors in bargaining strategies in international negotiations. One of the most comprehensive works on developing the two-level games approach, points out that "the most theoretically distinctive element in the two-level games approach is its typology and analysis of strategies for simultaneously exploiting both levels in a bargaining situation" (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam 1993, p. 17).

Other scholars account for the same merit. Schoppa (1993, p. 353) highlights that the greatest achievement of Putnam's article is the description of how international negotiations create opportunities for negotiators to pursue "synergistic strategies" aimed at reshaping politics in both their own and their counterparts' domestic arenas to make possible deals that would not have been possible in the absence of interaction between the two levels. Furthermore, Tamayo (2001, p. 70) underlines that the dependent variable refers to the changes in the bargaining

capacity of the chief negotiator as Putnam's goal was to formulate a theory of international negotiation.

Next, this part shows how the two-level games framework is useful for guiding empirical research on interaction between domestic and international factors in decisions on the negotiation process. Putnam pointed out that in international negotiations political leaders must assure the reconciliation of domestic interests with the interests of the negotiating partner in order to reach an agreement. In other words, "governments face a two-sided strategic interaction: a domestic one, vis-à-vis societal actors, and an international one, vis-à-vis other states" (Hale and Held 2011, p. 7). According to Putnam, interests are accommodated through "back and forth" interaction between the international level (Level I) and the national one (Level II).

Putnam asserts that the best way to understand the behavior of foreign policy decision makers is to recognize that they are in fact operating in two separate environments, each with a distinctive logic that structure choices accordingly. He uses rational-choice framework based on preferences, constraints, and informational environments to organize the analysis of choices. His approach is "informed by game theory and captures the dynamic attempts of decision makers to address local constituencies and external forces simultaneously" (Alden and Aran 2012, p. 60). Therefore, the two-level games approach is helpful in explaining the puzzling aspects of the strategies pursued in negotiations as "statesmen function as a transmission belt between domestic and international affairs" (Li 2005, p. 43).

One of the central concepts developed by Putnam is "win-sets"- which counts for the situation of a successful agreement when the priorities of both levels overlap. He states that a negotiator's strategies determine the size of the win-set. Other factors that affect the size of a win-set are Level II preferences and coalitions, and Level II institutions (Putnam 1988, p. 443). For example, one strategy he discusses at Level II negotiations is the use of side-payments to attract marginal supporters for a deal. At Level I negotiations, a useful strategy is to try to exaggerate or minimize the tightness of one's domestic win-set. The exaggeration serves the reaching of the most favorable agreement for a negotiator. The minimization functions as an impediment to an unfavorable deal. Other strategies are "reverberation" and "targeting"- involving direct communication and side-payment offers to domestic actors in order to expand a favorable win-set for the deal one proposes.

Furthermore, "voluntary/involuntary defection" constitutes an essential concept connected to decisions strategies (Putnam 1988, p. 440) in the ratification process. Voluntary defection is an impediment of an agreement in the absence of enforceable conditions. Involuntary defection occurs when domestic preferences are beyond the control of the government representatives responsible for signing the international agreement. In Putnam's view a negotiator might seek to misrepresent a voluntary defection as involuntary risking reputational costs.

Last but not least, he underscores that "it is reasonable to presume, at least in the international case of two-level bargaining, that the chief negotiator will normally give primacy to his domestic calculus, if a choice must be made, not least because his own incumbency often depends on his standing at Level II" (Putnam 1988, p. 457). He asserts that the preferences of statesman in international negotiations may differ from the constituents' ones. For Putnam, the statesman may have three main priorities: "enhancing his standing in the Level II game by increasing his political resources or by minimizing potential losses; shifting the balance of power at Level II in favor of domestic policies that he prefers for exogenous reasons; to pursue his own conception of the national interest in the international context" (Putnam 1998, p. 457).

3. Methodology

For achieving the research purpose aforementioned, this paper uses the case study method. Also, process tracing is used in identifying the intervening causal process-the causal chain and causal mechanism of the decision process on the referendum. Although the procedure of gathering process tracing evidence comes at times under fire as it takes into account all kinds of evidence in a disparate way (Gerring 2007, p. 178), it is praised for narrowing down the list of possible causes for a certain outcome. In addition, the analysis relies on the language of necessary conditions and the use of counterfactual logic to support the arguments.

The data used is mainly qualitative, containing primary (discourses, declarations) and secondary sources (media coverage, economic analyses). While mindful of the restriction to genuine Greek media and debates because of language impediments, the interpretation of discourses and interviews of Greek politicians in the international media was made in order to decipher the messages meant for the international community and for the Greek people as well. Furthermore, the analysis is based on the restricted available information on the negotiations involved. For this reason, the causes are analyzed through the rational actor model taking into account the aims and consequences of possible choices.

4. The Call on Referendum as a Bargaining Tactic

In order to answer the research question, it seems useful to consider the referendum call a bargaining tactic and eventually, a critical decision point. In establishing the primary causes of the decision, at each level of negotiation there are specified the options available, the constrains on both levels of negotiation, and Papandreou's expectations regarding the intentions of his adversaries and the likely consequences of various courses of action.

● **Background of the third EU, IMF, ECB- Greece Bailout Agreement**

A presentation of the background of the negotiations on the third Greece bailout is necessary because it puts into context the actors' standings on the agreement. Greece's economic problems became a particular European concern in late 2009 as its level of government deficit was the highest in EU (Eurostat Yearbook 2010. Europe in Figures: 40). The heated debates (comprising media, political or expert's discourses) on the causes of Greece's economic crisis are important as they shape public attitudes and policy decisions. The crisis is widely seen as the result of a mixture of structural causes such as soaring public spending, low productivity and widespread corruption (Avent, *The Economist*. 4 Mar. 2010).

George Papandreou came to power in snap elections called by outgoing Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis (conservative New Democracy Party) on 5 November 2009. As it can be seen in **Table no 1**, Papandreou's party Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) won 160 seats, ensuring a majority in the 300 - seats Parliament. Despite growing economic difficulties, there was a glimpse of hope for change on behalf of the Greek society as PASOK won after it had been in opposition for more than five years. At the time, European leaders welcomed the news with mixed feelings as Papandreou had won promising to avert austerity measures for Greek people. However, external loans proved deemed necessary despite of prohibitively high borrowing costs. Therefore, several rounds of austerity measures were adopted in order to meet the requirements of the bailouts agreements. Greece received three rounds of international loans from 2010 till late 2011.

Table no 1: Greece's election results in 2009. Seats in parliament

Source: *BBC news*, "Greece's Socialists win snap poll", 5 October 2009
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8289674.stm

Greece received three bailouts from EU, IMF and ECB. The first was agreed upon by EU, IMF and Greece on 2 May 2010. It was meant to prevent Greece defaulting on its debt. The deal valued 110 billion euros for a period of three years. The Greek Parliament adopted a set of austerity measures on 6 May 2010, with 172 votes in favor. The measures meant the harshest programme of fiscal and structural adjustment since the end of the Second World War. On this occasion fifty thousand protesters marched in Athens (Smith, *The Guardian*, 6 May 2010).

The second bailout was approved by Eurozone leaders and Greece on 21 July 2011. It comprised 109 billion euros and involved support from IMF, too. In this agreement private lenders (including banks) pledged to support Greece. Therefore, the Greek government agreed to implement further austerity measures involving public spending cuts and tax raises.

The third bailout was a deal of 130 billion euros. The novelty of the deal was that banks were forced to raise more capital to protect themselves against future losses and it also required banks a restructuring of Greece's debt by accepting a loss of 50 percentage of money they have lent Greece (Spiegel, *Financial Times, 28 Oct. 2011)*.

- **Call on a Referendum as a Bargaining Tactic on Level II Negotiations**

Public disapproval and opposition frenzy are two similarities between Papandreou's situation and Costas Karamanlis's position before calling snap elections half way through his four-year term. Yet, Papandreou avoided a "déjà vu". On 31 October, in a Parliament address, he called for two high-stakes votes. The first was a vote of confidence in his leadership, while the second dealt with the pursuit of a re-ferendum on the third bailout. Therefore, Papandreou chose a different way of dealing with Greece's political and economic crises (**Table no 2**).

Table no 2: Timeline: Papandreou's decision points (2011)

31 October	Papandreou (P.) calls for a confidence vote and a referendum vote
2 November	P. wins cabinet backing to hold a referendum
3 November	P. drops referendum plan
5 November	P. survives parliamentary confidence vote avoiding snap elections
6 November	P. seals a deal with the opposition to form a coalition to approve bailout with the condition of his resignation

Source: *Reuters*, "Timeline: Greece's debt crisis", 6 November 2011
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/06/us-greece-economy-events-idUSTRE7A52VF20111106

Papandreou faced numerous constraints in securing the bailout deal as the Level II "win-set" was very narrow. Firstly, the main opposition party (conservative New Democracy) had more political clout on the crisis issue. The difficult economic

situation gave the opposition the occasion to use a populist discourse criticizing the international creditors and the way the government managed the crisis. The views expressed by Antonis Samaras in his first interview to international media since becoming the main opposition leader are representative for the internal debates on the path that Greece should follow. He dismissed the austerity programme as "failure". In addition he advocated a different policy mix than the mainstream policy, recalling in the interview one statement made to Angela Merkel- "Look, if your plan works, then I am wrong. But if it doesn't work, then you are going to need a new plan and I am the one who can bring that" (Granitsas and Walker, *The Wall Street Journal*, 5 Jul. 2011). Although he did not elaborate on the new plan, his alternative involved new measures for economic growth instead of tax raises and public spending. Unfortunately, he was right in his predictions. Put it simply, austerity did not work, neither did the first bailout. In 2011 Greece missed its targets for reducing its deficit and further 7bn euros in savings will have to be found (Hewitt, *BBC news*, 23 Jan. 2012). New Democracy Party's opposition to austerity measures can be assessed as opportunistic but it was a credible threat in the long run as it simultaneously exploited and induced public dissatisfaction towards governing party.

One can argue that if Papandreou had not called on a referendum he would have risked endangering the bailout agreement through rejection of the austerity measures on behalf of the Parliament as the New Democracy Party showed strong disapproval over the deal. Still, the opposition threatened with a "no" vote in the previous international deals but eventually it participated in positive voting in order to secure the deal. The international media did not express concerns about a possible rejection of the third bailout through "no" vote on behalf of the opposition. Therefore, fears amid a negative vote in the Parliament were not a primary cause of Papandreou's decision as he had parliamentary majority, 153 out of 300 seats - dangerously slim, but enough to pursue further measures.

Secondly, a more serious concern for Papandreou was the government rift. The media (at least the international part) did not particularly cover this subject. Still the disagreements among the government members could have been read between the lines. The government seemed divided on the support for two traditional rivals within the socialist party, George Papandreou and Evangelos Venizelos (the Finance Minister during the crisis). The latter seemingly was not consulted on the referendum decision. Nevertheless, Papandreou managed to win cabinet support for the referendum. The announcement of the decision sparked party and government "rebellions" on the referendum. Two socialist lawmakers, Milena Apostolaki and Eva Kali defected reducing the socialist parliament majority to the bare minimum of 151 seats. Other PASOK Parliament members threatened to follow suit with six senior party members openly calling for Papandreou to step down (Lowen, *BBC news*, 2 Nov. 2011). The government rifts became evident as Evangelos Venizelos spoke out publicly against the idea of a referendum: "Greece's position within the

euro area is a historic conquest of the country and it cannot be put in doubt. This acquis by the Greek people cannot depend on a referendum" (Public statement, 3 Nov. 2011).

Thirdly, the PASOK Parliament members were also divided on the reforms that Greece could undertake. For example, a member of the parliament- prominent figure from the PASOK party (Vasso Papandreo) stated that it was the last time when he voted for austerity measures invoking that "the society was despairing and the country was collapsing" (Smith, *The Guardian*, 20 Oct. 2011). These problems emerged as opinion surveys showed 90 percentage of Greeks opposing Papandreou's policies and his party polling just 20 percentage of public support (*MSNBC World News*, 4 Nov. 2011). Furthermore, low opinion polls divided the government to such an extent because of the ever-gloomier diagnosis of the economy. Its GDP fell by 6 percentage in 2011, far more than expected.

Last but not least, on 20 October the Greek Parliament passed the new austerity package while 80 000 protesters gathered to show their disapproval. These particular protests were followed by a two-day general strike. In addition, there were violent clashes with one man killed in fights with police. The austerity measures draw on a five-year plan which allows for more money to be raised through tax increases and less money to be saved through spending cuts. Public dissatisfaction with the economic situation of Greece has grown amid worrying growing unemployment rate- 18.8 percentage in November 2011, up from 13.3 percentage in November 2010 (*The Guardian*, "Eurozone unemployment hits new record", 6 Jan. 2012). Yet, riots did not mean a new impetus for the referendum decision as violent protests became a common view on the streets of Athens. However, the public preferences towards the PASOK party whether expressed through riots or not were an important factor for Papandreou's decision. As mentioned before, the socialist party lost public support and chances for winning the next election (normally set up in 2013) looked bleak given the austerity programme that the ruling party had to enforce.

In summary, Papandreou's decision on the referendum was a move meant to escape a series of constraints that any leader would have met in his position. The referendum scenario aimed to downplay the opposition's fierce criticism once the Greek people had decided on the way forward. Furthermore, it placed some of the responsibility on the Greek citizens regarding the important decision on carrying on as a eurozone member. In his address to the Parliament he put it bluntly, "rejection of this agreement [the bailout], either because of a referendum or because of elections, either because we would not have parliamentary majority or because of a weakness in carrying out decisions, would mean an exit from the euro. It means an exit from the euro" (Steward, *The Guardian*, 3 Nov. 2011). He added that the referendum created a "positive shock" as it brought positive results to Greece's political world (Steward, *The Guardian*, 3 Nov. 2011).

The referendum proposal gave the government negotiation leverage on political landscape till the next elections. If he would have called on early elections, the polls show that he would have lost (Mavris, G. "Papandreou's referendum and public opinion", 07 Nov. 2011. Although the referendum call tactic did not achieve a mandate for other two years in power, it led to a coalition government which shared responsibility for the austerity measures required by the third bailout. For the coming elections (February 2012) the PASOK party has low public support but the referendum debate saved it from a graver plunge into the pools.

● **Call on a Referendum as a Bargaining Tactic on Level I Negotiations**

The timing of Papandreou's announcement on a referendum coincided with the preparations ahead of the G20 Summit- set for 3-4 November in France. It was widely reported that Papandreou did not consult the foreign partners on his decision.

At Level I negotiations Papandreou had similar tight space of maneuver as at Level II. His decision on referendum was a "voluntary defection". That was the case because at Level I his decision on the referendum did not aim providing more bargaining leverage in his dealings with the international community. In his address to the Parliament he stated clearly that a "no" vote will mean exit from the eurozone and that "the moment is such that a different national position should be applauded" (Steward, *The Guardian*, 3 Nov. 2011). Still, when the prospect of failing to gather support for a referendum was considered, the consequences were beneficial in terms of the message sent abroad because it raised the possibility of a different Greek approach towards the crisis.

On deciding on the referendum Papandreou had two options concerning the economic consequences for the country. One option was to keep euro as a currency and continue the required reforms established in collaboration with the European leaders. The alternative was to exit the eurozone and adopt economic measures which did not constitute guarantees in exchange for an agreement. Economic experts foresaw bleak consequences for Greece if it had dropped the euro. The new drachma would have plummeted, inflation would have taken off, it would have to print money to finance its deficit and it would still need external finance (*The Economist*, "If Greece goes...", 23 Jan. 2011). On the other hand, this would be the way for greater competitiveness. Yet the costs of a Greek exit outweigh the benefits.

Some commentators invoked Papandreou's power on the wording of the referendum question as a trick up his sleeve as pools showed that 60 percentage of the population were against the terms of the bailout and 70 percentage were against leaving the monetary union (Elliott, *The Guardian*, 1 Nov. 2011). Still, in his address to the parliament he was straightforward on the need to decide on the euromembership dilemma.

There are arguments that an exit from the euroarea would trigger a withdrawal from the EU in the legal sense (ECB, "Working Paper", 2009). Although at the moment of decision on referendum, the possibility on the exit of Greece was a taboo in European leaders' speeches, this was not the case anymore after the referendum debate. Nonetheless, even after avoiding a referendum, Greece's situation was compared with that of Lehman Brothers in the sense that the mix of policies applied were not efficient and alternative ways are too hard to reach. Angela Merkel expressed doubts about the chances of saving Greece from financial meltdown despite two years of severe austerity measures and multibillion bailout packages (Traynor, *The Guardian*, 25 Jan. 2012).

On the other hand, the EU would have also suffered to a great extent if Greece left the eurozone, despite the fact that Greece's GDP is just 2 percentage of EU's total. This event would have created a dangerous precedent spreading fear and chaos to citizens, bond investors and creditors because they would have regarded the euroarea as divided between first rank countries with safe economies and banks (e.g. Germany, France) and "pariah economies" (e.g. Italy, Portugal, Spain).

After the announcement of the referendum, the next 8 bn. euros of rescue loans were withheld from Greece while waiting for the result of the popular vote. Also, for the first time it was stated the possibility for a country to exit the eurozone. Therefore, the European leaders' indignation towards Papandreou's call for referendum was paradoxical as after two months they brought up the subject of Greece's inevitable default.

Eventually, Papandreou met European leaders and IMF representatives at Cannes on the fringes of G20 summit. After one day of the meeting he carried on to win cabinet support for the referendum, therefore, it can be stated that international influences did not avert Papandreou's decision. However, Papandreou sent a nationalist message abroad by showing that Greece can have the last word on its future economic policies. Yet, EU leaders met the new technocrat government with the same skepticism as they asked for a written commitment on behalf of Greek leaders as guarantee of austerity measures.

5. Conclusions

Despite the fact that "two-level games" approach does not have a fully-fledged theory status, it is useful for decision making process analysis. The model assumed by Putnam proposes thinking of national leaders as players in a "two-level game". His metaphor is helpful in explaining the moves statesman make at Level I and II negotiations recognizing the fact that astute players identify the strategies that would bring most benefits for them.

This paper aimed to identify the primary causes for Papandreou's decision on a referendum call on the third bailout in the logic of "two-level games" framework. It concludes that the referendum decision was the right move that induced political

domestic realignments and sent a nationalistic message abroad. Domestic constraints such as low public support for PASOK party and a growing opposition in opinion polls led to the necessity of a strategic move on the part of governing party. In addition, the third bailout meant further austerity measures in the context of bleak economic prospects for Greece and EU too. Therefore, if PASOK had continued to be held the sole responsible for the problems Greeks confront, it would have stand very little chances for the next election. The referendum was a credible "threat" as Papandreou had Parliament majority and unanimous cabinet support. After the announcement of the decision, government and party rifts became obvious endangering the prospect of a referendum. Nevertheless, the option of a failed referendum enforcement was beneficial for PASOK party as it led to negotiations over a coalition government which shared responsibility over the austerity measures and public dissatisfaction. Overall, Papandreou played the "two-level game" in a successful way for his party but he became the "victim" of the domestic negotiations for a coalition government.

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ADOLESCENT FATHERHOOD WITH THE CONTEMPORARY MALE YOUTH IN ABIDJAN (CÔTE D'IVOIRE): THE REALITIES OF CONSTRUCTION, DECONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Mathieu TCHETCHE [*]

Rezumat

În ce măsură problemele de mediu influențează experimentarea parentalității în adolescență, generând mutații multiple ? Acesta este întrebarea care stă la originea textului. Plecând de la analiza realității de construcție a fenomenului și deconstrucție a opiniiilor false cu referire la experiența unui tânăr tată din Coasta de Fildeş, preocuparea de integrare și responsabilitatea rămân în centrul experimentății paternității la adolescență.

Construcția fenomenului se articulează în jurul idealului democratic promovat de către mass-media și școală. Acestea sunt garanții iluzorii pentru că viața sexuală dezordonată conduce la paternitate la vârste mici (între 14 și 19 ani). Ca deconstrucție de iluzii, textul are drept scop o sensibilizare a comunității prin recurgerea la valorile socio-culturale în vederea angajării responsabiliății tinerilor aflați în această situație. Acest lucru îi determină pe tineri să înceapă reconstrucția experienței trăite în vederea căutării autonomiei financiare plecând de la activități care sunt , în general, opusul planului inițial de carieră.

Cuvinte cheie: adolescent, construcții, deconstrucție, reconstrucție, ideal democratic, valori iluzorii, autonomie financiară

Abstract

How young peoples' stake environment shapes the experimentation of adolescent fatherhood so as to generate multiform mutations? Such is the main question at the origin of this text. From the analysis of construction phenomenon realities, deconstruction of illusions relating thereto and of reconstruction of a new father true-life in Côte d'Ivoire, it appears that the concern of integration and responsibility remains at the center of adolescent fatherhood experimentation. The construction of the phenomenon is articulated around the democratic ideal promoted by the mass media and school. It carries illusory insurance manifested by disordered sexual life and leading to the paternity at so young ages (between 14 and 19 years). Concerning the deconstruction of illusions, it presents itself as the manifestation of community awareness through the use of socio-cultural values to generate the parental responsibility of young people incriminated. This leads them to start a reconstruction of their true-life around the search of financial autonomy from activities which are generally the opposite of their original career plan.

Keywords: Adolescent fatherhood, Construction, Deconstruction, Reconstruction, democratic ideal, illusory insurance, sociocultural values, financial autonomy

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Résumé

Comment les enjeux de l'environnement des jeunes façonnent-ils l'expérimentation de la paternité adolescente au point d'engendrer des mutations multiformes ? Telle est la question à l'origine de ce texte. A partir de l'analyse des réalités de construction du phénomène, de déconstruction des illusions y afférant et de reconstruction du vécu de jeune père en Côte d'Ivoire, il ressort que le souci d'intégration et de responsabilité reste au cœur de l'expérimentation de la paternité adolescente. Pour ce que la construction du phénomène s'articule autour de l'idéal démocratique impulsé par les mass media et l'école, celle-ci est porteuse d'assurances illusoires qui se manifestent par une vie sexuelle désordonnée et aboutissant à la paternité à de si jeunes âges (entre 14 et 19 ans). Quant à la déconstruction des illusions, elle se présente comme la manifestation de la conscientisation communautaire à travers le recours aux valeurs socioculturelles pour engager la responsabilité parentale des jeunes incriminés. Cela amène ces derniers à entamer une reconstruction de leur vécu autour de la recherche d'une autonomie financière, à partir d'activités qui sont globalement à l'antipode de leur projet professionnel initial.

Mots clés: Paternité adolescente, Construction, Déconstruction, Reconstruction, Idéal démocratique, Assurances illusoires, Valeurs socioculturelles, Autonomie financière.

1. Introduction

In the framework of the reproductive health, the issue of adolescents' participation to fertility inevitably raises the issue of parental experience among them. This reality can be seen as the consequence of uncontrolled sexual life. It is transversal to three forms of education which are formal education provided by school, non-formal education made through specialized training and marginal education which shapes within households and communities (Gillis *et al*. 1998, pp. 259-262).

Like the motherhood of young girls which is the concern of a substantial literature due to supposed vulnerability of this target, it is necessary to investigate the experience of fatherhood among the young boys who are also vulnerable as young girls. Hence the present study places at the heart of our analysis the phenomenon of adolescent fatherhood and its implications on the lives of African youth, especially male youth of Côte d'Ivoire.

The concept of adolescent fatherhood is the fact that a young man becomes a father before 19 years old, that is to say, the age group from 14 to 19 years (Irié and Yapo, 2001, p. 116). This period is revealed for the adolescent as the period of "toutes les interrogations et incertitudes" (Rohart, 2001, p. 75) expressed by "all questions and uncertainties". Thus, the experience of adolescent fatherhood can affect the quality of the training of youth, undeniable human capital[1] (Schultz, 1961) and its ability of children education. It is the source of moral crisis due to environment created by the globalization.

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[1] This concept indicates the accentuation and improvement of all the human training methods to raise the productivity.

Therefore, the construction of lasting marital relations between two families seems abandoned by young peoples in favor of opportunistic relationships and other risks. At the first level of these abuses is the sexual behavior of young adolescents, the second level reveals the problem of family reunification for the child's education; it is followed by the management of parental authority and finally, comes the problem of financial autonomy regulation.

At the level of sexual behavior, everything starts with the context of development of young adolescents. Indeed, many of them as said Jacob *et al.* (1993, p. 142) "ont acquis leurs connaissances de façon plutôt informelle, à partir de discussions avec des amis ou de leurs experiences personnelles" translated by "have acquired sexual knowledge rather in an informal way, from discussions with friends or personal experiences". As far as of the general theory of modernization, the adoption of new sexual behavior by young peoples is explained by the influence of modernization which gradually undermines traditional values regarding sexuality (Kobelembi, 2005, p. 66).

Concerning the issues of family reunification, the instability young father causes the "leak" of this one as shown by Loignon in *Ca sexprime* (2005, p. 3) in these terms: "le jeune homme quittera souvent la mère de l'enfant pendant la grossesse ou dans les années qui suivent la naissance. Dans d'autres cas, le garçon doit faire face à l'hostilité de la famille de la jeune fille…". Which means that: "the young man will often leave the mother of the child during pregnancy or the years following the birth. In other cases, the boy must face the hostility of the girl's family…"

About the management of parental authority, it's almost denied to the adolescent father. In fact, since that authority falls to parents or guardians of young parents, they are especially likely to be absent fathers (Sara *et al*. 2001, p. 2).

Regarding the issue of financial autonomy, most young parents are short of funds, because of the lack of job regularly paid. Those who are engaged in an activity as small as are not always able to take care of themselves because premarital fatherhood is associated with lower earning (Nock, 1998, p. 257). Therefore, several types of behavior are observed among many young Africans. It is the development of sex with older women, financially affluent and able to reduce their expenses. Moreover, the perversity leads some young people to have sex with older men against a financial reward (Kobelembi 2005, p. 75). Other young people aware of their responsibility of father, engage themselves in income-earning activities that allow them to assume totally or just a part of the family expenses. These income-earning activities ensure them to invest themselves in new responsibilities without real means (*Ca sexprime*, 2005).

All this constitute important issues in the life of young people facing adolescent fatherhood. Hence the concern as follows: How environmental issues shape adolescent fatherhood experimentation so as to generate multiform mutations?

From this question, we propose to seek, in first, the relationship between the contemporary construction of sexual experiences of youth and the phenomenon of adolescent fatherhood in Côte d'Ivoire, and then to see how the experiment of adolescent fatherhood is involved in the deconstruction of this juvenile reality and finally understand the role of this phenomenon in the impulse of social reconstruction of the experiences of young Ivoirians parents.

The first specific objective consists in identifying the facts that establish the connection between the contemporary construction of juvenile sexual experience and the present phenomenon of adolescent fatherhood. The second objective aims at pointing out the illusions created by the phenomenon of adolescent fatherhood. The goal of the third objective is to understand the mechanisms of socio-economic repositioning of young fathers regarding their sensitization of the parental responsibility. The objectives listed above are rooted in a set of theoretical and methodological approaches that should be clarified.

1. Theoretical and methodological anchoring

1.1. Theoretical anchoring

The analytical deployment of this work is based on the theory called constructivism. It has been promoted by Peter and Luckmann (1966) who envisage the social reality and the social phenomena us constructed. Bourdieu (1987) has participated to it through the concept of materialist constructivism which uses the schema of perception, thought, action called "habitus" and the social structures called "groups and fields".

The using of the triptych Construction, Deconstruction, Reconstruction calls three realities. The first is the construction of youth sexual model which creates the phenomenon of adolescent parenthood. The second is the deconstruction traduced by the awareness of various illusions developed by young people in their teens namely and the need of responsibilities they have to assume. The third concerning reconstruction presents the changes, the new strategies of social integration and the participation to the community development by the adolescent fathers became young.

1.2. Methodology

As the methodological point of view, the target population is constituted by the young peoples aged from 15 to 30 who have experienced the paternity between 14 and 19 years. It is therefore a retrospective survey. The field of our study covers four districts in the city of Abidjan, the economic capital of Côte d'Ivoire, an important metropolis in Africa. The popular neighborhoods in question are

respectively the urban districts of Abobo, Adjamé, Kumasi and Yopougon. In Abobo, the study is interested in young parents living in separate houses with commons court-yard[2]. In Adjamé, it is focused on several young people with casual work at the bus station through trade ambulatory, driver helper and conveyor activities. In Kumasi and Yopougon there are young people living in areas developed by the Ivorian Company of Construction and Property Management (SICOGI) whose are the object of interest.

The sample size is 200 youth aged from 15 to 30 years with experience of fatherhood between 14 and 19 years for 50 per site. The target populations were stratified into groups of young attending school and those who are taken out of the school system are excluded from the study. The survey technique is the accidental approach. It is a non-probabilistic technique which involves pulling items available and present at each site at the time of the investigation until exhaustion of the sample set.

Furthermore, this study combines the quantitative approach with closed questions that allow getting statistics and qualitative approach in its phenomenological version. It lists the forms of socio-familial conflicts and alternatives adopted for the reconstruction of young fathers' experiences.

2. Foundations of the adolescents' fatherhood construction

The construction of the adolescent fatherhood phenomenon lies within the overall framework of modern construction of social. This relates according to Ramonet (2002, p. 146) to the global expansion of the Western urban model on the world context, on the mass media and education. It is therefore appropriate to examine the respective influences that result.

2.1. About the mass media in the construction of the phenomenon

The mass media are constituted by communication media such as television, radio, internet and mobile with their multifaceted applications. Because of globalization, they flood the African adolescents and especially those of Côte d'Ivoire with images deemed "repugnant" by the society. These channels, websites and magazines are accused rightly or wrongly being an apologist for justifying the premarital sexual activity. In the study sample, 91% of young fathers reported having experienced this interest in adolescence. Almost, for all of them, the mass media are the origin.

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[2] Houses with common court-yard are group of houses were the inhabitants have their own house but they share the toilette and the court-yard with the others of the court. In these area the houses are less cheaper

Similarly, these channels contribute to the reduction of traditional control through marginalization of Community institutions witch supervise youth sexuality. Obviously, most of the current generation of young people are unaware of their community's processes of sexual supervision or undervalue them when they are known. This proves to be the case for young people interviewed.

In the solicitation of their point of view on three institutions of the community integration in Côte d'Ivoire witch are "Poro[3]", "Fakuè[4]" and "Doubéhi[5]", these are not properly elucidated by speakers. Some of them talk about their lapsing while those who try to accept them, disguise their attributions. Clearly, the "Poro" and "Fakuè" are put in the same category as an introduction to mystical things while "doubéhi" is considered as the popularization element of sexuality between citizens of the same village. It is in this context with the rise of mass media, parents and children watch the same offer of television programs. Even when for reasons of modesty, parents try to avoid this posture by selecting programs or limiting access to television, adolescents watch these programs with friends where parental control is less strict.

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the mass media move adolescent away from their family and submit them to sexual exogenous models. This role seems to be the same for school as we attempt to demonstrate in the following section.

2.2. About the role of the school in the construction of the adolescent fatherhood phenomenon

Despite the numerous benefits of school, it takes children away from their family during the time of training.

Moreover, by teaching the democracy, freedom and the rights of children, the school gives to the adolescents or young, the opportunity to contest certain values and norms of their community.

In this work, many young fathers are no longer under the authority of their socialization group. 48 per cent of them pretend to take their independence. Because of freedom, many of young fathers rebelled against the authority of parents or elders during their adolescent age.

Even if school predisposes young people to defer the first sexuality, they need of freedom and the effects of mass media lead them toward haste. This is the case

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[3] Traditional institutions of the adult life integration by the Senufo people (people in the north of Côte d'Ivoire), where after his training, the young boy can try sexual experience with a girl in order to marry her.

[4] Traditional institutions of the adult life integration by the Ebrié people. They use to call it "generation festivity". It is most of the time practice by lagoon people in Côte d'Ivoire. It achievement allows the young boy to found a family and at the time take social responsibilities.

[5] Liberal institution of the Bété people in the centre- west of Côte d'Ivoire. It allows young boys and girls to simulate voluntarily with the parent's control, a couple relations without sexuality because of the consanguinity.

of young fathers under study. Clearly, this freedom submits them to precocious fatherhood and disrupts households regularly constituted.

In many cases, the acquired freedom by the young people creates a lack of communication. In fact, 78 per cent of adolescent fathers reported that their parents were unaware of their sexual lives. But, 22 per cent whose parents were aware of the sexual experience say they have not received adequate family care. Similarly, 82.1per cent of the samples turn towards people outside the family, particularly friends.

Finally, this freedom of adolescents' goes with attitudes of distrust prevention messages[6]. Those issued against unwanted pregnancies, Sexual Transmissible Disease (STD) and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) are trampled by adolescent who have rather the desire to develop the qualities of seducers. When asked them about the knowledge of the problems concerning unwanted pregnancies, STD and HIV/AIDS, the answer of the young fathers is positive. They asserted to know the means of prevention before the experience of fatherhood. Indeed, less than 10 per cent of young people claimed to have been in the habit of using condoms during adolescence. Approximately, 80 per cent claimed not to care about. Their reason lies in the refusal of girls (19%) or in that of boys (35%). In most cases, the refusal is mutual (51%), while for only five per cent of the sample, the wrong use of contraceptive is the result of pregnancy, suspicious of adolescent fatherhood.

Consequently, the social world of adolescents, built around the influence of mass media and schooling turns into a fanciful society. But this dream is overshadowed by the reactions of referrals from the family, by stopping school fees and sometimes denial of the parents by discovering the paternity of the adolescent. This ambivalent situation provokes the problem of deconstruction. It seems to be rooted in the use of socio-cultural constraints.

3. Socio-cultural constraints as a source of deconstructing illusions related to the experience of adolescent fatherhood

Deconstruction mechanisms adopted by young people spring into two realities. One relates to the illusions of the experience of being father and the other focuses on the illusions of life experience as a couple.

3.1. About the constraints related to the experience of being a father

The experience of fatherhood among young adolescents necessarily involves two traditional obligations. One is characterized by the permanent presence of the

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[6] In Côte d'Ivoire the prevention messages against unwanted pregnancies, STD, and HIV/AIDS are convey on TV, radio, at school and in health structures towards the behavior changing communication meetings.

father in order to inculcate the social, cultural and religious values in them. The other is expressed by the financial autonomy of the father for the schooling of the child and its various treatments. It is the reason why in each Ivorian community, the young deemed to be married, received a cultivable ground and a space to build his house. These two offers are the proof of their social freedom.

In the modernist social construction, the young people are disillusioned by the realities of their rights when they became fathers. On the one hand, the requirement of permanent presence close to the child for his education is not done. Indeed, the care of children returned either to the youth's family or to the mothers'. Therefore, the education of 37 per cent among the young schooling at the time of the survey is provided by the parents of the mother, while in 31per cent it is realized by the parents of the young father. There is only 22 per cent of the sample who became students. They claim to be responsible for their child's education and considered the grandparents as mere guardians of their offspring.

On the other hand, young fathers are mostly in financial dependency. In fact, the parents (fathers, uncles, aunts, etc.) assure the need of the young boys and those of the newborn. This situation is not without impacts the schooling of young fathers. So, 20 per cent of the sample left school in benefit of the child. In the case of 21per cent, parents assure the education of the young father and his child. Other constraints are related to the experience of couple life. These constraints are evoked by the following part.

3.2. About the constraints related to the experience of living in couple

After the precocious pregnancy, negotiations between concerned families lead to the girls' transfer boy's house. 30 per cent of young fathers interviewed are concerned by this situation which makes them live different experiences. For some of them, this moving of the girl turns into a marital status. It causes the procedures for the payment of the dowry and the wedding planning[7]. For some others, the moving of the young girl lasts just the time of the child feeding. Concerning the young father students, only ten per cent having a scholarship, live with the child and his mother. However, 20 per cent, have done the same thing with they own activities. For the secondary school boys whose partners are pupil, 48 per cent show the time table as obstacle of marital responsibility. Consequently, the requirements of the mother girls' parents create in the family of the young men a conflicting atmosphere. Evidently, there are accused to modify the configuration of their families. These complaints are the following: the increasing of the family budget, the unexpected expansion of the household, and its' transformation in bi generational family.

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[7] This is concerned with the customary weeding. It is organized in order to remedy the dishonor inflict of the families involved in the problem of the pregnancy and to reinstate the youngs in the normal community life

The main decision created but this recrimination is the abandonment of the school fees. This is the case of most of non-biological children which represent 13 per cent of the sample. For young boys living with their begetter parents, many of them are forbidden to exert any kind of authority on the young mother girl. This attitude is not necessarily symptomatic of the desire to punish the young boy. But it reflects according to the explanation of the young boys themselves, the will to preserve the integrity of the young mother and to ensure an efficient growth of their grandchild. This is the proof of illusions' deconstruction concerning the married life as experienced by young people before being father.

In the long time, in front of the lack of financial resources, the inability to have control over their own children and the fact of constitute with them a burden for the family, The young peoples who are trying to assume their responsibilities, begin a process of awareness materialized by the reconstruction of their social universe. This process will be cleared up in the following development.

4. Strategic reconstruction of the adolescent fathers' real-life

This reconstruction is on two points. The first one is the forfeiture lived of young parents and the second is the strategies used by them to go back up.

4.1. About forfeiture as a catalyst for the reconstruction of adolescent fatherhood's experience

Before the situation of fatherhood, the adolescent and thanks to different conventions[8] clamed, the right for schooling, food, pocket money, spare time and freedom in the choice of their friends (ONU, 1993). These make the parents in a situation of powerless against them.

In this research, 69.1 per cent of the sample cumulated during adolescence the five types of right, 97 per cent have accumulated at least three types, and the whole sample had at least the right to have pocket money. It appears that the adolescents concerned by this phenomenon benefited in their majority of a kindness of their parents. However, during the adolescent fatherhood, the rights are systematically replaced by the duties. In this regard, one of the respondents argued: "For a long time, I used my pocket money to satisfy the needs of my girlfriend who is now the mother of my child". This talk corroborates the idea that the adolescent is in the imbroglio of paternity for fear that his girlfriend becomes the mistress of older and wealthier man (Irié and Yapo, 2001).

The supposed rights acquired by the young boys will show their limits as soon as the appearance of the pregnancy and the acceptance of the expenses which are

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[8] It's the convention of UNO concerning the right of children, published in Geneva in june 1993.

related to it. Some testimonies testify this confusion. One of the interlocutors asserts this: "To punish me, my father decided not to give me pocket money. For that reason, I fled the pregnancy of my child. I even refused it at the beginning fearing not to be able assume. I was ashamed of my father's eyes and I was thinking about how to assume my responsibilities".

Another person testifies that: "My parents have not dismissed me. They accepted to lodge my girlfriend after delivery; but I was ashamed to live with her and the child in the same house with my parents. It was like I married her while it was not the case. I was obliged to assume".

A third respondent reveals: "all the time, my uncle threats me. He says that I must now behave as father because I am no longer a child".

The testimonies above-mentioned shows that the role of father is seen through the taking of responsibilities and according to Quéniart (2004, p. 15), leads to resign himself to not having his youth life but develop a real attachment for a home-living life. Aware of this fact, the young peoples try by many ways to accomplish their obligation through initiations which seem to be dangerous.

4.2. About strategic initiatives of the fatherhood life's reconstruction

The initiatives of young fathers are based on logic of risk-taking. It can be explained by the concern for these young people to earn money so as to pay the expenses of the child, his mother and become independent towards the parents. They feel motivate to take responsibilities towards their families and themselves (Devault, 2005, p. 62). While some activities they adopt are conventionally admitted, the others skim the defiance of the norms accepted in society. It happens in the areas of trade, culture and politics.

Concerning the trading area, 42 percent of the sample works inner. They do activities such as the management of cellular phones boxes at the streets side and the photo and video reporting and the management of cyber café. If at first sight these activities appear to be correct, many young boys who take part in them are swindling via internet. While, others use the casting pretext to swindle some people seeking celebrity through cinema. To avoid saying it openly, young boys use expressions such as "look someone self", "make gumbo", "enter the bush" or "browse". Those expressions are respectively in French "se chercher", "faire du gombo", "entrer en brousse" and "brouter". Those subversive activities bring them more money.

Regarding culture, 31 per cent of the sample is concerned with singing and dancing activities without any training and experience. They participate to the creation of new musical rhythms that convey new habits and patterns. This is the case of rhythm like "coupé décalé". Through this rhythm, some singers magnify and others denounce the fraud and the megalomania of young boy called, "Vendeur d'Illusion" meaning "Sellers of Illusions". Among the disks jokers (DJ) who

promote this rhythm rate, there are several young fathers. They find themselves confronted with unlawful activities such as dealer or the procuring.

In the field of politics, the wind of democracy that swept Africa in the early 1990s touched also young fathers. 27 per cent of them have found refuge in that area and try to assume themselves thanks to politics. They developed clear strategies. In fact, they claim to serve the political parties and political leaders at different levels of responsibility. They earn their money in the commissions that they receive after performing tasks that the politicians entrusted to them. Some claim to be intermediaries between their leader (Deputy, Mayor, important politician, etc.) and the population by planning appointments.

For some others, they participate in securing the meeting of their movement through recognition of the organizers. In short term, this recognition is expressed by obtaining banknotes. In the medium and long term, these young peoples are integrated into a perpetuate activity. These are the entrance to the public office, the police, the gendarmerie and the army from a sponsorship. The politico-military crisis which Côte d'Ivoire is trying to get out has exacerbated this kind of behavior among many youngs. So that, those enrolled in armed band claim to be integrated in military and paramilitary troops.

Moreover, recruitment networks based on militancy and of recognition of the risk taken by the young people are increased. Some young peoples in Côte d'Ivoire have been propelled officers, soldiers of rank in the army at the thanks to the war. This situation gives a rise the corruption. These are the drifts linked to the responsibility interpellation of father at the age of adolescence.

5. Conclusion

At the end of this argumentation, it appears that, the use of democracy offers to African adolescents and particularly those of Côte d'Ivoire, is not always profitable neither to them, to their parents, and nor to the society.

In the understanding of the adolescent fatherhood, it gives us to see that in Côte d'Ivoire, this phenomenon rages. Specifically, it is more common among young people receiving substantial assistance of parents, unlike their Western counterparts.

Concerning the latters, Sara *et al* (2001) reveals that this phenomenon is more prevalent in poor communities living in difficult conditions especially in United States. The attitudes leading Ivorian youth to the phenomenon are encouraged by the mass media and schools. This concerns also youth of others African countries as said Gueye *et al* (2000) cited by Kobelembi (2005, p. 70) "increasing modernization and media exposure, along with a decline in the authority of parents and elders, have undermined the societal and cultural rules that formerly controlled and informed adolescents sexuality".

Besides, unanimity is done around the mistrust attitude of adolescents about prudence messages in the fight against unwanted pregnancies, STDs and HIV / AIDS. In this context, Loignon 1996; Duffort and St. Laurent, 2000; Cromer et al, 1997 cited by *Ca sexprime* (2005) evoke resistance to contraception. Their early fatherhood comes also from precocious sexual activity Sara *et al* (2001).

As a result, parents continue to take care of the adolescent father, his child and as well as the child's mother. This is in accordance with the situation in developed countries. Indeed, grandparents are involved in the education of young children with no income or low income (Gee & Rhodes, 2003, p. 381).

Moreover, in the consideration of the awareness concerning the responsibility of father, the young peoples go into more or less risky activities (Duncun, 2005). This responsibility taken is understood as the obligation of a person to answer for his actions because of the role, the responsibilities that he has to assume and bear the consequences (Quéniart, 2004).

To protect the family, the adolescent father and his child, it should be taken prevention initiatives upstream and downstream, acting by protecting each target. Prevention initiative will consist for social services to sensitize households on strategies to face up to the puberty of their children. It will also consist in helping them to discover their sexuality. For the pupils and students schools have to develop   health clubs in which young boys and girls will be able to discuss on the factors of interrupting of studies and develop by themselves control strategies against these factors.

Concerning the initiative of protection, it is important to consider a strategic promotion of non-formal education alongside the official form. This could help to train young fathers in business management they undertake. This order of education could be articulated on the one hand, around functional literacy for the illiterate and the other hand, around training in entrepreneurship strategies, in simplified accountancy and budget management to all these contractors.

Such a program required a synergetic action by governmental structures, development aid agencies and non-governmental organizations. This is to ensure the stability of adolescent fathers and their children's education in an atmosphere of trust with the presence of the mother. Through such a strategy, we can avoid the problems of governance which posed the hope of facilitating access to public service for those who followed the political road.

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THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

Ioan MITREA *

Rezumat

Acest articol reprezintă o sinteză a etapelor prin care a trecut de-a lungul timpului îmbunătățirea continuă a resurselor umane pentru apărare națională. Îmbunătățirea resurselor umane a apărării națională reprezintă unul dintre obiectivele strategice de securitate națională. Subsumate în activitățile militare de management al resurselor umane este de o importanță deosebită datorită schimbărilor permanente din societate, la care se adaugă reorganizări / redimensionarea structurilor militare existente.

Etapele de management al resurselor umane au fost în mod constant îmbogățit în producerea de modificări ale locului, rolul și contribuția de funcții de personal din cadrul organizației militare. Optimizarea resurselor umane pentru apărare națională este obligată de realitate existentă în prezent. Această transformare era impetuos necesară deoarece rolul armatelor moderne din Europa, din care armata română dorea să facă parte, se schimbase axându-se pe gestionarea crizelor, prevenirea conflictelor și controlul proceselor de stabilitate.

Cuvinte cheie: managementul resurselor umane, apărare națională, organizație militară, motivație

Abstract

This article is a summary of steps that went over time of continuously improving human resources for national defense. Improving human resource national defense is one of the strategic objectives. Subsumed in the military activities of human resource management is of particular importance due to permanent changes in society, to which we add re-organisations/resizing existing military structures.

Stages of human resource management were consistently enriched in producing modifications of the place, role and contribution of staff functions within the military organization. Optimization of human resources for national defense is required by currently existing reality. This transformation was necessary because of the role of modern armies in Europe, which the Romanian army wanted to be part of, had changed focusing on crisis management, conflict prevention and stability process control.

Keywords: human resource management, national defense, military organization, motivation

Résumé

Cet article est un résumé des étapes qui allaient dans le temps de l'amélioration continue des ressources humaines pour la défense nationale. Amélioration des ressources humaines de la défense nationale est l'un des objectifs stratégiques. Englobée dans les activités militaires de la gestion des ressources humaines est d'une importance particulière en raison

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des changements permanents dans la société, à laquelle nous ajoutons les réorganisations / redimensionnement des structures militaires existantes.

Étapes de la gestion des ressources humaines ont été constamment enrichies en produire des modifications de la place, le rôle et la contribution des fonctions du personnel au sein de l'organisation militaire. Optimisation des ressources humaines pour la défense nationale est tenue par moment la réalité existante. Cette transformation était nécessaire en raison du rôle des armées modernes en Europe, où l'armée roumaine voulait faire partie de, a changé en se concentrant sur la gestion des crises, la prévention des conflits et le contrôle des processus de stabilité.

Mots clés: gestion des ressources humaines, de la défense nationale, de l'organisation militaire, la motivation

1. Introduction

Before 1989, as in most European countries, our country's Army consisted of a mass army, based on conscription/recruitment and mainly equipped with heavy combat equipment, an army specific to the Cold War period, when there was still the fear of a possible major conflict in Europe. Immediately after the end of this period was started the military reform, reform related to complex principles of modern combat and available resources. As a subsystem of Romanian society, the Army has evolved with it, maintaining its primary aim to "guarantee the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, territorial integrity and constitutional democracy" (*Romanian Constitution,* 2003, Article 118, paragraph 1).

The military transformation process signifies changes both in terms of doctrine, organization and structure of forces, capabilities, and at the military intelligence, training and education, human resources management, budgeting procurement and program level. The legislative framework for the organization and functioning of the military system, which regulates its role in society, was largely revised and adapted to new environmental area, regional and global security conditions.

2. From classical army to modern army. Romanian army reform stages

Military organization is one of the Romanian society's pillars, and once with the fall of communist regime in December '89, the Romanian state began a complex transformation process which inevitably involved also the armed forces. This transformation was necessary because of the role of modern armies in Europe, which the Romanian army wanted to be part of, had changed focusing on crisis management, conflict prevention and stability process control.

In one of his articles, Lieutenant General Constantin Degeratu, Chief of the Defence Staff of Romania sustained that "the Romanian Armed Forces have begun a significant process of reform since January 1990. This restructuring process went through three stages during 1990-1999, as follows:

- *First Stage (1990-1994)* - aiming to start a first change of the structure, eliminate political control by the communist party and develop a new legislative framework for defence" (Degeratu, 1999, p. 53).

During this stage it appeared: Army Staff, Aviation and Air Defence Staff, Navy Staff, following a major restructuring of the Ministry of National Defence. Army was transformed into a modern structure, based on military, army corps, brigades, battalions (battalions).

- "*Second Stage (1994-1996)* - characterised by: completion or the structural reform; organisation of the Armed Forces on battalions, brigades and army corps; beginning of a process for achieving interoperability with NATO forces, based on the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme (Planning process and review PfP - PARP 1); reform of the military education system and completion of the process of organising those battalions assigned to peacekeeping missions" (Degeratu, 1999, p. 53).

During the second reform stage in 1995, was approved the Law no. 80 – Military Staff Status, which defines the status of the military staff, as being "Romanian citizens to which was granted the rank of officer, warrant officer or non-commissioned officer, in relation to their military and professional training, as provided by law. Military personnel are serving the nation" (*Law no. 80 - The military* 1995, chapter I, article 1, paragraph 1).

- "*Third Stage (1997-1999)* - characterised by: reorganisation of the command and staffs in a modular way, compatible to NATO structures; development of a new personnel strategy; reconsideration of officers' professional career; implementation of the interoperability objectives assumed within PfP/PARP 11; starting the process of creating the Rapid Reaction Force, and so on" (Degeratu, 1999: 53).

Also, in order to align with performance standards of modern armies, was acquired in 1998 a new vision of human resources in the Romanian army. It took over from the West the "pyramid model of the positions structure and trained military personnel (such as to reach, in 2003, the ideal proportion of one officer to three non-commissioned officers), beginning the rehabilitation of the non-commissioned officers status and turn it into the army's «backbone»; for laid off staff, left without jobs, were provided retraining measures" (*Curierul Naţional,* 2002, Anul 7, nr. 3579).

The first three stages of Romanian army reform were continued during 2000 - 2010 by two additional stages, as follows:

- *Fourth Stage (2000-2006)* - characterized by Romania's efforts to join NATO. This stage has two major components: restructuring the armed forces in order to ensure credible defensive capabilities and modernization through acquisition of new technologies to increase operational capacity of forces. In 2002 appears the first rapid reaction brigade in Dej county. On March 29, 2004 Romania is accepted as a full member of the North Atlantic Alliance.

- *Fifth Stage (2007-2010)* - characterized by creating the legal framework to regulate the activity of professional military officers, Law no. 384/2006 on the Status of soldiers and graded volunteers stating that they "constitute a distinct body of military personnel, recruited on a voluntary basis and situated at the base of military hierarchy" (*Law no. 384 - Volunteer soldiers and graduation status* 2006, chapter I, article 1, paragraph 1).

Of the official data is shown that at the beginning of reform, in 1990, the Romanian Army recorded a total of 320.000 people (military and civilian). Their number declined during the reform process, as follows: 1999 to 180.000; 2003 to 140.000, 2007 to 90.000, 2010 to 73.350 active troops *(The Military Balance* 2010, pp. 157-158)*, thus reaching the proposed targets in the early reform regarding the army's personnel by 2010.

3. Romanian army human resources. Past and present

Creating a professional small sized army, able to effectively serve the interests of military security of the country and participate in general European and trans-European efforts to strengthen security and peace on the continent, represents the main objective of the Romanian army's restructuring. With the restructuring of the Romanian army was given emphasis on the reorganization of military education, as "officers military schools turned into military higher education institutions and were the Military Medical Institute and the Faculty of Military Sports were created. The General Military Academy became the Academy of Military Studies and technical section became the Military Technical Academy. "Mircea cel Batran" Institute of Marine became the "Mircea cel Batran" Naval Academy, and since 1992 began operating the National Defence College" (*Curierul Național,* 2002, Anul 7, nr. 3579). All these institutions are the basis of human resources reform, through the contribution they make in training and continuous improvement of the military personnel.

Following experiences in peacekeeping missions related to human resource management, the theory implemented by modern armies led to the idea of the professionalism of the Romanian army. Maintaining a high level of profes-sionalism of the army should be linked to an appropriate performance management, being defined as "a strategic and integrated approach to ensure lasting success in organizations activity, by improving the performance of people working within and by developing teams and individual participants capabilities" (Armstrong and Baron 2003, pp. 28-39).

Addressing the idea of professionalism leads to identifying a national strategic objective, which "represents the creation of a personnel performance management system in line with the needs of restructuring and operational process of the armed structures, in order to ensure full interoperability in this field with the armies of NATO and the EU" (*Romanian Ministry of National Defence Strategic Plan 2010-2013,* 2009, p. 14). Human resource management requirements regarding selection

require that young people embracing a military career be characterized by the will, determination, competitiveness, effective and emotional commitment, intellectual curiosity and desire for teamwork.

Military profession is associated with a thorough training and acquiring skills, responsibilities and experiences associated with specific hierarchical positions of the military profession, since granting the first rank and employment in first job position. In the modernization process of military career management system, adopted programs aimed all human resource management components of the defence, namely:

- − *Defining position* - was adopted the structuring model of pyramidal military ranks.
- − *Personnel recruitment and selection* - building a system compatible with that of NATO armies (consisting of 41 information-recruitment offices and 3 regional centres for selection and orientation).
- − *Training and career development* - the existence of a Military career guide and the selection commissions (ensure transparency, equal opportunities and fairness in promoting/accession personnel in positions and/or continuing education courses).
- − *Evaluation and motivation for the military profession* - existence of an evaluation grid in accordance with NATO standards.

For the period 2011 - 2015 was approved by the Minister of National Defence the *Strategy to promote the military profession*. It supports "recruitment goals and assumes that the full professionalism of the army requires repositioning military profession on professional and labour offer market, boosting young people's interest for the military career and the prestige of the soldier/voluntary sergeant profession" (http://dmru.mapn.ro/index.php?pag=acte).

4. Impact of economic factor on Romanian army human resources

In most developed countries, annual financial resources allocated to the army are directly proportional to the size of the state's GDP. Romania can not make an exception to this rule, therefore "planning and programming funds for defence is achieved in accordance with the general objectives of the Ministry of National Defence and with the priorities defined based on the provisions of National Defence Strategy, defence policy guidelines set by the Government programme and in accordance with NATO's Strategic Concept and NATO Ministerial Directive, financing based on programs representing the basis for planning, programming and budgeting process" (*Romanian Ministry of National Defence Strategic Plan 2010-2013*, 2009, p. 8).

Depending on the funds allocated to an army, it may fulfil all or part of the proposed tasks. By providing an army with modern technical equipment, leads to increase operability and responsiveness. Worldwide military spending has increased exponentially as was showed in the chart below:

Figure no 1: The evolution of global military expenditure
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military expenditure by region in constant US dollars *apud. Băhnăreanu,* Influenţa, *41.*

This increase in funds allocated to the army is due to gradual increase of global GDP, which has doubled within 12 years. In 1996 the GDP value was 30.336 billion dollars and in 2008 reached 60.690 billion dollars.


Figure no 2: Evolution of world GDP
Source: IMF*, World Economic Outlook Database*, apud. Băhnăreanu, *Influenţa*, 40.

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As it can also be found in the book of Mr. Băhnareanu "for the allocation and distribution process of defence resources should be taken into account the following requirements: to be provided within the proper time, to be provided in sufficient quantity and required quality, to be useful, i.e. to meet military needs, to be complementary, that is coordinated with NATO and EU requirements, to be sustainable, i.e. to support military efforts for a long period" (Băhnareanu, 2009, p. 21).

As found in the Ministry of National Defence Strategic Plan 2010-2013 for the period 2006-2009, Romania has failed to meet its obligations under the Accession Treaty to the North Atlantic Alliance, namely to allocate a minimum of 2% of GDP to the army. Within the new budget planning for the period 2010-2012, the Government wants to accelerate the modernization process of the army to fulfil the commitments by allocating a minimum of 2% of the GDP. This forecast is found in the figure below:


Figure no 3: Forecast of resource allocation for defence in Romania for 2010-2012
Source: *Ministry of National Defence Strategic Plan 2010-2013, 12.*

5. Conclusions

Army is constantly changing and this requires a development of human resource management through its transformation into a strategic and coherent field, destined to face challenges and external influences. The success of the military organization and the importance of specialists training in this field are given by the human

resources policies strategy closely linked with the funds allocated for research and development of new technologies and programs.

Systemic approach of human resources issues in the army led to solving personnel problems from a much wider perspective, taking into account as many aspects as possible, including performance management, organizational culture and organizational behaviour. In modern conditions of the transition from an army of recruits to an army of volunteers and professionals, the emphasis is on prior training of the soldier, knowledge, skills, and also the principles already established.

The result of all stages of reform stands in the Romanian army involvement in all international keeping/peace enforcement missions under UN or NATO. Military reform can not stop at this level, requiring continuous adjustment to current and future requirements.

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BOOK REVIEW

ELECTORAL SOCIOLOGY. ELECTIONS, VOTERS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

by Romeo Asiminei, *Sociologie electorală. Alegeri, Alegători şi comportamente de vot*.
Editura Universităţii „Alexandru Ioan Cuza", Iaşi, 2013

Adrian LUPU

The *Electoral Sociology. Elections, Voters and Voting Behavior* written by Romeo Asiminei (2013) deconstructs the electoral mechanism in an attempt to provide an answer to the fundamental question of electoral sociology: *How voters decide who to vote for?* The analysis of the voting electoral mechanism is performed under three different dimensions which cannot exist separately: elections, voters and the voting behavior. In order to provide a conclusive answer to the question how voters decide who to vote for the book focused on the electoral events in post-communist Romania (1990-2009).

The author argues that for most voters the political parties and the political ideology are some kind of abstract terms, treated, mostly with disinterest. However, the vote is truly a "total social fact" and involves selecting a solution with impact on all social systems and subsystems. The literature proposes several models that make the electoral mechanisms explicit, models combined into three categories: sociological models, psycho-sociological and models and economic models. In this book the author is proposing a new model that has both an explanatory function as well as a function of orientation for the electoral research (election predictions): *the integrative model*. Summarizing, the model assumes a rational vote based on a series of signification and redefinitions of the three images (the candidate identity, the image communicated by the candidate and the candidate's perceived image) and an ideal portrait (for the candidate who will hold the position for which the electoral process is conducted). Finally, the voter tests the candidates' perceived images against a reference ideal portrait.

In addition the book examines a number of constitutive elements of the electoral process: the sources of the political participation (interpreted in a constructivist view), electoral systems and their impact on the electoral situation and the relationship between socio-economic and political context on the electoral behavior by analyzing the first six election cycles in post-communist Romania.

The book is structured in for parts: I. Political participation, II. Voting models and voting behavior prediction, III. Electoral Systems and IV. Elections and electoral behavior in post-communist Romania.

In order to answer to the fundamental question the book first analyzes the phenomenon even lead actor: the voter. Thus, the author tried to identify the levers of political participation. The answer to this question was structured based on a

constructivist approach: introspection - objectification - exteriorization. The data shows, unsurprisingly if we refer to the other research available, relatively low political culture (poor knowledge of the political phenomenon but also a pronounced disinterest to everything involving this phenomenon). Therefore, such a level of political culture will generate political socialization while impaired and is caused by poor political socialization materialized in very low levels of all forms of political participation (from simple information measure, to participate in election meetings and engagement in support of a candidate). Under these conditions the results of the case study on voting are not unexpected: a negative trend in Romania reported turnout in the first elections in post-communist period. The data analyzed show a differentiation turnout by type of election. In Romania, the most important are presidential elections (recording the highest rates of participation), second place the local elections and the parliamentary elections in third place. In the European context turnout rates in Romania are among the lowest in the European Union. From the methodological point of view requires the use of methods for estimating turnout, the more efficient the experiment in an investigation, and analysis of official presence at voting history.

Voting takes place in the framework described by the electoral system. It is difficult, in fact impossible, to say which is the best electoral system. Choosing a particular type of electoral system, whether we refer to majority, proportional or mixed models and based on the evolution of democracy currently are being used different approaches from mass democracy to individualistic and consumerist models worldwide. Essentially all electoral systems whether referring to the majority or to the proportion in mixed or other electoral systems generate disproportionate results tend to reduce the effective number of parties and can produce a parliamentary majority. The case study in third part analyzes the impact of new mixed proportional voting system uninominal district implemented for the first time in the 2008 Romanian parliamentary elections. One of the conclusions is that although numerically the composition of Parliament 2008-2012 was renewed, the system was unable to generate a real change in the political decision-making power. Targeted process of renewing the political class has not led eventually to significant changes in parliamentary structures. Furthermore, although the system adopted showed the lowest degree of systemic disproportionality (understood as the ratio of the actual percentage of votes and percentage of seats won) the result was the creation of a manufactured majority and an artificial minority ("artificial minority" is a concept that author is proposing to develop the Lijphart's theory).

Moreover, electoral competition takes place in a specific political and economic context. For a comprehensive analysis of these influences is essential to consider that an entire election cycle assessment and not just election time. In the forth part of the book the author proposes an analysis using a grid for each election cycle: analysis of social and economic context (social indicators, demographic, economic, significant events), analysis of political context (evolution of political life),

campaigning (themes, strategies) and the result. The case study in the last part of the book sought to identify whether socio-economic indicator and in what sense is associated with position indicator when the election winning party on political axis, with a retrospective voting model. Data analysis shows that there is little association between economic performance and political party ruling party's position that wins elections, concluding that economic factors are rather a constitutive element of election image building, rather than a decisive element in the functioning electoral mechanism.

Given these issues and analyzing the main patterns of voting the author proposed a new model, the integrative model, explaining in a more comprehensive manner the Romanian electoral mechanism. Integrative model is based on the evaluation of candidate image in relation to the ideal portrait of position's occupant for which elections are being held. The model is based on two premises: (1) vote is a rational process based on a set of actions redefinitions and (2) the vote is a personalized voter scheme by way of simplification of the political scene; there is little place for abstract concepts and ideology. Essentially integrative model analyzes the relationship between the three images (the candidate identity, the image communicated by the candidate and the candidate's perceived image) and an ideal portrait. Following a process of successive redefinition the voters are drawing a series of images of candidates (candidate's perceived image). The evaluation process consists of superimposing these images over an ideal portrait of occupant target position of those choices. Vote is given to those candidates whose images are in a great proportion superimposed over the ideal portrait. Integrative model proposed both a function of explanatory mechanism and, as well, a function of orientation of sociological research, defining a set of indicators and variables associated with each field delimited by the candidate's images and ideal portrait.

Romeo Asiminei is senior lecturer at "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi, Faculty of Philosophy and Social-Political Sciences, Department of Sociology and Social Work and his work is focused on political sociology, electoral sociology and public opinion. The book is edited by the prestigious "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi Publiching House and was awarded by Romanian Ministry of National Education

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