

# RISKS AND THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

## FROM SMALL STATES' PERSPECTIVE

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**Rezumat:** În fundamentarea constatărilor din cadrul articolului dat considerăm importantă abordarea analitică și conceptuală a noțiunilor de securitate, risc și amenințare care, în ultimă instanță, ne permite să evidențiem modul în care securitatea se învață, se gândește și se practică. Analizând din punct de vedere gradual, ne oprim și asupra evaluării vulnerabilităților căci acestea diminuează capacitatea de reacție a țării respective la riscurile existente sau potențiale. În acest context, atragem atenția asupra principalelor vulnerabilități interne ale Republicii Moldova care, în condițiile actuale, sporesc enorm rolul factorilor externi, reprezentând o forță ce condiționează politicile de securitate. De fapt, aici este vorba de perspectiva statelor mici cu un potențial slab de asigurare a securității naționale. Însă indiferent de situațiile prefigurate în cadrul acestui articol, atunci când vorbim de securitatea statelor mici și slabe, este cert că la etapa actuală se mențin la un nivel înalt riscurile și pericolele de natură internă, care le potențiază alarmant pe cele externe, precum este, de exemplu, criza economică globală.

**Cuvinte cheie:** securitate, vulnerabilitate, risc, amenințare, state mici, geopolitică, criza financiară.

**Abstract:** To ground the findings set forth in the given article, it is important to use an analytical and conceptual approach to security, risk, and threatening notions, which allow us pointing out the way in which security is to be learned, thought, and practiced. Analyzing from gradual point of view, attention should be paid to assessment of vulnerabilities, as they diminish the reaction capacity of the respective country to the existing or potential risks. In this context, the main internal vulnerabilities of the Republic of Moldova should be mentioned, which in current circumstances increase the role of external factors, representing the force which conditions security policies. Actually, we talk here about the perspective of the small states with a weak potential to ensure their national security. Regardless of the situations mentioned in the respective article, whenever we talk about the security of small and weak states, it goes without saying that currently the internal risks and dangers register a very high level, thus potentiating the external ones, such as the global economic crisis.

**Keywords:** security, vulnerability, risk, threst, small states, geopolitical, financial crisis.

**Résumé:** Tenant compte des conclusions du contenu de l'article, on considère assez important d'utiliser l'approche analytique et conceptuelle des notions „sécurité”, „risque” et „menace”, dont finalement nous permettent de mettre l'accent sur la modalité dans laquelle la sécurité s'apprend, se conceptualise et se pratique. Si on analyse du point de vue graduel, on s'arrête sur l'évaluation de la vulnérabilité, car cela deminue la capacité de la réactions du pays donné aux

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risques existants ou potentiels. Dans cette optique d'idée, on met en évidence les principales vulnérabilités internes de la République de Moldova, qui, dans les conditions actuelles, catalisent énormément le rôle des facteurs externes, ce qui représentent une force, favorisant les politiques de la sécurité. En effet, il s'agit de la perspective de petits états du tiers-monde à une assurance de la sécurité nationale. Mais, malgré à toutes les situations envisagées dans cet article, au moment où l'on parle de la sécurité de petits états, et moins développés, il est certain, qu'à présent, les risques et les dangers internes se maintiennent à un haut niveau, et qui catalisent aux étrangers, surtout quand il s'agit de la crise économique globale.

**Mots-clés:** sécurité, vulnérabilité, risque, menace, les petits états, géopolitique, la crise financière.

After becoming an independent state, the Republic of Moldova had to face a number of challenges induced for the national security and to overcome a range of risk factors groups. We are talking here about the threat for establishment and revival of imperial nature structures and positioning of the country outside the universal systems of collaboration and security. The existence of a regional environment which was not fully favorable for the Republic of Moldova was also generating problems, as it was marked by a zone of political instability and depressed economic circumstances. As a result, the Republic of Moldova was and still is located within the Russian Federation's interest space. Secondly, there still persisted the threat for maintaining and reactivating the ethno-separatists threats that could generate conflicts, meaning the conflict from the left side of the River Nistru. And thirdly, social internal pressures emerged due to the difficulties induced by the transition to the market economy. As compared to other states, Moldova's transition to the market economy was a rather long period characterized by crises and instability. As a result, the economic discrepancies between the Republic of Moldova and the countries of the Central Europe and CIS got deeper. We can also mention the mentality and the habits inherited from the soviet times.

Additionally, the Republic of Moldova, just as other countries from the Eastern Europe is far from overcoming the world economic crisis in all its dimensions. The financial crisis and the economic recessions, which became more obvious in the majority of the world states, represents the result of assuming and promoting, consciously or unconsciously, some deficient management policies and practices which generate risks for national security.

To fundament these findings, it is important to tackle the analytical and conceptual approach to such notions as security, risk and threat – this would allow us pointing out the way in which security is learned, thought, and practiced. At the same time, when referring to the attitudes, rules, and practices in the national security area, we can talk about establishing a certain culture in the respective area. In general, *security culture* represents an amount of values, norms, attitudes or actions which determine the understanding and assimilation of the security and other derivatives

concept (national security, international security, collective security, insecurity, security policy), contributing to setting up the democratic culture.

Thus, over the last years, three factors have changed substantially the analysis and practice of national security: the decline of national sovereignty, unprecedented density increase of interaction at the transnational level and conflict explosion on the international scene, supported by the identity dynamics, where *globalization* amplifies the problems related to *security* to the extent when they transform into national concerns. Although all these findings allow us assuming some notorious changes within the framework of security policies' dynamics, nevertheless, from etymological point of view, the term "security" originates from Latin language, where *securitas*, -*atis* means "to be sheltered from any danger in correlation and with the existence of a feeling of *confidence* and peace which is induced by the lack of any threat". Currently, the specialized literature (Moștoflei; 2010:21) mentions two types of security: *hypothetical absence of danger* for person, society, state, and their real defense from such threats, as well as *the capacity to cope with threats*. The modality of security analysis points out two aspects in defining the given concept: *security for whom and against what (whom)?* The answer to the first question is determined by who is the security subject (state, person, etc.). The answer to the second question, referring to risks and threats, has a general and frequently subjective nature. Thus, to avoid the subjective approach to the threats to the national security, we should pay attention to three dimensions which are interdependent and potentiate reciprocally, and these are: vulnerability, risk, and threat.

*The risk* is tackled as a set of active or latent, noticeable or hidden pressures for which solutions were not found so as to determine the elimination of causes that have generated them and which do not affect national security if maintain within certain limits (Pigui 2004). As well, *risk* means a danger (hazard) whose occurrence may be, more or less, foreseeable (*Dictionnaire de la langue française*, 1988:1652).

The modern approach of the risk concept should pay attention to the opinions of some sociologists who consider that the present-day society is a "society of risk" (Beck, 2003; Ghiddens, 1995). It should be noted that *Ulrich Beck* imposes the notion of *risk society*, trying to argument that the "social production of richness is systematically correlated with the social production of risks" " (Beck, 2003) in the present-day society. Unlike the classical industrial society, we live today in a "reflexive modernity" when all the persons should have minimal knowledge about the risk. Hence, risk acquires universal spread; "the risk became the measure for our actions" because the "risk society transposes the future issues into present issues". *Ulrich Beck* says that although in the past the notion of *risk* had positive connotation and has the meaning of "courage and adventure", today it is associated with the *threat* for self-destruction of all life forms. The notion of threat emerges in the same analysis framework and it is considered to be a concept with a more serious impact than risk, meaning, in general, *a hostile action with the aim to intimidate*.

From the political science perspective, we can mention *Richard Ullmann's* definition which considers that a threat for security is "an action or a sequence of events which endanger seriously to produce the degradation of a state citizens' life within a relatively short period of time or represents a threat which cannot be ignored to the freedom to choose the policy of a government or a private entity, or nongovernmental entity from within a state" (Ullman 1983:153). At the same time, attention should be paid also to the fact that *threats are also the adversaries' most handy skills, which may be used to exploit vulnerabilities* (Puşcaş, 1999:55). Thus, there are clear distinctions between these two concepts (risks and threats), but the concept of *vulnerability* also emerges.

When analyzing from gradual point of view, we should, first of all, assess the vulnerabilities, as they *diminish the capacity of the respective country to react* to the existing or potential risks. After which, they should be compared as if they were a *catalyst of the active manifestation* of some risks and threats. The neglected vulnerabilities may get amplified, transforming themselves into risks, if they cannot get adjusted to prevention modalities and adequate and flexible actions. At their turn, the risks, under certain conditions, shift from the latent to the active condition, becoming threats for the national security environment. For instance, the countries which do not have energy resources are vulnerable in front of the countries which have such resources. But this vulnerability becomes a risk only when the country or the countries having energy resources enter into a conflict with the state or the states which need access to the respective resources. At its turn, this risk gets transformed into a real economic threat when different ways are used to restrain the access of a state or more states to the energy resources.

Hence, *vulnerabilities* represent processes or phenomena from the internal life, which diminish the reaction capacity to the existing or potential risks or which favor the appearance or development of such risks. Under the current conditions, the vulnerability, as a source of potential unwished effects on the national, zone, regional, and world security is perceived differently from country to country. This perception is determined mainly by: the level of economic development of the respective state; its military power (number of servicemen, modern armament – intelligent arms, nuclear arms, communication satellites, etc.); they way in which its fundamental interests are defined; the assumed role and the statute held in the respective zone, region, and world. All these make dissociation more difficult in a globalised environment where internal and external vulnerabilities may be generated and potentiated reciprocally.

In this context, we can mention the main internal vulnerabilities of the Republic of Moldova. First of all, it should be mentioned the lack of control from constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova over the eastern part of the country, and respectively over the Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan-Ukrainian state border in the context of the unsettled Transnistrian conflict. This vulnerability of the state induces risks and threats for regional security due to lack of control over production of military equipment and armament, which is under the control of the

secessionist regime, creating conditions for the transborder organized crime and illegal traffic of arms, drugs, and human beings. At the same time, the unilateral dependency of the Republic of Moldova on the foreign monopolist systems in the energy area is a major vulnerability, which may easily transform into a threat to national security. Secondly, the prolongation of the transition period may be considered to be a vulnerability of the state, which continues to produce unwished economic, financial, and social effects and to have an impact on the structural reforms. Thirdly, we should mention the economic discrepancies within society based on such grounds as migration, unemployment, population ageing, as well as the existence of underground economy which may provoke pressures in the society. Actually, the economic and social problems determine the reforms' lent rhythm. We can mention here the excessive bureaucracy combines with corruption phenomenon and with the deficit of management in the state administration. Fourthly, the vulnerabilities which represents the characteristic of a poorly developed country should be also mentioned: delay in developing information infrastructure and unsatisfactory use of information related to national interests; use of some obsolete technologies in the productive are which may actually damage people's health and lead to ecological catastrophes; as well as emigration of highly qualified specialists and weakening country's development potential.

In general, vulnerabilities may be assessed easier than threats, because there are different ways to perceive these two phenomena. As a rule, threats are "covered" by the political actors with a political-ideological burden which either exaggerates or minimizes the real level, according to the rules of the momentum political game. Moreover, the threat perception, if it is associated with fear or concern, undermines the rational capacity of the different social-political actors and paralyzes any attempt to formulate adequate policies. For the time being, no tools were discovered to assess operatively and rigorously the challenges for national security, so as dissociates among them the practices to be considered as "normal" and those that indeed related to the state. The second obstacle in assessing the threats emerges from determining the sufficient level of the threat which risks hitting the state's vital point. According to Barry Buzan, "the main factors that affect the intensity of the threats are: the specific nature of their identity, their geographical and space proximity, the probability for the threat to manifest itself, the burden of its consequences and its eventual amplification by the historical circumstances" (Buzan, 2000:19).

Thus, based on the above-mentioned realities, we can say that the current interdependency of the vulnerabilities, risks, and threats determine the conceptual framework of security and national security notions. That's why we should pay attention to the fact that the assessment of the threats which are induced or may be induced for the security of a state cannot occur according to a certain template or pattern, but get some rather complex forms as it is difficult to believe that nothing else will be added to the list of threats. When analyzing the threats which are manifested currently and/or in the near future, directly or indirectly, we can say that they are

internal, external or combined. These threats have become “chronic” for the Republic of Moldova as a consequence of the state’s internal vulnerability and lack of well-articulated political institutions in the national context. Nevertheless, the external threats remain to be a concern, as security or lack of security are defined in correlation with external and internal vulnerability which endangers or undermines the capacity to ensure the national security of a state. In this context, the author *Mohamed Ayooob*, when analyzing security from the perspective of the third world countries, supports the idea that although the internal crisis of a state may be considered to be a potential factor for destabilizing the security of the respective state, will depend on the space and temporal context so as to consider a specific situation to be a threat or not (Ghica and Zulean, 2007:8). For instance, the problem of disappearance of a strategic resource, such as petrol or water, may be vital for a country and may be considered to be a security problem, while in another state, this problem is not part of the threats induced to the national security.

In relation to this problem, when discussing about the difference among the developing and developed countries, the author asserts that there are at least two different visions about security which are structured by differentiation the international scene into the Northern part, the rich countries, and the Southern part, the poor countries. This distinction is problematic, but it is frequently used to illustrate the approximate division of the world into powerful agents and agents with no material capacities who want to support and protect the power. This differentiation is important, as the security concepts vary from one context to another. At the same time, Ayooob suggest a more restrained vision of security and comes back to the idea that security is determined by the internal solidarity of the states.

Coming to this end, attention should be paid to the fact that today when we talk about risks and threats for the national security, reference is made to “weak and strong states” (Buzan, 2000; Sava, 2005) or “small and big states” (Prohni chi, 2002; Toma, 2005). Barry Buzan considers that “the distinction between weak and strong states is essential for any analysis of national security” (Buzan, 2000). Weak and strong states – the level of social-political cohesion is taken into consideration; weak and strong powers – refer to the economic and military capacity. Such weak powers as Austria, Holland, and Norway are all strong states. While such important powers as Brazil, Pakistan, and Indonesia are considered to be weak states. The super-power from old times, USSR and today China are classified as weak states because of the social-political indicators.

In general, the weak states are considered to be the source of insecurity. *First of all*, there are weak states as a result of a dependency on a bigger power (for instance, the situation of the states from the Latin America, which are dependent on the United States or the CIS member states – which are dependent of the Russian Federation). *Secondly*, there are weak states, especially from the third world and the former USSR, within which the fundamental statehood elements (population, identity, territory, and institutional structure) are insufficiently or precariously defined [see: Table no. 1].

*Thirdly*, there are weak states among the countries which although have achieved a form of internal cohesion (usually through authoritarian political regimes) manifest themselves on the international plan as powerful sources of instability and insecurity (Northern Korea, Libya, Cuba). A common feature for all the weak states from any of the above-mentioned categories is the high level of internal risks, which anytime may transform into threats for the government, because the “weak states either do not have or did not succeed to come to a political and societal consensus of enough stability so as to eliminate the large-scale use of the force, as a major element and continuity in the nation’s political life” (Buzan, 2000).

When the state is strong, national security refers, especially, to the protection from external interferences, as it is considered that within the state the institutions operate in optimal way, the territory is well defined, and the mechanisms of power transfer do not endanger political stability. When the state is weak, security assurance refers to both: external and internal threats.

Actually, the analysis of risks and threats for the national security from the perspective of the “weak or powerful state” is part of a larger framework of discussions and namely the security of the “small or big state”. The adepts of the small states’ classification through the power perspective are the representatives of the political realism, for which the power is “the capacity to influence the decisions of other states”. Power is inherently associated with possession of human, natural, military rights, territory, economic potential, political stability, national cohesion, etc. If previously the small state was delimited only by geographical criteria (territory, population, presence of natural resources, etc.), today the technological development, educational system, and economic growth are the most important indicators of a state’s power, although the military factor also remains to be a very important factor (Prohni chi, 2002). The comparison between Sweden and Japan is relevant for this purpose. Although both countries differ considerably from territory point of view (Sweden - 450.000 km<sup>2</sup>, Japan - 372.200 km<sup>2</sup>), Japan is unanimously recognized as a big power, while Sweden is considered to be a small state. At the same time, both states have very big economic potential and both of them are able to ensure their own security, although through different approaches. Hence, it is the geographical localization and not the geographical size that counts for the security of small state. This comparison also points out another important aspect, and namely the fact that a small state is not mandatory also a weak state, although in reality, the majority of small states, including the Republic of Moldova are weak and very weak states (Hindmarsh, 1996).

Thus, when analyzing the nature of risks and threats to national security, it is important to pay attention also to the nature of the state - big or small and strong or weak. For us, the most relevant opinions are the ones that tend to dominate the thinking about small states’ security. First of all, the perspective of small states is analyzed from their survival point of view, which depends on what this state can do to ensure its security. From this point of view, it is important to pay attention to the state’s internal perspective, where the actions of the small states may have considerable impact on

their final fate. The long-term survival depends on the state's diplomacy quality, on finding correct policies, the best-thought direction and the "wisest" approach (Toma, 2005: 89). Thus, the conclusion may be drawn, that although the Republic of Moldova is a small state, this is not a justification for the external implications for the national security. In this analysis framework, internal risks' and threats' mitigation is the most important action.

Secondly, there is an opinion that the security of the small state is determined by external factors. In this respect, the policies of the big powers are considered to be determinant for the destiny of the small states, and previously we called this fact as *dependency*. But we also should pay attention in the framework also to the geopolitical perspective of the small states (Toma, 2005:90), as for the Republic of Moldova is vital to choose the development vector. At the same time, the evolution of the *geopolitical situation of the Republic of Moldova* influences the increase or the decrease of the risks to the national security, although in the globalization process context, *geopolitics* is frequently condemned to lack of actuality, when globalism should go beyond the geopolitical pressures (Bădălan, 2001; Le Matin, 1999). Nevertheless, we consider that the influence of the geopolitical space on the Republic of Moldova's security is a complex and important problem as for any other state. For Moldova, the process of choosing the geopolitical vector is very difficult in all the areas, but the historical development path of Moldova as European state is related to European integration. In Europe's new architecture, the place of the Republic of Moldova is determined by its location, as it is in the confluence of three political-geographical regions: Central Europe, South-Eastern Europe, and Eastern Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moldova did not interrupt its relations with the former soviet republics due to economic reasons, so as to keep the external sale markets and to ensure itself energy resources and raw material. Hence, choosing the vector for Moldova's integration with European Union or Russia depends on the geopolitical interests and orientations of these actors, as well as on the Republic of Moldova's dependency on external energy resources.

The approach to the problem related to the Republic of Moldova's integration into the European Union implies finding answers to a number of questions. Nevertheless attention should be paid to the fact that such problems as internal political stability, energetic and commercial policies, Transnistrian problem became more dependent on Russia's and Ukraine's behavior. At the same time, the western partners of the Republic of Moldova, which can influence the behavior of these countries, have to face more new challenges in world regions which are of a higher interest for them. This fact is determined also by Ukraine's role as a regional economic actor on whose territory the energetic ways towards Europe are located, while only one single gas pipeline crosses the territory of the Republic of Moldova [See: Map no. 1].

Ukraine's role within the regional security is immense. The geostrategic orientation of Ukraine is not constant, and the events which occurred in Ukraine tell us that we cannot rely on Ukraine's support when integrating in EU or joining NATO, or



even when settling the Transnistrian conflict. The problems related to the Republic of Moldova's properties on Ukraine's territory, borders' delimitation, the Giurgiulest terminal, and Palanca segment, but moreover the problems related to the impediments for transiting Moldovan goods through Ukraine's territory when exporting them to the SIC space have shown that Ukraine is not a safe partner. The geopolitical interests of Moldova and Ukraine do not have the same support and the same possibilities to continue promoting reforms and ensuring national security or counteracting the risks to national security.

But regardless of the above-mentioned situations, when we talk about the small and weak states' security, it is certain that internal risks and threats are maintained at a high risk nowadays; and internal risks induce alarmingly the external one, just like the global economic crisis, which started in 2007.

As a rule, crisis is tackled as an instable condition implying a sharp and significant imminent change. The academic environment defines "crisis", in general, during the discontinuity period, as a perturbation of stability within a social system, which implies threats for society's essential values (for instance, security, health, wellbeing). When referring to the current financial crisis, in general, it is considered that it reduces production, thus increasing unemployment, and as a result creating a negative social impact, and over a recovery period, production is the first one to revive, being followed by the situation with working places, and by the end the social assistance. Besides, there are solid proves from the East-European countries as well as from the states of the former Soviet Union showing that the increase of production over the last years was higher than the increase in number of jobs. A GDP growth was ascertained, but no recovery in employment area; on the contrary, there is a deficit of working places, concomitantly with the increase of the informal sector (Impact of Economic Crisis on Poverty and Social Exclusion in the Republic of Moldova, 2009).

For many Western European countries, this in essence captures more or less the whole picture regarding the crisis impact. Unfortunately, for many eastern European countries in general and for Moldova in particular, there is an additional element that has major economic and social implications – the issue of migration and remittances receipts (Impact of Economic Crisis on Poverty and Social Exclusion in the Republic of Moldova, 2009:7).

As economies turn down, migrants suffer. Many industries where migrants cluster (tourism in Ireland, financial services in Britain, construction in America and Spain) have shed jobs fast. Staying abroad does not seem to be an attractive prospect for many of them under the given circumstances, but returning home seems even gloomier, because there are limited or no job prospects back home either.

But government reactions to address the crisis and the job losses require resources and fiscal and political space and capacity for action. All three of these are limited due to the crisis and a number of additional challenges. We should mention here the experience of the European economic crisis from the '30 which showed how damaging it can be if the governments do not intervene when the rest of the economy

starts already a new expansion period. Although during that period of time, after the failure of the classical deflation means, the governments intervene to overcome the crisis (for instance: public work projects (USA, Germany), state's partnership in different enterprises or their socialization (England, France), credits for entrepreneurs and control of prices and salaries, etc.), nevertheless the dictatorship trends and international pressures impede the recovery of the works economy and national economies before the emergence of the second world war.

That's why, at this stage of economic crisis, besides determining the contamination channels and crisis impact on national security (taking into account the economic, political, social, cultural, and other dimensions) of the Republic of Moldova, it is important to develop and implement adequate policies. For instance, it is necessary to have better communication between the government and the companies which wait for a clearer help from the government. On the other hand, the companies from Moldova will have to exploit new economic growth factors in future.

As a rule, the main policy recommendations are addressed to the government, because the maneuver area for the institutions affected by the crisis is rather limited. It is already too late to combat the crisis with fiscal instruments. The government should urgently eliminate the institutional and internal structural barriers that affect the demand and the offer in economy. The re-launch of Moldova economy implies, first of all, the recovery of the confidence for the government and recuperation of access to external and internal markets for all economy sectors (Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Local Communities in Moldova, 2009).

As the economic growth of the Republic of Moldova depends on migrants' remittances and will remain dependent on them, in short term, it is important to facilitate the international mobility of the labor force, instead of constraining it. This measure is necessary in short term so as to regain consumers' trust, while for long term, the economic growth should be based on more investments for job creation. That's why we should not perceive *crisis as a tough economic period, but also as an opportunity to tackle radically the main weak points of the economy*. Hence, when tackled from systemic perspective, the systemic crisis a society goes through is not only a moment of truth, but also an opportunity to learn the lesson of the life, to draw some conclusions, and to undertake supported efforts so as to shift to a new development level. In such circumstances, which are not simple at all, fundamental concepts may be formulated, from which an adequate strategy should derive for getting out of the crisis, developing the country, consolidating the internal cohesion and identity of the nation.

In this context, it should be noted the narrower vision on security expressed by Ayoob, who comes back to the idea that security is determined by the states' internal solidity, confirmed by the *globalist paradigm of security*, for which the "security" concept is very close in meaning with "stability". Internal stability is defined as integrity of the political system; promotion of democratic norms, including the regulate

rotation of governing elites; absence of ethnic and social conflicts; a healthy economy which functions normally.

The dangers and threats for the national security of the Republic of Moldova represent, to a big extent, the direct and indirect consequences of the USSR collapse, but the picture of insecurity sources is subject to its own dynamics, with an essential role going to including Moldova in one of the security schemes valid in the context of European integration process. Thus, there is a close interaction and a solid interdependency between the external and internal factors, which are even more obvious in globalization conditions. In case of the weak states, such as the Republic of Moldova, the three main principles which may reduce security threats are: democracy, good governance, and law supremacy.

**Table no. 1. The main conditions for defining weak states**

<b>Conditions</b>	<b>States</b>
1. Manifested political violence	Afghanistan, Iraq, Cote d'Ivoire, Somalia
2. Repressive actions of the political police	Belarus, Russia, China, North Korea, Ukraine
3. Manifested political conflict between different groups, inspired from conflict ideologies related to the ideology which is wished for organizing the state	Peru, Turkey, Iran, Salvador
4. Lack of common national identity and/or presence of some national groups (minorities) with competitive political objectives	Sudan, former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka
5. Lack of recognized political authority	Lebanon, Uganda, Bosnia-Herzegovina
6. Absorption of the civil society by the state, through control of association forms, control over media, elimination of alternative groups	Russia, China, Iran

Map no. 1. Major pipelines of oil and gas from Russian Federation towards Europe



Source: [www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/images](http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/images)

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